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“Set against one of the most horrible atrocities of the early 
twentieth century, the ethnic cleansing of Western Anatolia 
and the burning of the city of Izmir, Smyrna’s Ashes is an 
important contribution to our understanding of how hu-
manitarian thinking shaped British foreign and military 
policy in the Late Ottoman Eastern Mediterranean. Based 
on rigorous archival research and scholarship, well written, 
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the history of human rights.” kEitH dAvid wAtEnpAuGH, University of California, Davis
“Tusan shows vividly and compassionately how Britain’s attempt to build a ‘Near East’ in 
its own image upon the ruins of the Ottoman Empire served as a prelude to today’s Middle 
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A Note on Maps
“Smyrna’s Wall of Humanity.” George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of 
Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LC-B2-5851 – 11 [P&P].
1As the last fires smoldered in Smyrna at the end of September 1922, the 
300,000 refugees left homeless sat on the pier under the watchful eye of 
the Turkish military. Waiting for Allied humanitarian transport ships 
that would take them away from the city burned to the ground by Turkish 
nationalists, a shout went up: “Long live Mustafa Kemal Pasha, long live!” 
One refugee remembered thinking as he joined in the cry, “Yes, long live 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha. We will be forever grateful to him for what he has 
done: after butchering thousands of Christians, after robbing and ruin-
ing this rich city, he has subjected hundreds of thousands of people to an 
untold misery. Yes, long may he live.”1
Out of the ashes of Smyrna came a new city, Izmir, and a new Turkish 
nation. One year after Smyrna burned the Allies and Turkey divided the 
spoils at Lausanne. In the 1923 treaty that marked the end of World War I a 
vision of a Muslim East — the product of state-sponsored genocide, nation-
alist ideals, and Western imaginings — came to fruition in an agreement 
that uprooted 400,000 Muslims and 1.2 million Orthodox Christians.2 
The Ottoman Empire’s attempt to rid Anatolia of its Christian minorities, 
legitimized by the Allies in the population exchange mandated by the 
Lausanne Treaty that moved Ottoman Christians to Greece and Greek 
Muslims to Turkey, confirmed a vision of a Muslim East divided from a 
Christian West. “I recognize Mitilini which I had visited ten years earlier 
when the island was still under Turkish rule and when the governor was 
Faik Ali Bey, my poet friend who was Kurdish by origin and a great friend 
of the Armenians,” Garabed Hatcherian recalled after disembarking in 
Greece as a penniless refugee. He understood that times had changed. 
“Involuntarily, we settle down in Mitilini even though we know it is not 
an appropriate place for us.”3 Here in a newly reconstructed East the lines 
Introduction
2    /    Introduction
between Muslims and Christians were starkly drawn in a way that seem-
ingly only made sense to Lausanne’s mapmakers.
Today the West tends to understand the Middle East primarily in 
terms of geopolitics: Islam, oil, and nuclear weapons. But during in the 
nineteenth century, this place was conceived of differently. The story of 
Smyrna suggests that the interplay of geography and politics found defi-
nition in a broader set of concerns that included humanitarian and reli-
gious questions. This book reevaluates these considerations as part of a 
series of debates that defined Western proprietary interests in the Eastern 
Question. The “shifting, intractable and interwoven tangle of conflicting 
interests, rival peoples and antagonistic faiths,” as the British journalist 
and politician John Morley called it, made the Eastern Question one of 
the most pressing humanitarian problems of his generation.
This history of the Eastern Question explains how the Middle East 
emerged as a site of politics through a competing set of military and 
humanitarian interventions that pulled the region into the moral sphere of 
British imperial interests. News of atrocities committed against minority 
populations in the Ottoman Empire started to filter back to Britain in the 
late nineteenth century and helped construct a liberal democratic ethos 
that cast humanitarianism as part of its political mandate. Reformers, 
politicians, and missionaries cultivated a sustained interest in campaigns 
that raised awareness and funds intended to stop crimes against civil-
ian populations including the 1876 atrocities against the Bulgarians, the 
Ottoman massacres of the mid-1890s, the 1915 Armenian Genocide, and 
the burning of Smyrna in 1922. The impulse to aid distressed minority 
populations remained a problematic legacy of these encounters as it came 
up against the seemingly insurmountable realities of Total War that cul-
minated in the tragedy at Smyrna.
In this context, the Eastern Question offered new ways of seeing the 
East. Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, the East came to hold a 
central place in both the imperial and cultural imagination as a Christian 
borderland. Religion worked in tandem with geography and politics to 
draw the land of the Ottoman Empire and its Christian populations 
closer to Europe. The British were the first to use the term “Near East,” 
a designation that suggested an intimacy that went beyond mere geo-
graphic association. The notion of a “Middle East” necessarily relied on 
first securing a conception of the East as divided into “Near” and “Far” 
regions. The latter, a product of the seventeenth century, found its com-
plement in the invention during the 1850s of a Near East situated between 
the Balkans and Persia.
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The idea of the Middle East came almost half a century later. The jour-
nalist and Foreign Office operative Valentine Chirol put the Middle East 
in an imperial context soon after the American Captain Alfred Thayer 
Mahan made use of the term in 1902. “The Middle Eastern Question,” 
Chirol declared in the London Times, was merely “a continuation of the 
same question with which we have long been familiar in the Near East.” 
This question of the East encompassed what he called the “moral, com-
mercial and military” commitments of the British Empire.4 Over the 
course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the contest over 
the Eastern Question came to determine imperial claims and humanitar-
ian commitments in a place Britons would first refer to as the Near and, 
later, Middle East.
To understand the birth of the Middle East in Western thinking this 
book focuses on the geographical idea that preceded it: the Near East. 
Britain certainly was not alone in this project of mapping the Ottoman 
Empire as adjacent to Europe. France and Germany also had their own 
ways of understanding the region. Although the German and French con-
ceptions of the Ottoman Empire are beyond the scope of this study, it is 
important to note that Germany’s Naher Osten and France’s Proche Orient 
were inventions of the post – World War I period. Terms like the Levant 
in the French case and Orient in the German broadly encompassed the 
region the British had claimed as their Near East.5 These broad concep-
tions divided the world in terms of Occident and Orient, with little dis-
tinction made between the Ottoman Empire, India, and China. The early 
organization of the East in terms of Near, Middle, and Far proved for the 
British a means of linguistically marking claims to the Ottoman Empire.
Such conceptual nearness had particular resonance due to imperial 
ambitions in the Far East. The hold on India made these lands particu-
larly important as a gateway to its eastern empire. One of the things that 
reassured Britain in staking its claim in the Near East was an imagined 
kinship with Eastern Christians, who many believed shared a com-
mon origin with Anglican Protestantism. The opposition of Eastern 
Orthodoxy to Rome secured these connections by forging a sense of 
solidarity against a Catholic other. Pulling these regions closer to the 
British sphere of influence relied on ethnographic and religious associa-
tions with the land and particularly the people that made these connec-
tions tangible. Though little enthusiasm existed to formally incorporate 
the Balkans, Anatolia, and Persia into the British Empire, arguments 
for informal control over internal Ottoman affairs grew louder after the 
Crimean War ended in 1856. Attempts to strengthen the hold over this 
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region after the 1850s included offering humanitarian aid, mapping the 
region, and increasing the presence of diplomatic officials.6
An obsession with the Ottoman Empire as both the cradle of civili-
zation and Holy Land gave heightened meaning to these interventions.7 
During the second half of the nineteenth century Britain set out on an 
ambitious project to survey, map, and expand its diplomatic footprint in 
the Ottoman Empire. As James Scott has observed, acts of mapping pre-
suppose particular modes of knowing.8 In the case of the British, know-
ing the East entailed defining not only where it was but who lived there. 
The rise of the discipline of ethnography, a means of classifying groups 
based on ethnic and religious origins, provided a point of entry into this 
world. This science of society starting in the 1850s divided the Near East 
between Orthodox Christians and Muslims, a cosmography that remains 
an important legacy of the Victorian period. Missionaries also began 
to see the region as fertile ground to spread their message among the 
Christian minority populations, mainly Greek, Bulgarian, Assyrian, and 
Armenian.9 By the late nineteenth century a mission had been launched 
to convert Muslims.10 This conception of the Ottoman Empire in terms 
of religious ethnography helped revive interest in the Near East as the 
birthplace of Christianity. The embrace of the emerging field of bibli-
cal archeology further secured the Holy Land as a place of religious and 
scientific exploration.11
Casting the East solely in terms of geopolitics thus would have seemed 
strange to Victorians like Morley and Chirol. For them, the idea of the 
Middle East found expression in the shifting geography of the Eastern 
Question, which called into existence an East that was both territorially 
vague and conceptually specific. At stake was more than a contest over 
claiming space for the British Empire on a map. The Holy Land, considered 
the historic site of Christianity, animated contemporary thinking and led 
to the embrace of the plight of Eastern Orthodox Christians as an ancient 
peoples persecuted by a despotic state. The crises that preceded the 1878 
Russo-Turkish War and culminated with Smyrna’s destruction in 1922 
cast geopolitical concerns in terms of a humanitarian responsibility to vic-
tims and served to articulate a vision of a moral and just British Empire. 
The new post – World War I map that unevenly divided the world between 
Christian and Muslim was in part a product of such cultural imaginings.
liBeraliSM’S huManiTarian conScience
The understanding of an East divided by ethnic and religious strife 
took root in a culture of diplomacy that made foreign policy a matter of 
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conscience. Moral, humanitarian, and religious preoccupations with the 
Ottoman Empire played an important role in defining a liberal vision of 
Britain in the world. This notion came to prominence under the lead-
ership of W. E. Gladstone in his highly publicized campaigns against 
Ottoman atrocities during the last third of the nineteenth century.12 A 
radical moralizing diplomacy offered new focus to the Eastern Ques-
tion as the problem of the declining Ottoman Empire’s treatment of 
Christian minorities. Although most closely connected to Gladstonian 
Liberal Party politics this idea found its broadest expression in a valori-
zation of a shared belief in British liberty that defended freedom against 
tyranny. A sense of national identity rooted in notions of liberation 
clearly belied the exploitive nature of Britain’s own empire. Pledges to 
defend subject peoples against foreign despotism, particularly in the 
Near East, resulted in part from the rise of a free, popular press starting 
in the 1850s that offered the public access to information on interna-
tional affairs. This, coupled with mid-nineteenth-century evangelical 
religious revivalism, helped construct humanitarianism as a shared 
Protestant value.
The humanitarian voice of liberalism cast the Eastern Question as a 
national moral crisis that required a political solution born out of British 
leadership. As the public embraced the notion that the British Empire 
had a special responsibility to aid persecuted minorities, others worried 
about the effect intervention into Ottoman domestic affairs would have 
on imperial prestige. This raised the larger question of whether or not 
foreign policy should be used to resolve humanitarian abuses abroad 
creating a potential disconnect between high politics and the larger body 
politic. The humanitarian ethos that animated interest in Christian 
minorities also found expression in other campaigns against slavery 
and the exploitation of laborers in Africa.13 Atrocities committed against 
civilians in the Near East powerfully directed this impulse towards a 
place of strategic and commercial importance and among a people con-
sidered akin to Europe for the first time. At the heart of this story came 
first of the plight of the Bulgarian and later the Armenian, Greek and 
Assyrian peoples.
The Eastern Question posed in terms of intervention on behalf of 
these subject minorities unfolded in three phases. The first placed the 
Bulgarians at the center of the story. Popular interest in Christian 
minorities emerged soon after the Crimean War thanks in part to press 
coverage that focused attention on both the conflict itself and Ottoman 
minorities. Orthodox Christianity, the faith of the great majority of this 
population, had captured the imagination early on of High Churchmen 
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like Gladstone, who cast humanitarianism as a moral and religious cru-
sade.14 The claim that Orthodox Christians represented an authentic 
Christianity from which all churches derived began to hold sway thanks 
in part to the campaign he waged on behalf of persecuted Bulgarians in 
the 1870s. The firestorm at home over the so-called Bulgarian Atrocities 
put diplomatic pressure on treaty negotiations after the Russo-Turkish 
War to support some protection for minority populations, for which 
Britain agreed to take responsibility to enforce. After the Treaty of Berlin 
that ended this war created a Bulgarian state in 1878, public interest in 
the Eastern Question shifted farther east to the Armenians, Assyrians, 
and Greeks living in Anatolia.15 Armenians dominated the territory in 
Eastern Anatolia, today part of modern Turkey, making them the largest 
Christian minority in the empire after Bulgaria ceased to be an Ottoman 
territory at the end of the 1870s.
This second phase began with pledges to revive the culture of a people 
who shared a distant religious and cultural past with the British. Some, 
like Lord Curzon and the Church Missionary Society, placed Muslims 
(who they referred to as Aryan relatives) in this trajectory. However, it 
was the persecution of Christian minorities that continued to capture the 
public imagination. The events of the Armenian massacres of the mid-
1890s and 1909 and the Genocide of 1915 put Armenians at the center of 
the story through World War I. Called “the oldest of the civilized races 
in Western Asia” by the historian Arnold Toynbee, Armenia viewed 
through this lens held special status as “the first state in the world to 
adopt Christianity as its national religion.”16 Renewed interest in the 
plight of Greeks and Assyrians that culminated with the burning of 
Smyrna after the Armenian Genocide and mass displacement of hun-
dreds of thousands of Assyrians during the war, resulted in advocacy 
efforts that considered the plight of Armenians alongside these other 
groups. In this final phase of the Eastern Question Greeks and Assyrians 
joined the considerations of Armenians as oppressed minorities worthy 
of sympathy and material support.
After World War I, this humanitarian vision of the Near East lost its 
purchase. Historians have suggested that political pragmatism coupled 
with an exhausted and war-weary electorate spelled the end of a vision 
that had shaped Britain’s encounter with the Near East for over seventy-
five years. Yet this explains only part of the story of diminishing interest 
in victims of massacre and genocide in the Near East. The debate over 
the Eastern Question gave us a modern understanding of the state as a 
moral actor. At the same time, as the ground began to shift after World 
Introduction   /    7
War I, a region once considered near moved farther east in British col-
lective imaginings, reducing the possibility of compassion for victims 
of wartime atrocities. The complete disappearance of a once widespread 
Christian community, the result of massacre, state-sponsored genocide, 
and Lausanne Treaty mandates, severed an important historical connec-
tion with the region. As this population scattered as a widening diaspora 
spanning from Persia to Europe to the United States, so too did the focus 
of a humanitarian ideal that once championed its cause. Such a reading 
calls into question the notion that a disinterested abstract universalism 
determined the shape of early humanitarian intervention.17 Although the 
culture of humanitarianism remained, the possibility of empathy with 
human suffering diminished in a new Middle East where interest in oil 
and exploitable resources forged other ties.
The legacy of the Eastern Question gave shape to a humanitarian ethos 
informed by both the material and geopolitical, which later would influ-
ence human rights campaigns into the twenty-first century. Today, we 
accept humanitarian considerations as a companion to foreign policy con-
cerns, from peacekeeping missions to rebuilding infrastructure for former 
enemies after military victory. The idea that a state or international body 
has an obligation to act on behalf of a universal set of humanitarian prin-
ciples continues to animate contemporary foreign policy debates.18 This 
story of the Eastern Question serves as a reminder that calls for a moral 
foreign policy did not always exist in their current form but rather as a set 
of contingent historical relationships. Such configurations have as much 
to do with material representations of the place and the people at the cen-
ter of concern as they do with ideological commitments. How a humani-
tarian standard is applied to particular groups at particular moments then 
requires historical explanation.
The Middle eaST aS BriTiSh hiSTory
The study of how the West represents and engages the Middle East has 
shaped recent work in British history. Drawing largely upon methods 
from cultural history, historians have interrogated the perceptions of 
missionaries, writers, and travelers in an attempt to explain the nature 
of Western hegemony in this region.19 Diplomatic historians have taken 
a different approach rooted in an older tradition, analyzing the successes 
and failures of missions to the region by consuls, diplomats, and other 
high-ranking officials to understand the nature of military conflicts and 
treaty negotiations with the so-called Sick Man of Europe.20
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This volume brings these literatures together by providing a cultural 
history of diplomacy and the Eastern Question. It explores what hap-
pened in the space between political expediency and the humanitarian 
ideal, how foreign policy handled the question of conscience. Debates 
within the press reveal a divided policy on the Near East, with one side 
supporting direct intervention on behalf of Christian minorities and 
the other taking a more pragmatic view when news of atrocities against 
civilians came to light. At the same time, the stories of missionaries, 
aid organizations, and military and diplomatic consuls told in this book 
offered very real points of contact, identification, and association with 
the region’s people. These encounters shaped a discourse that understood 
the Near East as a site of political engagement from both a strategic and 
humanitarian perspective.
In the attempt to bring the east nearer, Victorians created a Muslim 
and Christian typology that belied easy categorization. Many of the ways 
the British characterized both Muslims and Christians during the nine-
teenth century fall into the worst orientalist stereotypes.21 My intention 
in analyzing these racialized dichotomies is to offer another way of see-
ing how orientalism worked to ossify characterizations of religious dif-
ference. Metaphors of Orthodox and Aryan kinship worked discursively 
to render familiar peoples of the Ottoman Empire through narratives of 
kinship. At the same time, notions of a “barbarous” Muslim other distin-
guished Christian populations as a unique charge of Protestant Britain. 
How these notions were mobilized to understand and de-orientalize 
Ottoman Christian minorities remains a central part of this history of 
discursive invention.
“Smyrna’s Ashes” also builds upon the recent work on humanitarian-
ism in the United States and Europe particularly as it relates to Ottoman 
atrocities and genocide. Attempting to tell the stories of victims of 
humanitarian disasters can be problematic when viewed through the 
perspective of aid workers, missionaries, and public officials. However 
inadequately, I hope to have left space on the page to read these narratives 
as more than representations of someone else’s suffering. This is a story 
I wanted to tell. My grandmother was born in the Ottoman Empire. As a 
member of the large minority Christian population massacred before and 
during the war she understood the Eastern Question personally. When 
I asked Grandma Vicky years ago where she got her Anglo-sounding 
name she replied, “During the turn of the last century, every Armenian 
family had a girl called Victoria.” My memory of the Alberts, Richards, 
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Williams, and Marys of that generation who once called themselves 
Ottoman subjects serve as a reminder of the extent of Britain’s reach 
into the villages devastated by war and genocide in the heart of eastern 
Anatolia. In this small way, the story of British intervention in the Near 
East is part of my own.
10
“The ground on which we stand here is not British nor European, but it is 
human. Nothing narrower than humanity could pretend justly to repre-
sent it,” declared W. E. Gladstone to a cheering crowd of 6,000 supporters 
at an overflow town meeting convened by the Lord Mayor in September 
1896 in Hengler’s Circus, Liverpool. The occasion of what would prove 
Gladstone’s last great public speech was a rally to protest the massacre of 
Ottoman Armenians. Dubbed a “humanitarian crusade” by the Times, the 
former Prime Minister asked his listeners to act on behalf of a common 
set of values that had come to define popular discourse on the Eastern 
Question.1 All across the country in late September public officials, relief 
groups, and religious organizations held dozens of meetings and passed 
resolutions in support of a “national movement” and “unified action” to 
force the government to do something to stop the two-year campaign of 
violence under Sultan Abdul Hamid II that would leave some 200,000 
dead.2
When Gladstone came out of retirement to rally the Armenian cause 
in 1896 he drew upon a decades-long discourse that posited a moral 
obligation to minority Christians. Indeed, he was a key architect of 
the liberal humanitarian ideal that found voice during the “Bulgarian 
Atrocities” controversy of the mid-1870s. Gladstone strongly condemned 
war crimes committed by the Ottoman military against Bulgarian sub-
jects on the eve of the 1878 Russo-Turkish War. This event had shocked 
the nation and solicited an outpouring of sympathy for Bulgarian victims 
while precipitating the ascent of the Liberal Party to power in 1880. By 
the time of the Armenian massacres, the public had grown accustomed to 
narratives of suffering among Ottoman Christian minorities in the press, 
in political debates, and from new organizations that lobbied for human 
1.  Humanitarianism and the Rise 
of the Eastern Question
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rights. While some favored diplomacy, others argued for direct military 
action on behalf of victims. The Armenian controversy prompted a crisis 
of leadership in the Liberal Party when in early October 1896 then party 
leader, Lord Rosebery, resigned due to “some conflict of opinion with Mr. 
Gladstone” over the Eastern Question.3
The high political drama of the Eastern Question extended beyond 
determining the fortunes of the Liberal Party. As the timing and recep-
tion of Gladstone’s speech suggests, over the course of the last third of 
the nineteenth century humanitarianism had found a populist voice 
under the leadership of the former Prime Minister. This chapter tells 
the story of how this liberal humanitarian ethos took hold in Victorian 
Britain through an engagement with the Eastern Question. Why would 
news of massacres that happened so many miles away prompt a populist 
humanitarian response and make foreign policy considerations a mat-
ter of public debate? Such a convergence did not happen everywhere or 
completely. In Germany, news of the persecution of minority Bulgarian, 
Armenian, Greek and Assyrian populations during this period solicited 
an entirely different response. German public opinion sided not with 
Christians but the Muslim elite.4 In Britain, an important part of the 
story of the Eastern Question was humanitarian. This prompted its own 
counternarrative that such concerns amounted to unrealistic moralizing 
in foreign policy. Then Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli’s scornful dis-
missal of the Bulgarian Atrocities agitation as “coffee house babble” had 
its complement in his characterization of Gladstone’s emotive leadership 
on the issue. “Humanitarian politicians,” Disraeli asserted to a crowd of 
supporters, “do not always look before they leap.”5
Though critics contested the championing of minority causes in the 
Ottoman Empire as sentimental politics, it was the very appeal to human 
sympathy for a group that many had come to see as representative of 
British moral and religious values that gave the narrative its purchase. 
Contributors to this narrative included radical and liberal politicians, 
journalists, secular and religious advocacy groups, and feminist activ-
ists. This diversity gave British humanitarianism its particular character, 
moving between a discourse of obligation to fellow Christians to a broader 
language of imperial and moral duty. That these early crusades favored 
Christian minorities over other needy subjects tells us something impor-
tant about why this humanitarian ethos took such powerful hold around 
the Eastern Question. As different constituencies appropriated the cause 
as their own, the campaign came to define itself as much by what it was 
not as by what it was. “This is no crusade against Mahommedanism,” 
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Gladstone admonished the crowd in Liverpool. Rather, it favored inter-
vention on behalf of a particular oppressed minority. Liberalism’s human-
itarian conscience needed a clear corollary in order to forge an intimacy 
that motivated action.6 During the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the nearness of fellow Christians represented as sharing a common set 
of values and religious origin inspired this association. This connection 
formed gradually in the wake of the Crimean War as humanitarian and 
imperial interests converged in a place Victorians came to know as the 
Near East. By the turn of the century debates over the Eastern Question 
provided the region with its geographical and ideological boundaries by 
creating a portrait of a people living in a not too distant land with ties to 
an imagined British past.
The BirTh oF The near eaST
In November 1856, Fraser’s Magazine, a progressively minded periodical 
of religion and politics, coined the term “Near East” by describing it as the 
land “for the integrity of which we went to war with Russia.”7 That year 
Britain had just finished fighting the Crimean War (1854 – 1856) alongside 
her European allies to check Russian ambition and establish a more for-
mal influence over the Sublime Porte, the seat of Ottoman government in 
Constantinople. Called “the people’s war” by the Times, it marked the first 
military conflict that had widespread coverage in the media.8 The war 
captured the attention of the public as politicians and pundits began to 
ask how Britain would further secure its status as the reigning European 
power in the region. The first step would be to define the Near East itself.
The post-Crimea moment offered the Near East its early geography 
as a place close to Europe. Drawing the East “near” afforded an opportu-
nity to make a clearer taxonomy of the notion of the Levant, a catchall 
category that generally described the “countries of the East.”9 Fraser’s 
argued that the newly won influence over the sultan and his territories 
in the Near East should translate into improving British routes to India 
via the Ottoman Empire. Here the advantages of closer connections 
related to the proposal to build the Euphrates Valley Railroad joining 
the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. The railway “carried through the 
heart of Asiatic Turkey, and touching close upon the confines of Persia, 
may at some future period exert a vast influence on the civilization of the 
Near East, and that it will recreate and become the channel of commerce 
renowned in antiquity, but of which at this day faint traces remain.”10 In 
other words, closer economic ties would advance civilization by reviving 
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a lost relationship between East and West while facilitating better trade 
with the East. An unbroken rail line across the desert would secure this 
connection and map new efficiencies over less reliable caravan routes.
Fraser’s choice of “Near East” to describe parts of the Ottoman Empire 
at this time is important. First, the term is defined in “contradistinction” 
to the Far East, a huge category that included China, Australia, Japan, and 
India and whose usage dated to the seventeenth century. Both regions 
relied on the existence of the other for their definitional and geographic 
integrity. Ultimately, the ability to engage in commerce united the “Near” 
and “Far” parts of the East in this worldview: “the whole of the Far East is, 
as it were, opening to us. The idea has been abandoned that the Eastern 
trade must be limited to gold, ivory, spices and dyeing stuffs, silk, tea, 
coffee, rice and tobacco. Cotton is expected from India, and Australian 
wool has wrought the almost utter confusion of the sheep of Germany 
and Spain.”11 These lines conjured up the image of an economy reliant 
on imperial trade networks and foreign products. Closer ties with the 
“Far” regions of the British Empire made the East seem closer through a 
geographical sleight of hand that rhetorically incorporated the Ottoman 
Empire into its imperial network. In this way, the Near East provided a 
literal and metaphoric gateway to Britain’s Far East.
Second, this new nomenclature emerged as a means of defining the 
indefinable: a region with porous borders that resisted easy to decipher 
geographical boundaries. For the British, the Near East gradually super-
seded both more specific labels like “Turkey in Europe” and general ones 
like the “Levant” on maps and in prose descriptions of the region. This 
meant that the Near East could include the Balkans, Asia Minor, and 
parts of Arabia, depending on the preoccupations of writers and map-
makers. Fraser’s neologism accommodated the inclusion of all of these 
regions from Crimea to Persia. By describing the Euphrates Railroad as a 
project that cut through the “heart of Asiatic Turkey, and touch[ed] close 
upon the confines of Persia,” the Near East spanned both the Western 
and parts of the Eastern Ottoman Empire. Building a railroad through 
“Asiatic Turkey” was understood as a way to exercise both economic and 
cultural influence over an amorphous region conceptually bounded by its 
changing relationship to the British Empire. Simply put, the finance and 
control of such a route would indelibly mark it as British.
Questions over the future success and security of the Suez Canal 
provided another important context for the emergence of the Near East 
as a discursive category. Egypt existed on the margins of British under-
standings of the Near East. Although nominally under the control of the 
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sultan, Egypt maintained a problematic semicolonial relationship with 
Britain. These concerns over Suez made the possibility of an overland 
route, even one considered more risky and expensive, a secure alterna-
tive especially if Britain could exercise greater control over the Sublime 
Porte after the Crimean War. In the end, even after the opening of the 
Canal in 1869 proved an effective trade route to India and Egypt fell more 
securely within the purview of the Empire after 1882, the British helped 
finance the building of the Anatolian Railway, which connected Eastern 
parts of Asia Minor with Europe.12 Only after German plans to take over 
the financing and building of the southern route, the so-called Baghdad 
Railroad, sparked public outrage in Britain in 1903 did these plans for an 
overland route fade.13
Understandings of the Near East further drew upon notions of the 
region as the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of Christianity, or 
the “Holy Land.” Critics maintained that the end of the Crimean War 
offered a new opportunity for the West to reconnect with its ancient past 
in the East. “Since the 17th century there has been but little direct inter-
course between the Orthodox East and the Protestant West,” wrote the 
Edinburgh Review in 1858, “but the great events of the last few years, 
which have opened for England such a career in the East, cannot fail to 
bring the subject very prominently before every one who pays real atten-
tion to such matters.” Anglicanism could now rejoin Eastern Orthodox 
Christianity in its birthplace: “A noble opportunity now presents itself in 
the memorial church about to be erected at Constantinople. That monu-
ment to the brave men who died in the late war ought to become a centre, 
not of proselytism, but of friendly intercourse with the members of the 
ancient churches of the East. There they ought to behold a communion, 
united with them in opposition to Roman corruptions and usurpations.” 
This new Anglican Church, “assigned a conspicuous site upon the hills 
with crown the Bosphorus,” was built as a war memorial to the British 
efforts in Crimea to represent “a trophy of our heroism and our faith.”14 A 
monument to Christianity, the church promised to connect Orthodoxy 
with Anglicanism against the “Roman corruptions” of Catholicism in a 
prominent and unmistakable way. For Anglican missionaries, victory in 
Crimea opened up similar opportunities that included restarting a previ-
ously abandoned Church Missionary Society project in 1858 focused on 
reviving the Eastern Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire.
These symbols of Anglican and Eastern Orthodox unity reinforced a 
sense of common cause in the Holy Land. New technologies would has-
ten the reuniting of Eastern and Western Christendom in a more material 
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way, according to one critic in an article on the Eastern Orthodox Church: 
“Civilizing agencies are now wielded by European nations . . . The press 
itself, long the great instrument of human advancement, is transcended in 
its effects and invested with wider and more immediate influences, by the 
railway, the telegraphic wire, and the photographic process. These mar-
velous powers are spreading themselves gradually over the whole earth, 
and marking out the lines of future conquest. There are yet vast spaces 
to be reclaimed to civilization and Christianity in every quarter of the 
globe.”15 The notion that development went hand in hand with Christian 
civilization strengthened proprietary claims. Fraser’s had argued on the 
eve of the Crimean War that Britain had a responsibility to not let the 
region fall under the influence of Orthodox Russia, which considered 
itself the natural defender of Ottoman Christians: “the climate is mild, 
the soil wonderfully fertile, and under a good government and with years 
of peace, these provinces would probably be unsurpassed in Europe for 
wealth and prosperity. At present they bear only the marks of the hard 
lot to which their position between Europe and Asiatic invaders has for 
centuries past reduced them; ill cultivated, half peopled, half civilized 
with few towns and scarcely anything that can be called a road.”16 British-
led reform and development schemes would revive a Christian East by 
solving the political and material causes of underdevelopment.
In this line of thinking, forging more intimate connection with 
Ottoman Christian minorities would bolster trade while effectively chal-
lenging “Asiatic invaders,” which included the Russians. Britain’s future 
ties with the Near East, as a debate in Parliament during the Crimean 
War concluded, rested not in its Muslim rulers or Jewish minorities but 
in supporting the Ottoman Empire’s commercially minded Christian 
races: “the system of the Porte, bad and corrupt as it may be in many 
ways, has yet been found compatible with the rise of a rich and increas-
ing commerce. That commerce is almost exclusively in the hands of its 
Christian subjects.” Accordingly, “Their gradual improvement and amal-
gamation in the course of time” would offer both “the peaceful solution 
of a question, of which the very prospect has long perplexed the world” 
while securing British predominance. The British also cast the Jews as 
having a proclivity towards trade during this time.17 However, the pre-
dominance of Christian minorities particularly along the rural trade 
routes that followed the proposed Anatolian Railway singled out this 
population for attention. As the debate concluded, support for Ottoman 
Christians would ensure that “No one Power will be allowed to steal or to 
force a march on the capital of the East.”18
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Conceptions of Orthodox Christians bound by geopolitical and cul-
tural ties to the Empire continued to animate thinking after the war in 
this newly minted Near East. Some writers went as far as to push for 
greater recognition of religious connections between commercially 
minded Christian races and the British: “It is strange that a nation like 
England, in whose inner life religion plays so important a part should be 
slower than almost any of the Continental nations to recognize the all-
important influence of the religion professed by a people upon its institu-
tions and character.” This line of argument aligned British interests with 
support of the civil emancipation of Christians: “No country ever thrives 
on the strength of natural resources without industry, knowledge, equal 
laws, respect for personal rights and security for property – things of 
which a genuine Mussulman would never so much as dream. Hence 
their commerce is carried on by foreigners; their land, once tilled by 
serfs, remains waste and passes into the hands of bitter internal enemies; 
the master’s share of the produce is virtually not rent but tribute.”19 The 
answer: forcing the Ottoman Empire to reform its legal and tax system 
to favor those mainly Christian minority populations carrying on trade 
in the cradle of civilization.
The Bulgarian criSiS
As the Near East settled in as a familiar Victorian geography the Eastern 
Question began to occupy a growing space in public discourse. Between 
1856 and 1900, over one thousand articles explaining, debating, and 
arguing the Eastern Question appeared in Liberal, Conservative, and 
nonparty periodicals.20 As table 1 indicates, the mid-1870s witnessed the 
beginning of a general and sustained increase in interest in the Eastern 
Question that lasted through to the twentieth century. This rise directly 
coincided with the Bulgarian crisis. 
The events precipitated by the Russo-Turkish War heightened inter-
est in the Near East. Historians have treated the controversy over the 
massacre of Bulgarian civilians in 1876 as an isolated event, which has 
disconnected it from a longer set of debates over the Eastern Question.21 
Public outrage over what became known as the Bulgarian Atrocities had 
roots in a foreign policy that posited Britain as a defender of minority 
Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Britain along with its European allies 
had previously supported the Tanzimat reforms that protected of the 
rights of minority Ottoman subjects in the wake of the Greek wars of 
independence in the 1830s. At the end of the Crimean War in 1856, Britain 
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helped negotiate a set of reforms that would protect Christian minorities 
as part of the peace.22 Most realized the ineffectiveness of these reforms 
even before the Bulgarian crisis began. However, news of the extent of 
the massacres in Bulgaria focused new light on these pledges, raising 
the specter of British culpability in the face of the humanitarian disaster 
unfolding in the Near East.
Then Foreign Secretary Lord Derby understood the tangled nature of 
a diplomacy that tied imperial interests to humanitarian commitments. 
“The eternal Eastern Question is before use again,” he declared on the 
eve of the crisis at a meeting of Conservative Working Men in Edinburgh 
in December 1875, “and I for one have no idea that the year 1876 will 
see it finally settled.”23 The Conservative government’s purchase of Suez 
shares the previous month coupled with word of a revolt by Bulgarian 
nationalists brought the Eastern Question into the spotlight. A little 
more than six months after his Edinburgh speech Derby received a series 
of deputations from concerned working men, city officials, and promi-
nent citizens protesting the slaughter of tens of thousands of Bulgarians 
by Turkish soldiers in the wake of the revolt.24 What, they asked, would 
the government do to stop the atrocities and protect British interests? 
Derby was called upon to soothe imperial worries and moral consciences 
TaBle 1. Coverage of the “Eastern Question” in the Mainstream 
Periodical Press
(articles and book reviews)
 1856 – 75 1876 – 85 1886 – 1914
Blackwood’s Magazine 15 86 44
Contemporary Review 8 57 57
Cornhill Magazine 6 5 3
Edinburgh Review 16 31 40
Fortnightly Review 30 102 134
Fraser’s Magazine 23 33 n.a.*
Macmillan’s Magazine 11 24 6
National Review 2 9 84
Nineteenth Century 0 68 59
Quarterly Review 11 48 37
 ToTalS 122 463 464
Information from Proquest British Periodicals database, accessed January 28, 2009, 
http://britishperiodicals.chadwyck.com/home.do.
*Fraser’s ceased publication in 1882.
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in light of Disraeli’s derisive dismissal of the atrocities as a matter of little 
importance. Derby told the crowd what it wanted hear: “Equal treatment 
to Mahommedan and Christian; better administration for both; security 
for life and property; effectual guarantees against a repetition of such 
outrages . . . these are practical objects and for these objects we shall 
labour.” Britain, he repeated in response to the well over 400 petitions 
he received by December, would honor its historic pledges to protect the 
Bulgarians.25
Gladstone’s leadership in denouncing the Bulgarian Atrocities ensured 
that the controversy stayed in the news. It also gave the cause its par-
ticular religious and moralizing character.26 Gladstone began to draw 
connections between Anglicanism and the Eastern Orthodox Church 
starting in the 1850s. The belief that the Orthodox Church had a special 
connection with an authentic early Christianity drove this sympathy for 
Ottoman Christians and came out of the Anglican High Church tradi-
tion.27 Victorian liberals who followed Gladstone’s line of thinking led 
the charge particularly after news of the slaughter of Bulgarians reached 
Britain in May 1876 through reports published in the Daily News. An 
image of a meeting held by supporters of the Bulgarian cause at St. 
James’s Hall in December 1876 published in the Illustrated London News 
in figure 1 depicted the mass appeal of liberal arguments on behalf of 
Ottoman Christians. “Attended by more than a thousand delegates from 
all parts of the United Kingdom to express public opinion” who came to 
discuss the “responsibilities of Europe and England in particular, in refer-
ence to the Eastern Question,” the delegates list read as a who’s who of 
liberal statesmen who vowed to uphold British interests by supporting a 
system that would insure the implementation of minority reform provi-
sions in the Ottoman Empire.28
The Bulgarian Atrocities agitation offered a way of seeing the Eastern 
Question as the problem of a declining Ottoman Empire, particularly 
in regard to its treatment of Christian minorities. This understanding 
predominated throughout the last third of the nineteenth century and 
beyond thanks in part to sustained coverage in the popular and politi-
cal press.29 Writing in the 1930s, historian R. W. Seton-Watson credited 
Gladstone’s moralizing foreign policy with ushering in a new way of 
thinking about the Ottoman Empire: “While then Disraeli clung to the 
very last to his illusions on Turkey and identified British interests with the 
artificial maintenance of a decadent state, Gladstone saw that the future 
lay with the nations whom Ottoman tyranny had so long submerged.”30 
Gladstone had successfully marshaled public sentiment against fighting 
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a war with Russia by publicizing Ottoman war crimes against Bulgarian 
civilians. His pamphlet “The Bulgarian Horrors” made a convincing case 
for a foreign policy that took into account humanitarian concerns, sell-
ing over 200,000 copies after its publication in September 1876. In it 
Gladstone “entreat[ed] my countrymen” to put pressure on the govern-
ment “to put a stop to the anarchical misrule” in Bulgaria. The eventual 
demise of the Disraeli government in the wake of the controversy chal-
lenged over a generation of pro-Ottoman policy (see figure 2).31
Gladstone’s crusade made moral and religious questions a populist 
form of engagement with foreign affairs. What Britain should do to alle-
viate the suffering of Ottoman Christians was elevated to one of the key 
questions of the Victorian period. This concern prompted the founding 
of humanitarian advocacy institutions that included most notably The 
Eastern Question Association. Formed in 1876 “for the purpose of watch-
ing events in the East, giving expression to public opinion and spread-
ing useful information,” the organization boasted a list of distinguished 
members led by the Duke of Westminster as president and the Earl of 
Shaftesbury as vice president. Clearly hoping to influence the outcome 
of what would later become the Treaty of Berlin, the association issued a 
Figure 1. Illustration of W. E. Gladstone speaking at St. James’s Hall on the 
Eastern Question. Illustrated London News, December 16, 1876.
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series of twelve pamphlets written by politicians, women’s rights activ-
ists, and churchmen published together in one lengthy volume in 1877.
Instead of dwelling on the Bulgarian case the Eastern Question 
Association used these pamphlets to introduce readers to the “races, reli-
gions and institutions” of the Ottoman Empire through its Armenians, 
Assyrians, and Greek inhabitants. Papers on the Eastern Question 
included “Armenia and the Lebanon” by J. W. Probyn, “The Slavonic 
Provinces of the Ottoman Empire” by W. E. Gladstone, “Fallacies of 
the Eastern Question” by Rev. William Denton, and “The Martyrs of 
Turkish Misrule” by Millicent Fawcett. The association continued into 
the twentieth century much along these same lines as a “non-partisan 
and non-governmental” organization. As Frederic Harrison claimed in 
his presidential address at the annual meeting in 1910, the association 
saw as its mission to help the “various peoples of the East of Europe in 
resisting the oppression of a sanguinary tyrant.”32 The Eastern Question 
remained on the minds of Victorians due in part to the efforts of Liberals, 
Nonconformists, and journalists who argued for a radical Christian ver-
Figure 2. Cartoon of Gladstone as a woodsman toppling the tree of Turkish 
rule in the wake of the Bulgarian Atrocities while Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield) 
appeals to him to stop. Punch, May 26, 1877.
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sion of humanitarian diplomacy. For that story, we turn to two of the 
most vocal proponents of this vision.
huManiTarian cruSaderS:  
e. a. FreeMan and W. T. STead
Both E. A. Freeman (1823 – 92) and W. T. Stead (1849 – 1912) came to the 
Eastern Question early in their careers. For Freeman it started with a fas-
cination with the Eastern Orthodox Church in the 1850s. Stead came later 
to the Eastern Question through a critique of Conservative policy over 
the Suez Canal and brought a new intensity to the debate. To Freeman’s 
professorial didacticism Stead brought a popular appeal. Together these 
two writers helped secure the ascendancy of a Gladstonian moral diplo-
macy and helped shape over a generation of thinking about the Eastern 
Question.
Converted to the liberal cause in his teens, Freeman considered 
Gladstone his “captain” in matters political and religious. He attended 
Oxford and later served, on the recommendation of Gladstone, in the 
Regius Professorship of Modern History. His spirited defense of the 
Greeks, Assyrians, and Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire came 
out of his Oxford-influenced belief in the intimate connections between 
the Eastern Orthodox Church and High Church Anglicanism. Calling 
the Eastern Church “one of the great phenomena in history,” he asserted 
that its brand of Christianity proved an authentic source of connection 
between Englishmen and the Christians of the East.33 He argued for the 
unity of Eastern and Western churches in dozens of articles, books, and 
pamphlets published starting in 1855, believing that improving relations 
between different Orthodox sects and Anglicanism would result in a suc-
cessful challenge to Ottoman rule. Christianity, for Freeman, proved a 
defining cultural marker that unified British interests with the Eastern 
Question. As he most forcefully argued in Ottoman Power in Europe in 
1877, religious kinship with Eastern Christians should operate as a moral 
compass for foreign policy.
Stead, as he would do with later campaigns like “white slavery” in 
England, took on the Eastern Question as a crusade, elevating the con-
troversy to the level of a political movement.34 As editor of the Northern 
Echo he built a career as a critic of the Conservative government. He first 
entered the debate over the Eastern Question in 1875 with a scathing 
critique of Disraeli’s “secret” purchase of additional shares in the Suez 
Canal from the Egyptian Khedive, which gave England a majority stake 
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and soon force Lord Derby on the defensive. “Startling News from the 
East,” declared the headline of the Northern Echo on November 27, 1875, 
“Purchase by England of the Suez Canal.” Not long after, the Bulgarian 
Atrocities agitation provided this Nonconformist radical with the oppor-
tunity to sharpen his critique of Conservative policy as imprudent and 
immoral. Although his politics mirrored Freeman’s, his approach did not. 
The press was the starting point for Stead, who took his campaign from 
the pages of the Northern Echo to the public meeting hall. His ability as 
an organizer impressed Freeman, who admired how quickly the agita-
tion took hold in the largely Nonconformist North where Stead counted 
forty-seven protest meeting during the months of August and September 
alone.35 Gladstone so admired his work on behalf of the Eastern Question 
that he entrusted Stead with his papers in the hopes that he would write 
the history of the Bulgarian agitation.36 His populist style of journalism, 
putting sensational reporting in the service of humanitarian crusades, 
carried over to his later work as editor of the Pall Mall Gazette and the 
Review of Reviews. As he characterized his career in 1894, “I am a revival-
ist preacher and not a journalist by nature.”37
Freeman’s and Stead’s writing on the Eastern Question represented the 
clearest articulation of a liberal humanitarian critique of Conservative 
foreign policy. The so-called “philo-Turk” position of supporters of 
Disraeli came increasingly under fire by liberals including John Bright 
and organizations such as the League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey 
soon after news of the Bulgarian Atrocities reached Britain.38 Freeman 
went as far as to accuse Disraeli of pro-Ottoman sympathies, using it 
as an excuse to attack his Jewish background and question his loyalty.39 
This critique went beyond a question of support for either cross or cres-
cent. The threat from Russia supposed by a generation of politicians 
starting with Lord Palmerston found a counterpoint in a critique that 
understood Russia as an ally in the defense of Eastern Christendom.40 
Stead’s Northern Echo, where he served as editor during the 1870s, and 
other liberal-minded periodicals such as the Contemporary Review fur-
ther popularized the Eastern Question as a diplomatic problem with a 
moral solution. Conservative-minded critics dismissed this as naïve and 
sentimental politics, arguing that only military support of Turkey would 
keep Russia in check. By the 1870s this view had come increasingly under 
fire from liberals, who countered that Britain was backing the wrong ally. 
Freeman himself had broken ties with the Saturday Review, where he 
earned six hundred pounds a year for his writing, when the periodical 
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expressed support for the Disraeli government’s willingness to go to war 
against Russia in defense of Turkey.
None of these arguments would have taken hold without Gladstone’s 
indomitable presence in the debate. In “The Paths of Honor and Shame,” 
published in March 1878, Gladstone warned against going to war with 
Russia to save the Ottoman Empire: “A war undertaken without cause 
is a war of shame, and not of honour.” Rather the British government 
should use diplomacy to promote reform in the Ottoman provinces: 
“The security of life, liberty, conscience, and female honor, is the one 
indispensible condition of reform in all these provinces.”41 Conservatives 
responded with the charge that this policy substituted one brand of preju-
dice for another. In “What is the Eastern Question?” one commentator 
rallied against Gladstone’s “hypocritical mask of humanity, liberty and 
religion,” which threatened to expel Muslims from Europe.42 Others 
worried alongside Disraeli that government by “sentiment” would make 
a mockery of British power and prestige. To this, liberals responded with 
appeals to British justice: “It is not a question, be it remembered as is 
often imagined, of Mohammedan as against Christian; it is a question 
of the ruling Turk as against all his subjects alike, whether Christian or 
Mohammedan.”43 Another argued that England “must be on the side of 
humanity, freedom and progress, if it is to be in harmony with both her 
interests and her duty.”44 For Gladstone, the specificity of the Bulgarian 
case elevated humanitarianism to the status of a common cause: “Rich 
and strong we are; but no people is rich enough, or strong enough to 
disregard the priceless value of human sympathies.”45
Freeman’s and Stead’s writings on the Eastern Question cast Bulgaria’s 
revolution as a beginning meant to inspire other oppressed minorities. 
In 1875, Freeman drew attention to the Turkish response to the revolt in 
Montenegro, which he called “a genuine revolt of an oppressed Christian 
people against Mahometan masters.” “The true Eastern Question,” 
according to Freeman, hinged on “whether European powers shall go on 
condemning the nations of South-Eastern Europe to remain under bar-
barian bondage.” As he concluded, “The so called Turkish government is 
then, I say, no government at all.”46
By the 1890s both men had published numerous articles advocating 
civil and political reform in the Near East. Freeman’s religious moralism 
and his “devotion to the cause of righteous government,” according to 
his biographer, kept him writing.47 Freeman kept the Eastern Question 
before the public in articles such as “Bulgaria and Servia” (1885), “Present 
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Aspects of the Eastern Question” (1887), “Ancient Church Endowments” 
(1891), “Dangers to the Peace of Europe” (1891), and “Progress in the 
Nineteenth Century” (1892). Stead’s journalism carried on in the same 
vein. Articles published in the Northern Echo included “England and the 
Eastern Insurgents” (1876), “Our Policy in the East,” and “The War,” which 
gave him claim to the title of the people’s representative in the Eastern 
Question. Up until his death aboard the Titanic in 1912 he continued 
to write about the plight of Eastern Christians. The Review of Reviews 
featured articles on the Armenian massacres of the 1890s, the Russian 
and Armenian churches, and Anglo-Ottoman relations. A set of articles 
profiling Gladstone in the Review of Reviews in the 1890s championed 
the liberal statesman as defender of Eastern Christians. In the wake of 
the Young Turk Revolution that brought on another wave of sectarian 
violence in 1908, Stead published articles arguing that Britain should put 
pressure on the new Ottoman government to reform its minority policy.
Stead used the Bulgarian Atrocities campaign to launch a brand of 
moral crusading that helped make his name as a journalist. After the 
controversy that he claimed in characteristic overstatement “was in a 
great measure my work,” Stead reflected on the moral imperative that set 
him writing. “What is true of Bulgaria is true of larger things,” he wrote 
in his journal in 1877. Religious piety combined with a moral sense of the 
public good led to his vow “to stimulate all religious men and women, to 
inspire children and neighbours with sense of supreme sovereignty of 
duty and right.” England’s leadership as an empire (“keep[ing] the peace 
of one-sixth the human race”) and in protecting female virture (“The 
honour of Bulgarian virgins is in the custody of the English voter”) were 
part of his set of core principles.48 This world view drew upon Gladstone’s 
assertion that England had a duty to defend “female honor.” This call to 
defend rape victims cast Bulgaria itself as a wronged woman. The sexu-
alizing of the Bulgarian Atrocities thus introduced another moralizing 
strand to British diplomacy. Stead later used this tactic to spectacular 
effect at home during his 1885 newspaper expose of child prostitution in 
London in the “Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon,” and in his condem-
nation of the Boer War as an “immoral” war that threatened the honor of 
the female Outlander in the Transvaal.49 In the case of the Bulgarians, a 
compelling melodrama of religion and sexuality helped keep the issue 
before the public.
Secular and religious activists alike had something to take from the 
branding of the Bulgarian case as a humanitarian crusade. Gladstone’s 
moral leadership, Stead’s populism, and Freeman’s fiery diatribes offered 
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a powerful counter to conservative charges that cast this campaigning 
as wrong-headed sentimental politics. The founding of institutions that 
supported this ideal further enabled this liberal humanitarian vision 
of the Eastern Question to take root. The increasing professionaliza-
tion of charity networks tapped into British ideas of benevolence and 
humanitarianism by giving individuals a stake in ameliorating human 
suffering by donating money to causes like “Bulgarian Relief” and later 
“Armenian Relief.” The indefatigable Adeline Paulina Irby and her army 
of female helpers oversaw aid funds and institutions in the Near East. 
Philanthropists like Lady Strangford continued in this vein well beyond 
the end of the Bulgarian agitation at home. By the summer of 1877, 
English-based relief funds had contributed over 250,000 pounds to relief 
work in the Balkans.50
Offering aid through donations was one thing, making Britons feel 
a moral obligation to Eastern Christians was still another. The story of 
the decision of Nonconformists to support Gladstone’s campaign offers 
a well-studied example of how this idea took root during the Bulgarian 
agitation. Nonconformists, as Richard Shannon has argued, represented 
“the temper of moral seriousness in the public life of nineteenth-century 
England” and played a central role in transforming the argument to assist 
Christians in need into a crusade. Although the agitation spread across 
England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, Nonconformists in the north 
and southwest played a disproportionate role in the agitation.51 These 
mainly Methodists, Unitarians, and Quakers saw their own second-
class status as parallel to that of Eastern Christians. At the same time, 
the nineteenth-century fascination with the Holy Land as a birthplace 
of Christianity gave Nonconformists reason to understand Eastern 
Christians as authentic representatives of early Christianity. Gladstone 
recognized early on the importance of Nonconformity in forging con-
nections between Britons and Eastern Questions, praising the “exertions 
made by the Nonconformists in the cause of humanity and justice” dur-
ing the Bulgarian crisis.52
At the heart of the Nonconformist response rested the belief pos-
ited so strongly by Gladstone himself that Eastern Christians shared 
a kinship with Anglican Protestantism. Stead and Freeman made this 
connection by attempting to strengthen British claims over the Holy 
Land. Freeman’s anti-Semitic attacks on Disraeli aimed to widen the 
perceived gulf between Judaism and British Protestantism with respect 
to the Near East. Freeman also represented Eastern Christianity as anti-
Catholic, which he claimed afforded it a natural affinity with Anglican 
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Protestantism: “The High Church section of the English Church take a 
natural interest in a communion which like their own, protests against 
the usurpations of Rome, while it sympathizes with their special views of 
ritual and discipline, of sacramental efficacy and Episcopal government.”53 
These Protestant values, according to Freeman, should also appeal to 
“Broad Church” believers who understood Christianity as a crucial link 
between East and West. In this line of argument, the connection between 
the Eastern Church and the “Reformed Churches of the West” that began 
during the Reformation could find needed revival through projects such 
as the Crimea Memorial Church built by Britain in Constantinople to 
commemorate the Crimean War.54 A union of faiths had emerged out of 
the crucible of war to create a sense of common faith and purpose among 
Christians in the East and West.
For secular-minded skeptics, Freeman offered a kinship model based 
on an evolutionary and racialized view of history. “One special feature 
of what is called the Eastern Question is the direct and immediate con-
nexion into which it brings the earliest and the latest times of history,” 
Freeman argued in “The Geographical Aspect of the Eastern Question” 
in 1877. “The lands between the Hadriatic [sic] and the Euphrates” offered 
Britons a glimpse of their own past. In the Near East, “the past and the 
present are in being side by side” and distinctions of race and religion 
become more pronounced from West to East.55 The “political geography” 
of the Eastern Question, according to Freeman, was that of a slow march 
forward where religious distinctions would give way to national identi-
ties as they had done in Western Europe. Until that time, Freeman sug-
gested a type of imperial federal structure that would allow for a more 
peaceful and democratic coexistence and bring the western Ottoman 
Empire closer to Europe.
Stead and Freeman both held up the “desire for liberty” as a defining 
characteristic of Eastern Christians. Even with “all their shortcomings” 
according to Stead, “they represent the cause of progress, of humanity, 
of civilization.” Disraeli’s support of Turkey in its conflict with Serbia 
and Montenegro led Stead to declare that the premier would “tarnish 
England’s glory and disgrace the English name by assisting to defeat 
the heroic men who have gone forth against the Turk under the ban-
ners of Independence, with the war-cry of ‘Liberty or Death.’ ”56 Freeman 
considered the Ottoman’s “an army of occupation” and maintained that 
the desire for self-government set Eastern Christians apart from their 
Muslim rulers.57 The responsibility of England to those seeking freedom 
from Ottoman rule rested in the “English political belief” that “freedom 
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and just government were indeed righteous and holy thing to be striven 
after by all men.”58 This support for the aspirations of minority Christians 
thus reflected a deeper English value that had its roots in a culture of 
justice and liberty. As Stead asserted, “the day when Englishmen cease 
to sympathise with those who are struggling for freedom will date the 
downfall of their own liberties.”59
By 1880, the liberal argument that favored intervention on behalf 
of minority Christians deeply informed considerations of the Eastern 
Question. That year witnessed the landslide victory for the Liberal Party 
under Gladstone’s leadership. Historians credit Gladstone’s role in the 
Bulgarian Atrocities agitation with securing his victory against the pro-
Ottoman Disraeli government.60 Freeman likened the event to a “deliver-
ance” from conservative tyranny that revealed that the people of Britain 
“have a conscience.” This moral diplomacy informed future Liberal 
administrations and the response of Lord Salisbury’s Conservative gov-
ernment to the Eastern Question during the mid-1890s. This had not 
little to do with the discourse of humanitarian reform that took hold in 
the wake of the diplomatic resolution of the Russo-Turkish War.
a Moral Foreign Policy
The Treaties of San Stefano (March 1878) and Berlin (July 1878) cast 
the Eastern Christian “desire for liberty” as a problem to be solved by 
Great Power diplomacy. At stake was the question of how to adjust the 
territories of the western Ottoman Empire to offer greater autonomy to 
the Bulgarian, Romanian, and Serbian populations while protecting the 
Assyrian, Greek, and Armenian populations still living under Ottoman 
rule in Anatolia. Treaty negotiations, widely reported in the British press, 
proved of only limited success in resolving the minority question (see 
figure 3). While the westernmost provinces of the Ottoman Empire were 
granted a measure of national autonomy, other reform provisions fell flat. 
Conservatives had played a central role in negotiating the terms of peace 
and helped to soften the harsh terms of the Treaty of San Stefano that 
favored greater autonomy for subject minorities. When the Treaty was 
rewritten as the Treaty of Berlin four months later, British negotiators 
had removed the clause that would have forced reforms on the Ottoman 
government. Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty formalized British responsi-
bility for the treatment of Christian subjects but offered little by way of 
enforcement. 
The diplomatic maneuverings that seemingly resolved the Bulgarian 
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issue through the creation of a semiautonomous Bulgaria had done little 
to quell calls for more liberty for other minorities. The lack of an enforce-
able minority protection clause for in the Berlin Treaty kept the plight of 
Ottoman Christians in the news. In the wake of Berlin, the watchword of 
“reform” of the Turkish administration provided a point of departure for 
both liberal and conservative public opinion. Failed attempts to enforce 
the reforms of the Tanzimat period shaped ideas regarding how and by 
whom these changes would be carried out. Liberals favored removing 
territories from Ottoman rule while conservatives largely favored influ-
encing the sultan through diplomatic pressure. “Are Reforms Possible 
Under Mussulman Rule?” asked Malcolm MacColl in an article by the 
same name in the Contemporary Review in August of 1881. Concerned 
primarily with placing “the Christian subjects of the Sultan on a footing 
of equal rights with the Musselmans,” MacColl argued that “The only 
possible hope is in the withdrawal of Armenia from the direct rule of the 
Sultan . . . Appoint a Christian or at least a non – Mussulman Governor 
and make him practically independent of the caprice of the Sultan and the 
intrigues of the Palace and the Porte. There will then be no difficulty in 
introducing reforms in all branches of the administration.”61
Figure 3. Sketched portraits of diplomats attending the Eastern Question 
Conference. Graphic, January 6, 1877.
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The unresolved issue of minority rights cast a long shadow over 
the postwar settlement. Bulgarians occupied the role of the victim in 
the negotiations at San Stefano and Berlin. The creation of the nomi-
nally independent territory of Bulgaria came as a response to the con-
troversy over Ottoman war crimes. To “protect” them from misrule by 
the Ottomans the negotiators separated Bulgarians from the Ottoman 
Empire. Negotiators believed they had solved the minority problem 
through a national solution. Instead of promises of British protection, 
the treaty gave Bulgarians their own semiautonomous territories. The 
so-called Big Bulgaria proposed in San Stefano quickly gave way at 
Berlin to a group of smaller, weak states drawn along ethnic and religious 
lines. With the stroke of a pen the newly invented Bulgaria, Servia, and 
Roumania promised to solve the Eastern Question by eliminating the 
causes of sectarian strife and thus foreign entanglements with Ottoman 
internal policy. At the same time, this agreement offered a more indi-
rect form of protection by drawing these religio-ethnic states closer to 
Western Europe while pushing the Ottoman Empire farther east.
Reports that the Treaty of Berlin had failed to introduce reforms to 
protect minorities in remaining Ottoman provinces offered a powerful 
platform for humanitarian advocates. Invoking notions of kinship among 
“Christian nations” during his 1879 Midlothian campaigns, Gladstone 
launched his re-assent to the Liberal Party leadership by heralding a 
moral foreign policy that “should always be inspired by love of freedom.”62 
After winning the election the liberal press served as the mouthpiece for 
this program. This included mainstream and advocacy publications such 
as the Anglo-French newspaper Armenia edited by a former delegate of 
the Berlin Conference. By 1889, a ninety-eight-page parliamentary report 
on the “Condition of Populations in Asiatic Turkey” found its way into 
an article in the Contemporary Review and argued for immediate action 
on behalf of oppressed Assyrian and Armenian Christians.63 That next 
year James Bryce, a man who would prove to be a pivotal figure in war-
time debates over the Eastern Question, started the Anglo-Armenian 
Association with the explicit purpose of enforcing Article 61. The article 
outlined Britain’s commitment to the Ottoman Empire: “Under the 61st 
clause of the Treaty of Berlin we are bound in certain eventualities to 
defend Turkish territory; but the obligation rests on the preliminary con-
dition such reforms as England shall approve are carried out. The respon-
sibility for the delay of such reforms is therefore at our door . . . From the 
time of Milton’s appeal for the Waldenses down to the Bulgarian troubles 
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of our time the English people have always rejoiced to show their sympa-
thy with populations of their own faith in time of persecution.”64
A more urgent call for reform came from those who represented 
Christian minorities as allies under threat. In “Shall the Frontier of 
Christendom be Maintained?” J. W. Howe asked, “Is this world nation 
willing that unarmed and unoffending communities shall be swept out 
of existence? . . . The Turk is now the ally of Russia. See to it England that 
these despotisms, united, do not for all time deprive you of your natural 
allies the Christians of the East!”65 This call to honor a “natural” alli-
ance with minority Christian communities, others argued, had at its core 
a set of cultural values that came out of a common faith. “Christianity 
is a religion of humanity,” claimed one commentator on the eve of the 
San Stefano Conference. “Its social idea is industrial, not predatory or 
military.”66 Such views followed the Gladstonian line that had animated 
his northern Nonconformist supporters. For Gladstone, the loyalty of 
Eastern Christians was a prize worth fighting for: “I am selfish enough to 
hope, in the interest of my country that in the approaching Conference 
or Congress we may have and may use an opportunity to acquire the 
goodwill of somebody. By somebody I mean some nation, and not merely 
some government. We have repelled and I fear estranged twenty millions 
of Christians in the Turkish Empire.”67 Here moral obligations dovetailed 
with strategic interests. Supporting minority reform, according to this 
argument, would produce loyal allies to Britain and protect its imperial 
interests in what one commentator called “the whole Oriental world.”68
The eroding of the Ottoman Empire’s hold on Christian minority 
populations in the Balkans represented in the new Bulgaria and trea-
ties of San Stefano and Berlin failed to quell calls for reform. Rather, 
a new crisis in the Ottoman Empire shifted focus from Bulgarians to 
other Christian minority groups, namely the Greeks, Assyrians, and 
Armenians. The resolution of the Bulgarian issue in the Treaty of Berlin 
focused attention on the Armenians in particular due to their status as 
a large, historically persecuted Ottoman minority who adhered to the 
Eastern Orthodox faith. By the time the Armenian massacres started in 
the mid-1890s this other persecuted minority had captured the imagina-
tion of liberal humanitarianism.
The arMenian MaSSacreS
The Armenian cause gained momentum as a corollary to the Bulgarian 
Atrocities agitation early on. Humphrey Sandwith introduced the issue 
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of “How the Turks Rule Armenia” in the midst of the Russo-Turkish war 
treaty negotiations. In 1878, he argued that Britain’s pro-Ottoman policy 
made it complicit in the slaughter of innocent Christians and went as far 
as to advocate the annexation of Armenia. As David Feldman has argued 
about the Jews, Christian minorities’ connection with Britain rested 
on their “industrious” nature and embrace of liberal values.69 Religious 
affinities further strengthened this bond. Sandwith cited case after case 
of Christians subject to unfair tax burdens and thwarted and some-
times killed in their attempts to accumulate wealth through trade and 
industry.70 Others argued for greater British intervention by presenting 
a more problematic view of Britain’s long-standing interest in Eastern 
Christians. Isabella Bird understood British interest in Armenians in this 
vein: “while the Nestorians, Chaldeans or Assyrians (as they are vari-
ously called) from their comparatively small numbers, general poverty 
and total lack of mouth pieces, excite no interest at all, the interest felt 
in the Armenians is seldom a cordial or friendly one. . . . The Armenian 
is too self-interested to be lovable, too politic to be trusted and too proud 
to be patronized, and too capable and often too rich to be despised.” 
“Armenians,” however, she concluded “cannot be ignored.”71
The “Armenian Question,” as some began to call the Eastern Question 
in the mid-1880s, took on an air of urgency after the massacre of Arme-
nian civilians began in Anatolia in 1894.72 Interest in the Armenians of the 
Ottoman Empire grew steadily in the years preceding and following the 
massacres. Coverage in the Times increased from 14 mentions in 1886 to 61 
the following year. By 1890, articles on the Armenian Question numbered 
122.73 Between 1890 and 1897 dozens of articles appeared in the Nineteenth 
Century, Spectator, Contemporary Review, Blackwoods, and Fortnightly 
Review.74 The call to aid Armenians during the massacres themselves 
reverberated throughout the press much as it had in favor of Bulgarians 
twenty years earlier.75 “It is a simple unvarnished fact that unless Russia 
does occupy Armenia the Christian population will be exterminated,” one 
commentator claimed in the wake of the first wave of massacres in the 
Anatolian villages of Sasun and Mush. “No other Power can save them; 
and when England understands the alternative she will applaud rather than 
resist the advance of Russia as she did after the massacres in Bulgaria.”76 
Punch, in one of its dozens of depictions of the Armenian Question illus-
trated this connection in 1895, depicting Gladstone and the Duke of Argyll, 
another long-time supporter of minority rights in the Ottoman Empire, as 
“Brothers in Arms Again: Bulgaria, 1876 and Armenia, 1895” (see figure 4). 
Frustration with the lack of response by the government during the 
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Bulgarian Atrocities shadowed considerations of the Armenian crisis. 
“The time has come for every reasoning inhabitant of these islands delib-
erately to accept or repudiate his share of the joint indirect responsibility 
of the British nation for the series of the hugest and foulest crimes that 
have ever stained the pages of human history,” wrote E. J. Dillion in the 
Contemporary Review in 1896.77 Dillon’s “vehement protest against these 
hell-born crimes” attempted to force the Liberal Rosebery and succes-
sor Conservative Salisbury governments into action. Memories of the 
unwillingness of the British government to respond to the Bulgarian 
massacres led commentators to ask for concrete reforms. Citing the fail-
ure of minority protections provisions in the treaties of Paris and Berlin, 
one writer in the Fortnightly Review asserted that Britain was being 
misled again by the sultan: “The whole of Europe has been outwitted, 
defied, humiliated, and held at bay by a Prince whose throne is tottering 
under him. . . . Christendom with all the might and all the right on its 
side, is powerless.”78 Under Gladstone’s urging Rosebery came up with a 
sympathetic though largely ineffectual policy that did little to help either 
Ottoman Christians or Liberal fortunes in the next election. “In spite of 
the circumstance that the late Liberal government was in possession of 
these an analogous facts,” argued one commentator regarding the mas-
Figure 4. Cartoon of Gladstone and 
the Duke of Argyll campaigning on 
behalf of Armenians in 1895, as they 
had done almost twenty years earlier 
for Bulgarians. Punch, May 18, 1895.
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sacres, the government “found it impossible to have them remedied and 
unadvisable to have them published.” Hope for resolution would rest with 
the newly returned Conservative government: “There is fortunately good 
reason to believe that Lord Salisbury . . . will find efficacious means of 
putting a sudden and a speedy end to the Armenian Pandemonium.”79
The spirit of reform that animated debates over the status of Ottoman 
Christians gained momentum after the Treaty of Berlin in both 
Conservative and Liberal Party circles. Salisbury, during his time as one 
of Disraeli’s ministers in 1878, had argued forcefully in favor of a pro-
Ottoman policy against Russia. When Salisbury led the Conservative 
Party to power in 1895 public opinion guided his own plan for self-
government for Ottoman Armenians that met with widespread approval. 
As Lord Sanderson put it, in the wake of the Armenian massacres, “Lord 
Salisbury declined to pledge the British Government to any mate-
rial action in support of the Sultan or of the Rule of the Straits, on the 
ground of the alteration of circumstances and the change in British public 
opinion.”80 In November 1895 the Illustrated London News published a 
two-page rendition of a meeting of the “Cabinet Council” on the Eastern 
Question that depicted the main players engaged in serious debate. On 
the reverse was printed an article critical of the reign of Sultan Abdul 
Figure 5. Sketch of members of the British Government Cabinet Council 
deciding the future of the Eastern Question. Illustrated London News, 
November 30, 1895.
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Hamid (see figure 5). Salisbury’s overtures, designed in part to keep his 
critics on the defensive, did not amount to any more than Rosebery’s ear-
lier ineffectual pledges.81 “Public opinion in England has spoken loudly 
and decisively on the Armenian question,” asserted H. F. B. Lynch in the 
concluding article of his series on Armenia in the Contemporary Review; 
“two ministries have taken energetic action, yet, from some reason which 
has not yet been sufficiently explained, their intervention remains with-
out result.”82
Frustration with ineffective government action spawned an extra-par-
liamentary response. William Watson’s 1896 The Purple East: A Series of 
Sonnets on England’s Desertion of Armenia implored the administration 
in a collection of verse “to smite the wronger with thy destined rod” or risk 
“The gathering blackness of the frown of God!”83 The reformer George 
Russell took a more pragmatic approach, founding a new advocacy orga-
nization: “The Forward Movement in relation to Armenia is an attempt 
to do by the moral force of the Liberal Party that which the ‘non-party’ 
movement so grandly auspicated a year and half ago, has signally failed 
to do.” The “Forward Movement” was inspired in part after hearing the 
Armenian Church Liturgy performed “under the shadow of our august 
Abbey.” During this church service “the binding pressure of a common 
Christianity” drove listeners to form a movement based on “an inexo-
rable command of conscience which bids us to GO FORWARD.”84 P. W. K. 
Stride offered a yet more practical course of action. In “The Immediate 
Future of Armenia” he offered a plan that placed Armenia in the hands of 
an international body: “To be strong enough, such an organization must 
be military; to be imposing enough, it must be non-national, or rather 
open to, and supported by the Great Powers; to be above suspicion it 
must work without thought of gain and whatever surplus there may be of 
income over expenditure must be devoted to the further development of 
agriculture and industry. An institution — call it a Brotherhood, a Society, 
a Company, or what you will — conducted on these lines would have at 
any rate the chance of great usefulness.”85
As during the Bulgarian Atrocities agitation, critics cast the response 
to the Armenian massacres as imprudent sentimentalism. Ghulam-us-
Saqlain in “The Musselmans of India and the Armenian Question,” wrote 
of the “alleged Armenian atrocities” in the Nineteenth Century, raising the 
specter of Muslim subjects in India rebelling against the British Empire 
as a result of its Ottoman policy.86 Similarly, in “A Moslem View of Abdul 
Hamid and the Powers,” R. Ahmad blamed “British Christian opinion” for 
stirring up trouble in the Ottoman Empire. Although Ahmad could not 
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understand why “England alone of all the Powers has whipped herself 
to fever-heat” over Armenia, he, too, made the case for reforms to the 
Ottoman system based on rule of law. As he concluded, “The misgov-
ernment in Turkey is injurious alike to the Christians and to the Turks 
and all reforms must benefit the two races equally.”87 The critique that 
humanitarianism served as a cover for anti-Muslim sentiment first voiced 
during the Bulgarian Atrocities now made a broader pitch for humanitar-
ian diplomacy rather than rejecting it out of hand.
News of the massacres led to a series of nationally coordinated advo-
cacy efforts. The “National Protest against the Torture and Massacre of 
Christians in Armenia Public Meeting” held at St. James’s Hall London 
in May 7, 1895, with the Duke of Argyll in the chair, offered publicity to 
the cause. The number of relief organizations eventually grew so large 
that in May 1897 the National Conference of British Societies engaged in 
working for the Relief of Armenians in Distress was formed under the 
leadership of James Bryce to coordinate relief efforts. Prominent relief 
organizations included the Friends of Armenia, which raised tens of 
thousands of pounds for relief efforts, the International Association of 
the Friends of Armenia, Quaker relief organizations, and the Women’s 
Relief Fund.88 The National Conference met first in London and later in 
Cardiff under the auspices of the “Friends of Armenia Branch” there with 
the goal of securing “permanent” relief by coordinating efforts of societ-
ies operating throughout England, Scotland, and Wales.89 This national 
organization did not seek to consolidate societies but rather benefit 
both small and large organizations by publicizing and pulling together 
resources. Large organizations like the Friends of Armenia — with head-
quarters in London and branches throughout the British Isles, including 
those in Manchester, Edinburgh, Paisley and Liverpool, for example — 
worked with smaller funds like the Irish Armenian Relief Fund run by 
the Lord Mayor of Dublin that had a more localized constituency. Such 
institutions alongside others that would come out of causes that included 
the feminist movement made the Eastern Question part of the fabric of 
Victorian humanitarian discourse.
gendering The eaSTern QueSTion
A Nation’s History! How shall it be writ?
With tears of blood – in a sealed book of shame.
For when the weak and persecuted call her name
The mighty heart of England – slept!90
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A. Bradshaw’s poem “Deserted Armenia” appeared in the feminist peri-
odical Our Sisters in 1897. Starting in the early 1890s a discourse of “sis-
terhood” encouraged feminist activists to take up the Armenian cause 
as their own. The Women’s Penny Paper announced the founding of the 
Women’s Vigilance Association in London in November 1890 “for the 
purpose of calling attention to the condition of the women in Armenia.” 
Through a “series of addresses and meetings” the association intended to 
draw attention to the kidnapping of Armenian women to “sell as slaves.”91 
Feminist perspectives on the Eastern Question appeared in feature arti-
cles, book reviews, and biographical sketches of women activists in all 
of the major women’s papers including the Woman’s Herald, Woman’s 
Signal, Women’s Penny Paper, Our Sisters and Shafts.92
Feminist human rights campaigning added weight to the argument 
in favor of intervention on behalf of Christian minorities. Assuming 
the role of Britain’s moral conscience, liberal feminists found in the 
Armenians a just cause for reform. In 1895, Shafts published a letter 
addressed to Lady Henry Somerset, a key voice in this campaign, from 
the Armenian women of Constantinople that described the massacres in 
that city in 1895. Somerset’s response to the letter, signed “Your Suffering 
Sisters,” concluded with a specific call to English womanhood: “Will 
English women be deaf to the voices that call to them in the hour of their 
supreme agony? Will they not rise to demand that such steps be taken 
at all hazards as will secure the rescue of this tortured people?”93 Others 
echoed Somerset’s gendered notions of British justice. “We should be cal-
lous indeed, if our sympathy remained unmoved by the fearful crimes in 
the Turkish dominions,” wrote one correspondent in Shafts.94 Our Sisters 
published reports of the massacres in Diarbekir, describing events like 
the mass murder of “the defenseless crowd of men, women and children” 
gathered in a church set fire to by Kurds who lived in the hills surround-
ing the village.
Such coverage suggests that by the time of the Armenian massacres 
in the mid-1890s readers of feminist papers had come to understand the 
Eastern Question as a women’s issue. Somerset, a well-known women’s 
rights activist, used her newly renamed paper, the Woman’s Signal, to 
sound the alarm on behalf of victims. In an address at the annual meet-
ing of the British Women’s Temperance Association she argued: “The 
Turkish Empire has been kept alive by treaties which have been broken 
again and again and yet in a great crisis when our fellow Christians cry 
to us in their death agony, we as a country are powerless to move and are 
obliged to acknowledge that we are impotent to save the people we agreed 
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to defend.”95 Coverage of the Women’s National Liberal Association 
included a similar line of argument, claiming that “[t]he sufferings of 
the Armenians appealed to the sympathies of all” present at the meet-
ing.96 Lead articles contained references to “the persecuted Armenian” 
and appealed to readers to heed “the bitter cry of Armenia.” News briefs 
referred to the “attacks on Armenians in the very heart of the Turkish 
government’s rule” while describing the actions of Sultan Hamid.97
Somerset, a liberal committed to the Gladstonian line on the Eastern 
Question, understood England’s affinities with Armenians in terms of 
both religion and gender. “The situation in Armenia does not seem to 
improve,” Somerset lamented, “As our readers know, Russia and France 
have withdrawn from the Conference of the Great Powers, and have 
left England to work out Armenia’s salvation alone, or else to leave the 
unspeakable Turk to exterminate a people who have been Christian 
since Christianity was.”98 Gladstone’s eighty-fifth birthday celebration 
provided Somerset with the opportunity to make the case for “A Call to 
Action” in her columns. On this occasion, London Armenians presented 
a chalice to Hawarden church in honor of what Gladstone “had done for 
their nation.”
The story of Mrs. Bedros, who escaped the massacres in Sasun and sat 
next to the Somerset at the birthday celebration, was told by a missionary 
after dinner. Somerset related to readers in graphic detail the murder of 
Mrs. Bedros’ three-month-old baby and her two aunts by Turkish sol-
diers. The young woman was saved by remarkable circumstance, accord-
ing to Somerset: “ ‘Don’t kill this woman,’ said one of the brutal Turks. 
‘She is young and pretty; I will take her along with me.’ But she struggles 
with her brutal captors with all her strength. ‘If you are such a fool,’ said 
the Turk, ‘as not to go with me quietly, we shall kill you at once.’ She still 
struggled. They tore her clothes off her back. Her fate was near, the worst 
of outrages and death at the hands of the men who had just killed her 
baby before her eyes.”99 When coins that her husband had fastened to her 
belt fell along the ground, she escaped to the woods while the soldiers 
picked up the gold and quarreled over the money.
Somerset’s dramatic retelling of the story in the press echoed W. T. 
Stead’s Bulgarian Atrocities narrative twenty years earlier. Outrages of 
rape, violence, and greed figured prominently in the story as retold by 
Somerset, who spoke for Mrs. Bedros through her missionary patron 
interpreter. This narrative provided Somerset with a call to action. “The 
Christian womanhood of England as presented by the Woman’s Signal 
can be depended on to demand that the extermination of these people 
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shall be stopped.”100 Moral responsibility for Armenia, in this repre-
sentation of the massacres, rested on the protection of womanly virtue. 
Somerset’s outrage was strengthened by her status as a woman. Unlike 
Stead and his depictions of outrages against Bulgarian virgins, Somerset 
held a unique position of ownership over such narratives of injustice. 
She represented to her audience an authentic voice of sympathy and thus 
added moral weight to her call for action.
The call to forge a sisterhood with rape victims resonated with liberal 
feminists who came to see the Armenian Question as a corollary to the 
Woman Question. One correspondent suggested in a letter entitled “Our 
Sisters in Armenia” the franchise for women in England would result in 
real change for Armenian women.101 Somerset’s growing disillusionment 
with the Liberal Party due to its lack of commitment to either votes for 
women or the Armenian cause most likely influenced her decision to turn 
to an extra-parliamentary approach. The occasion of the “national protest 
against the Armenian atrocities” held at St. James’s Hall in the spring of 
1895 gave Somerset the opportunity to make her case in a public forum. 
Like the national meetings held to protest the Bulgarian Atrocities, a 
list of distinguished speakers spoke to a massive crowd on the need for 
intervention.
Somerset’s authority in a group otherwise made up entirely of dis-
tinguished male speakers relied on the claim that she represented the 
voice of the womanhood of England and Armenia. Her speech “touched 
a new note,” according to one report, “pointed as it was by the presence 
of ‘the child-mother’ to whom she alluded with a touching pathos.” The 
retelling of the story of Mrs. Bedros who stood on the stage next to her 
husband moved the crowd to cheer Somerset’s call to intervene on behalf 
of the martyred Christians of Sasun, who, she claimed, “Died that the 
untrammeled beneficent, consecrated life of England’s purest woman-
hood might slowly come to women in their own beautiful and pleasant 
land.”102 This language of mutual sacrifice contained within it the seeds 
of redemption. For Somerset, helping Armenian women would elevate 
English womanhood.
In 1896, Somerset launched the idea for the Armenian Rescue Fund. 
The Signal was now under the editorship of Florence Fenwick Miller, who 
helped create the “Woman’s Signal Armenian Refugee Fund” distributed 
through Lady Somerset. Donations ranged from 100 pounds to 1 shil-
ling and totaled for one week in October 1896 over 240 pounds. Prayer 
meetings, British Women’s Temperance Union branches, Congregational 
church members, individuals, and anonymous donors including “An 
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English Sister” contributed to the fund, whose purpose was “not only 
to cover and feed these suffering ones, but to see that they have homes 
and work.” Potential donors were assured of the worthiness of the 600 
refugees helped by the fund: “Let it be remembered that they do not 
drink, that they are devout and earnest, exceedingly docile and kind and 
remarkably quick-minded.”103 Despite these industrious credentials refu-
gees would be resettled in Marseilles, not London. The fund eventually 
came to serve the destitute Armenians still living in eastern Anatolia. 
Somerset claimed in March 1897 that she had raised enough money to 
support a three year program to educate and care for orphans in Van. To 
Fenwick-Miller and the readers of the Signal she offered her thanks. The 
money collected from readers served as “eloquent proof of the worth of 
your paper which has gathered round it the best hearts of the woman-
hood of England.”104
Narratives of kinship between Britons and Ottoman Christians living in 
the cradle of civilization played a powerful role in the mid-century con-
ception of the Near East. By the turn of the century, a discourse of cul-
pability, responsibility, and proprietorship refined how this relationship 
came to be represented. Politicians, journalists, diplomats, travelers, and 
missionaries all participated in this process, telling stories about the Near 
East that connected the land, its people, and their customs to a distant 
Christian past that created bonds of kinship from discourses of suffer-
ing and subjugation. In many ways, the casting of the Eastern Question 
as a humanitarian issue had as much to do with its status as one of the 
great religious questions of the day as it did as a problem of European 
diplomacy. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the geographical 
representation of the Near East on the map. Over the course of the late 
nineteenth century, a project of ethnographically mapping the Ottoman 
Empire represented British imperial interests as intimately connected 
with Eastern Christians. The next chapter describes the material and dis-
cursive processes that conceptually drew the Near East closer to Britain 
as a Protestant borderland.
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By the end of Victoria’s reign, a common awareness of the Eastern 
Question meant that few would have failed to recognize the idea of the 
Near East, though most understandably might have been hard-pressed to 
trace its physical borders on a map. As Larry Wolff has argued, marking 
Europe in terms of East and West was part of a larger Enlightenment 
project that shifted the way Western Europe understood its place in the 
world.1 This reorientation of the map from a division based on Northern 
and Southern Europe to one divided by East and West held particular 
resonance for Britain, as it shifted an imperial gaze from North America 
to India.2 During the mid-nineteenth century, the “Near East,” the land 
separating Britain from India, the Empire’s geographical anchor, took on 
new significance. By the late nineteenth century, Britain drew the Near 
East closer to its empire through reconstructing the region considered 
just beyond Europe as a Protestant borderland.
The project of orienting the Near East in relationship to the British 
Empire relied on Victorian religious and ethnographic preoccupations. 
Geographical imaginings of the region in prose descriptions and draw-
ings of surveyors, diplomats, travelers, and missionaries made this 
world legible. The rise of geography as an academic discipline, bolstered 
by high-profile expeditions funded by the Royal Geographical Society 
and the Palestine Exploration Fund, contributed to representations of 
the Holy Land as adjacent to Europe.3 Improvements in communication 
and travel through transportation schemes like the Baghdad Railway 
shrunk the cultural and temporal distance between the Balkans, 
Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and Western Europe while trade, once tied to 
the monopoly Levant Company, encouraged business ventures that made 
the Eastern lands of the Ottoman Empire seem near.
2. Mapping the Near East
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Significantly, Ottoman Christians, spread across the Balkans and 
Anatolia, resided at the geographical epicenter of this capacious vision of 
the Near East. This chapter considers the importance of ethnographic map-
ping to this process of invention and incorporation. If the Enlightenment 
divided the world in terms of East and West, then Victorians reoriented it 
again in terms of religion and ethnicity. Put another way, the East/West 
divide was refined in terms of a Muslim/Christian distinction, which 
organized difference and defined geographical space on the map in a new 
way. The Near East in this cosmography had a number of different priori-
ties mapped onto it: commercial, imperial, and religious. It was this last 
category that most distinctively animated this reorientation producing a 
cultural geography based on ethnographic markers.
The term “Near East” sounds quaint to modern ears. It has largely lost 
its usefulness in political geography and instead evokes the distant reli-
gious and cultural world of ancient Mediterranean peoples living along 
the Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Seas. Travelers, missionaries, and civil 
servants certainly shared this romantic sense of the cradle of civilization 
populated by a mix of Orthodox Christians and Muslims living in and 
around the Holy Land. Victorians, however, also understood the ethno-
graphic boundaries of the term lending it a deeply political meaning that 
rendered significant the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire. To 
understand why, it is important to retrace the contexts in which the Near 
East first emerged as the geographic marker of the Eastern Question.
a neW MaP
The earliest maps of the Near East necessarily relied on the Victorian 
imagination. The difficulty of compiling an accurate topographical sur-
vey of the Ottoman Empire coupled with a growing preoccupation with 
the religious ethnography of the Holy Land gave nineteenth-century 
maps of the region their particular character. Actual survey work under-
taken by the British government only began after the 1878 Russo-Turkish 
War and continued in fits and starts up through World War I.4 Reliance 
on “a pot-pourri of sketch maps, travelers’ itineraries and anecdotal mate-
rial,” rather than “systematic survey,” insured the protracted nature of 
this process.5 Even after the Intelligence Department of the War Office 
began systematizing its output of maps, plans and drawings in 1881 the 
ad hoc nature of information gathering in Ottoman lands continued to 
hinder mapmakers. Worries on the part of the sultan with the “sinister 
intentions” of surveyors, along with “foreign competition and jealousy,” 
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put roadblocks in the way of meaningful survey work. As late as 1907 one 
surveyor complained that “our maps” of the Ottoman Empire “are very 
bad or inaccurate.”6
The unevenness of military surveys opened up a space for an eth-
nographic ordering of the Near East to take root. Here the pen and ink 
renderings of the Victorian mapmaker came to rely on literary repre-
sentations. Ethnographers began to focus attention on the peoples of the 
Ottoman Empire immediately after the Crimean War. Robert Latham’s 
The Varieties of the Human Species (1856) explicitly linked the study of 
ethnography to geography. For Latham, considered the father of ethno-
graphic science, understanding the “nations of the world” relied first on 
charting the “varieties of the human species.” His 1856 “Ethnographic Map 
of the World” depicted a Europe connected to the East by a small swath 
of “Indo European Caucasians” that included Armenian and Assyrians 
(see figure 6).7 For Latham the Turanians, or “Turks,” occupied a space 
between, fully part of neither Europe nor Asia.8 The liminal status of the 
ethnographers’ “Turanian” peoples reoriented the map according to ethnic 
considerations that drew the Near East, via its “Indo European Caucasian” 
populations, geographically closer to Europe. 
Military and academic preoccupations with the mapping of the 
Ottoman Empire found their complement in a growing popular interest 
in maps in general and Near East geography in particular. Maps them-
selves began to take on a new cultural significance during the second half 
of the nineteenth century. Improved lithography techniques and mar-
keting by commercial mapmaking firms made the mapmaker’s render-
ings more widely available through cheap reproductions found in books, 
newspapers, and other periodicals. The invention of the thematic map 
during this period captured the Victorian imagination by offering a new 
way of orienting oneself to the world by depicting religious distribution, 
climate, and social status, the most noteworthy in the latter category 
being “Booth’s Poverty Map of London.” Thematic world maps offered 
Britons another way of seeing the globe beyond national and imperial 
borders.
Maps of the Near East became a regular feature in periodicals, travel 
books, and literature starting soon after the Crimean War. Depictions 
increased substantially after the Russo-Turkish War. The rising popu-
larity of the atlas in particular helped shape British geographical under-
standings of the Near East. The renowned Edinburgh mapmaker A. K. 
Johnston’s Worldwide Atlas of Modern Geography, published in 1892, 
for example, contained two maps of the Near East: “Turkey in Asia” and 
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“Turkey in Europe and Bulgaria.” Complete with blank maps for students 
to practice geography lessons this atlas made no mention of the “Ottoman 
Empire” by name and instead reoriented the Near East in relation to 
Europe and Asia.9 Johnston also marketed individual maps to consumers 
including a large portrait-sized map of the “Near East” that sold for one 
shilling.
The first widely produced British maps of the Near East came out in 
the 1870s during the publicity surrounding the Bulgarian Atrocities. 
Edward Stanford’s 1876 Ethnological Map of European Turkey and Greece 
sold for one shilling sixpence and included a long introductory essay 
with accompanying statistics on population distribution by ethnicity and 
religion. Sir George Campbell, a former lieutenant governor of Bengal 
who spoke at the St. James’s Conference on the Eastern Question, wor-
ried that “as a nation we seem to have been content not at all to trouble 
ourselves about the fate of the Christians.”10 His 1876 book, A Handy 
Book on the Eastern Question, went into multiple editions and argued that 
Britons needed to see the Christian-dominated regions of the Ottoman 
Empire as connected to Europe.11 His “Map Showing the Distribution of 
the Christian Races in European Turkey” (figure 7) offered, with accom-
panying statistics, a thematic portrayal of Europe mapped along religious 
and ethnic lines. This map erased Muslim presence even in places like 
Albania where by his own estimates this group made up half the popu-
lation.12 Campbell advocated a physical remapping of the region in the 
wake of the Bulgarian Atrocities that followed this division: “the Bulgaria 
written across our maps, as applied to the long strip of territory north 
of the Balkans is a use of the term known neither to Turks nor to the 
Christians of Turkey. . . . It is clear that the Bulgaria to be dealt with must 
be the ethnological Bulgaria and not the Bulgaria of mapmakers.”13
Others supported this vision of a map oriented along religious and 
ethnic lines. Rev. William Denton argued in 1876 in his book The 
Christians of Turkey that Britons had both a moral and economic rea-
son for supporting Ottoman Christians in both “European” and “Asiatic” 
Turkey. Christian races, in contrast with Muslims, were natural allies 
due to their “superior industry and morality.” Frequent massacres, heavy 
taxation, and threats from nomadic peoples had historically stood in the 
way of Christian minority populations getting ahead.14 Denton used this 
argument to counter claims by Turkophiles who shared Disraeli’s view 
of the Ottoman Turk as Britain’s true partner. According to Denton, “the 
Turks are neither consumers of foreign goods nor producers of articles of 
commerce to any appreciable amount; and that when the whole race has 
(continued on page 48)
Figure 6. Ethnographic map of the world showing the similarities between 
peoples of Europe and the Near East. From Robert Latham, The Varieties of 
Human Species (London, 1856).
Figure 7 (overleaf). Religious and ethnographic map of Europe and 
the Near East. From Sir George Campbell, A Handy Book on the 
Eastern Question (London: Houlston and Stoneman, 1876).
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disappeared from the countries which it occupies . . . then, not merely 
will the peace of the rest of the world be less frequently menaced, but its 
commerce will be largely augmented.”15 As evidence of the advantages 
of Christian rule in the Near East, Denton cited Greece as an example of 
a country that successfully entered the European system after Ottoman 
rule ended in the 1830s.16 Ottoman Christians, in this reading, shared a 
common kinship with their Anglican Protestant brothers due to busi-
ness acumen and similar cultural sensibilities. These were the “polite and 
commercial people,” to borrow a phrase from Paul Langford, of the Near 
East.
The resolution of the Russo-Turkish War in the Treaties of San Stefano 
and Berlin in 1878 called for a physical remapping of the westernmost 
regions of the Ottoman Empire. As discussed in chapter 1, minority pro-
tection clauses proposed in the Treaty of San Stefano made a nominally 
independent Bulgaria and the reform of Ottoman laws that disadvan-
taged Christians a priority. Negotiators abandoned strong minority pro-
tection provisions when they superseded San Stefano with the Treaty of 
Berlin four months later. The spirit of San Stefano’s defense of minority 
Christian populations, however, lived on in attempts to remap the Near 
East along ethnic and religious lines, which advocates argued, in the end, 
would best protect minorities and promote British interests.
Sir John Ardagh, the man who led the team that drew the new bor-
der, embodied this belief. Born in 1840 in Waterford, Ireland, Ardagh 
started his career as part of the Royal Engineers, which eventually led to 
a post in 1876 with the Intelligence Department. In 1878 he attended the 
Congress of Berlin as a “technical military delegate attached to the special 
embassy,” where he produced a first draft of the new boundary.17 Ardagh 
met the other members of the Bulgarian Boundary Commission after 
the Conference in Constantinople, setting out on horseback to survey 
the country to be divided. Infighting among the German, French, and 
Russian surveyors opened up a space for Ardagh’s team of English sur-
veyors to contribute twenty of the thirty-four sketches of the new border. 
Three different surveys undertaken over the course of two – and-a-half 
years (“the task of fitting all these together was no easy one,” Ardagh 
recalled) produced a largely British drawn twelve-foot map.18
The disproportionate role played by British topographers in the survey 
work was reflected in the final map. Ardagh’s inability to decipher the 
world of political, religious, and ethnic rivalries on the ground made his 
hope of an “impartial” adjustment impossible. As he soon discovered, “By 
the Treaty of Berlin ‘the ancient frontier’ is to be maintained and accord-
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ing to the inhabitants, both Turk and Bulgarian, its actual position differs 
widely.” Continued conflict between Turks and Bulgarians made accurate 
survey work difficult at best. The new map, Ardagh continued, “would 
have been finished long ago but for the delay in furnishing the topog-
raphers with the safe-conducts necessitated by the disturbed condition 
of the country.”19 His letters complained of constant “interference” by 
residents who considered the boundary commission a “Mixed Army of 
Occupation.”20
Ardagh himself, having worked closely with the Turkish army as a 
British intelligence officer, showed little sympathy for the Bulgarians, 
whose attempts to influence the location of the new border he considered 
“a disgrace to the new Principality.” Nevertheless, Ardagh’s new map 
“pressed on the Turkish Government” in 1880 at a reconvening of the 
conference at Berlin shifted the imperial orientation of this former part 
of the Ottoman Empire to an ethnographic one that approximated the 
Christian/Muslim divide that animated popular and academic thinking 
about the region after the Crimean War.21
At least four different British cartographers rendered thematic maps 
of the boundary map over the next thirty years. Significantly, the bor-
ders of San Stefano, which had favored an ethnological “big Bulgaria” 
that encompassed the majority of the region’s Christians, lived on in 
popular maps even though it had been superseded by Berlin, which pro-
vided for a series of small Christian states organized more sharply along 
ethnic lines. Edward Stanford’s map of the failed Treaty of San Stefano 
(figure 8) continued to be reproduced well into the twentieth century. 
The “Map to Illustrate the Treaty of Berlin” issued after the ratification 
of this second treaty (figure 9) showed the changes to the war settlement 
and included, in pink, the territorial shifts of the nullified San Stefano 
settlement. 
These two maps offered a glimpse into the process by which the 
European powers attempted to balance Turkish and Russian power by 
bringing the Near East into the fold of Europe. In San Stefano we see 
the independent states of Campbell’s Christian Europe come into view. 
Berlin’s revision of San Stefano took the blanket division based on reli-
gion (that is, putting all of the Christians together) and refined it along 
ethnic lines, fragmenting “big Bulgaria” into three different principali-
ties. S. Augustus Mitchell’s 1880 “Map of the Berlin Congress Treaty” 
(figure 10) offered a similar view but included in its title “Map of Turkey 
in Europe.” In the end, these maps secured in the mind of a generation of 
Victorians the ethnographic boundaries first introduced by Latham after 
Figure 8. Edward Stanford, “Map to Illustrate the Treaty of San Stefano.” This 
widely reproduced map illustrates territorial boundaries as negotiated but never 
enacted under the Treaty of San Stefano. Courtesy of the National Library of 
Australia.
Figure 9. Edward Stanford, “Map to Illustrate Treaty of Berlin,” illustrating 
territorial boundaries as renegotiated under the Treaty of Berlin to limit 
Ottoman influence in the Near East. Courtesy of the National Library of 
Australia.
Figure 10. S. Augustus Mitchell, map illustrating the Treaty of Berlin 
settlement (London, 1880).
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the Crimean War, applied by Campbell and Denton during the Bulgarian 
Atrocities agitation of the mid 1870s and later codified by Ardagh. 
Significant sections of all three thematic maps included insets of 
Armenia and its Christian minority population. Stanford’s Treaty Maps 
included in former British Ambassador to Constantinople Stratford de 
Redcliffe’s 1881 account of the Eastern Question offered an even wider 
view (figure 11). Here eastern Anatolia finds itself connected to the 
Balkans by a single line that bypasses the majority Muslim region of 
western Anatolia. This reorientation of the map along religious and eth-
nic lines after the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin relied on assump-
tions that joined imperial and humanitarian impulses. As Campbell 
and Denton argued in the wake of the Bulgarian Atrocities and on the 
eve of the Russo-Turkish War, the Near East by virtue of its Christian 
populations belonged in Europe. Commercial prosperity, humanitarian 
concerns, and political stability for Europe and the Ottoman Empire in 
this narrative relied on strengthening this connection. 
In 1908, the mapmaker and publisher A. K. Johnston issued another 
thematic map of the two treaties. Sold for one shilling, the map (figure 
12) put the by-now thirty-year-old crisis again at the center of Western 
European concerns. The insets of Europe in 1815 and 1875 demonstrate 
how the changing of the map below fits into the larger narrative of 
European politics of the previous century. This version remains virtu-
ally identical to similar maps published in the 1870s with the important 
exception of the title: “Map to Illustrate the Near Eastern Question.” With 
war between the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente only narrowly avoided 
over Bosnia in 1908, interest in the Near East and the treaties that helped 
invent it would have justified this rechristening. 
The near eaST MoveS eaSTWard
So far the maps and descriptions discussed in this chapter have consid-
ered the Near East as beginning and ending, with the important addi-
tion of lands occupied by Armenian and Assyrian Christians in eastern 
Anatolia, in what is today Eastern Europe. Indeed, as late as the 1890s 
many still considered this the important physical and psychological bor-
derland of the Near East. As the traveler William Miller put it: “When 
the inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula are meditating a journey to any 
of the countries which lie to the west of them, they speak of ‘going to 
Europe,’ thereby avowedly considering themselves as quite apart from 
the European system. So far as ‘Europe’ is concerned this geographical 
(continued on page 58)
Figure 11. Treaty map that includes both the San Stefano and Berlin territorial 
agreements that geographically connect Eastern Christians in the Near East. 
From Stratford de Redcliffe, The Eastern Question (London: John Murray, 1881).
Figure 12 (overleaf). A. K. Johnston, turn-of-
the-century geopolitical map of the Near East 
(Edinburgh: W. and A. K. Johnston, 1908).
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inaccuracy possesses considerable justification. For of all parts of our con-
tinent none is so little known to the average traveler as the Near East.”22
Writing in 1898 Miller recognized the Near East as beginning where 
Europe ended. At the same time he emphasized the Near East as a lesser 
known part of “our continent.” Miller’s inside/outside conceptualization 
of the Near East reflected a growing preoccupation by British geogra-
phers and travelers alike to mark this territory as European. Miller, not 
satisfied with the thematically-oriented maps commercially available in 
Britain declared that “No good English map of the Peninsula” existed and 
decided “to use the best German map” to illustrate his book, which “neces-
sitated leaving the bulk of the names in the map in their German dress.”23 
During the late nineteenth century, diplomats, politicians, and travelers 
embarked on a project of mapping that included the Balkans as well as 
Anatolia and Persia, as Miller put it, “in English.” Significantly, the War 
Office launched its first official mapping surveys of Eastern Anatolia, the 
area considered the center of historic Armenia, starting in 1893.24
This cosmography offered an enlarged European-oriented Near 
East (figure 13). Miller’s oversized three-foot-wide map of the Balkan 
Peninsula included as a large foldout insert at the back of his book 
reached into Anatolia, including all of Constantinople, regions around 
the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Aegean Seas. A small legend at 
the bottom of the map translated Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Turkish 
geographical terms into English. Large swaths of land covered by eth-
nic groups rather than national borders covered the map. It ignored all 
national boundaries including those drawn at Berlin in 1878 that had laid 
down the borders of Roumania, Bulgaria, Servia, and Eastern Roumelia 
for the first time. 
This seemingly gross oversight made sense since Miller most likely 
used the German geographer Heinrich Kiepert’s ethnographical map 
produced before the Russo-Turkish War settlement.25 However, Miller’s 
readers would not have known this, since he neglected to give any credit 
to Kiepert. Laziness or concerns over plagiarism might have explained 
Miller’s choice to translate Kiepert’s map into English rather than offer 
a more accurate map that showed new national boundaries. More likely, 
his decision to include this particular map reflected the trajectory of his 
narrative organized around a host of ethnographic observations on what 
he called “barbarism and civilization” during his travels. This explana-
tion suggests that ethnographic conceptions of the Near East continued 
to exist alongside national considerations long after the European powers 
divided the region into a chain of small nation-states.
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Although Britain, Germany, Austria, Russia and France all compiled 
their own ethnographic maps during this period, the British made this 
cosmography their own by tying ethnography to commerce and empire.26 
In Britain, the science of “human geography” grew out of the theoretical 
framework laid out by Robert Latham at mid-century and tried to explain 
social progress through ethnographic markers.27 Geographers such as 
Marion Newbigin popularized the use of topography, location, and cli-
mate to explain why some societies prospered while others languished. 
In her widely read Modern Geography, Newbigin rejected notions that 
national boundaries could take the place of geographically bound racial 
and ethnic divisions that had determined the evolutionary develop-
ment of societies both in and outside of Europe.28 The Holy Land offered 
Newbigin a useful case study in ethnographic determinism. Concluding 
the book with a chapter entitled “The Coming of the Turks,” she remarked 
that after the Ottoman invasion “civilized man had outgrown his cradle,” 
leaving “the Midland Sea for the greater world beyond.”29 This portrait 
of a conquered Mediterranean stuck in its infancy under Ottoman rule 
made it a place ripe for a modern revival.
The geographer D. G. Hogarth offered an ethnographic portrait of a 
Near East tied to Britain by both religion and commerce. His book The 
Nearer East was published in 1902 as a volume in the series Regions of 
the World, which targeted a popular audience. Hogarth, an archeologist, 
traveler, and fellow at Magdalen College Oxford, expanded the borders 
of the Near East beyond Eastern Europe using human geography: “The 
aim of this volume is to present the causative influence of geographical 
conditions upon Man in a certain region.” Here his ethnological map of 
the Nearer East mirrored Miller’s by showing Albanians, Montenegrins, 
Armenians, Turks, and Arabs, with specific attention paid to Islamic 
designations spread across what is today Eastern Europe, Turkey, the 
Arabian Peninsula, Greece, Egypt, and most of Iran (figure 14). 
The logic of the designation “the Nearer East” relied on its relationality 
to the West. First, the “cradle of civilization” represented the birthplace of 
Christian Europe and the Holy Land. Second, Hogarth’s Near East was 
the present source of “luxury products” such as spices, food stuffs, silks, 
and carpets that Europeans valued. Echoing the characterization of the 
Near East by Fraser’s magazine in 1856 discussed in chapter 1, Hogarth 
described a world where these two elements, Christian and commercial, 
Figure 13 (overleaf). Turn-of-the-century travel map of the Near East. From 
William Miller, Travels and Politics in the Near East (London: Unwin, 1898).


Figure 14. “The Nearer East” defined by region according to religion and 
ethnicity. From D. G. Hogarth, The Nearer East (London: W. Heinemann,1902).
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constituted what he referred to as the region’s contribution to the “corpo-
rate human body.”
As with earlier maps, Hogarth’s ethnographical divisions relied on 
a distinction between Christian and Muslim populations. However, he 
offered a more unified vision of place than others, like Campbell, pre-
sented twenty-five years previous. Here an expanded geography divided 
Christians and Muslims in a patchwork of ethnic affiliations, from the 
eastern edge of the Balkans to Persia, that brought these populations 
together in an entity called the Near East. Hogarth remained conscious 
of the tenuous nature of this designation, however, claiming that the 
Near East existed as a series of “Debatable Lands” loosely joined together 
by their relationship to Europe. Hogarth hoped to use his work to encour-
age the accurate mapping of the Holy Land. Better maps, he maintained, 
would lead to a clearer understanding of human social origins and con-
sumer relationships that gave the Nearer East its geographical integrity. 
The final section in his introduction included a list of the most up-to-date 
maps of each region covered in the book along with their deficiencies. 
Pointing out the inaccuracies of these maps arguably made his own con-
ceptual renderings of the region that much more influential.
The journalist and traveler David Fraser found Hogarth’s ethno-
graphic map particularly useful when he wrote The Short Cut to India 
in 1909. Fraser argued that Britain should fund the completion of the 
Baghdad Railway across Anatolia to Persia. Improvements in rail travel, 
the Orient Express’s service to Constantinople began in 1883, and bet-
ter communication technology already had begun to connect these 
regions more concretely to Britain.30 To make his case for strengthening 
these links he cited Hogarth, claiming that “it is essential to take into 
consideration the idiosyncrasies of the people, and the character of the 
country and climate.” Traveling along the route of the proposed railway 
route in 1908 in the midst of the Young Turk Revolution in the Ottoman 
Empire, Fraser understood the risks of investing British capital in such a 
venture. He used Hogarth’s categories to counter claims that an inland 
route through a sparsely populated region would not be cost effective. 
For although it might be difficult to find Arab laborers to build the rail-
way, he argued, Near Eastern Christians were a particularly industrious 
race who eventually would make good use of the route and bring fur-
ther development to the region. According to Fraser, “They are nearly all 
Arabs (along proposed route) to whom manual labour is as repulsive as 
it is to the unemployed in Trafalgar Square.” By contrast, he maintained 
that “Armenians are really the most useful element of the population, 
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for they are diligent farmers, expert craftsmen, capable shopkeepers and 
when education avails, they become skilled in the professions.” “Hearsay” 
evidence from doctors Fraser had met in the region reassured him that 
the Christian population was reproducing much more rapidly than the 
Muslim, which he concluded would bode well for the venture.31
Ethnography influenced military mapping as well. The decision to 
map “Eastern Anatolia” came in anticipation of a conflict on the bor-
der between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The Intelligence Branch 
completed the Russo-Turkish Frontier in Asia map as mandated by the 
Treaty of Berlin in 1880. Attention then turned to a very detailed survey 
of the towns, topography, and people of the eastern Ottoman Empire. 
Significantly, each section surveyed began with a detailed description 
of the majority populations. In the case of eastern Anatolia, the site of 
historic Armenia and the first region to be mapped in this survey, these 
included the “Turks, Armenians and Greeks.”
Led by Captain F. R. Maunsell, the government project relied on 
surveys by British consuls serving in the region, Royal Geographical 
Society (RGS) expeditions, and the observations of travelers.32 Maunsell, 
himself a fellow at the RGS, was educated at Cheltenham College and the 
Royal Military Academy and entered the Royal Artillery in 1881. During 
the course of his more than fifty-year career, he wrote extensively on the 
Eastern Question and served as vice-consul in various posts in eastern 
Anatolia.33 The government handed over the final map to the RGS, which 
made this information available to the public, publishing the final version 
of Maunsell’s map in its journal in 1906.
The military was not done with Maunsell’s map, however. The RGS 
took what they called the “Map of Eastern Turkey in Asia, Syria and 
Western Persia” and put it through multiple revisions, adding territory 
and railroads as information became available. In 1917, the War Office 
bought the original plates of the Maunsell map, as it became known, from 
the RGS. Retitling it “Map of Eastern Turkey in Asia, Syria and Western 
Persia: Ethnographical,” the military gave Maunsell’s map a color-coded 
overlay that separated the people of the region according to ethnicity and 
religion.34 The Germans published their own version of Maunsell’s map 
one year later.
The persistence of this ethnographical frame, which grew to accom-
modate the Balkans, Asia Minor, and parts of Persia, speaks to its 
usefulness as a way of organizing the East. Between 1897 and 1939 the 
Near East appeared in the titles of over fifty advocacy, travel, and his-
torical monographs. The RGS magazine during this period also began 
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indexing the “Near East” for the first time. The increasing number of 
index entries in this category charted the growing interest in maps of 
the region. Hundreds more references occurred in the press and within 
scores of other texts. Some titles, like The Situation in the Near East: A 
Brief Account of the Recent Massacres (1904), made a case for humanitar-
ian involvement, while others, like British Policy in the Near East (1897) 
and Our Allies and Enemies in the Near East (1918), advocated a stronger 
British military presence.
The Near East, though generally referring to the lands dominated by 
the “European and Asiatic” parts of the Ottoman Empire, still remained a 
place where its actual physical boundaries remained in flux. In part, this 
was because the easternmost regions remained only partially mapped by 
British geographers up through World War I despite efforts by the War 
Office to make the mapping of the Near East a priority in the 1890s.35 The 
problem, however, went beyond more accurate survey work. The mul-
tiethnic and religious character of the region had always resisted easy 
classification. No map could make sense to Western eyes of the maze of 
overlapping societies that had existed side by side for centuries, some-
times at peace and sometimes at war. In the British imagination the Near 
East represented an amalgam of cultural markers that linked imperial 
interests in part with the fate of the region’s Orthodox Christians living 
in the cradle of civilization.
a ProTeSTanT holy land
For missionaries, this conceptual mapping of the Near East had particular 
resonance. The rise of a vibrant missionary press during the second half 
of the nineteenth century offered Victorians a religion-oriented geog-
raphy through coverage of foreign mission projects.36 As the Ottoman 
Empire emerged as a focus of evangelical work during the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the religious press began to offer prose and icon-
ographical descriptions of the Near East. This interest in the Ottoman 
Empire as a site of mission work contributed to ethnographic representa-
tions of the Holy Land.
Some of the most compelling of these depictions came from the 
flagship journal of the Church Missionary Society (CMS), the Gleaner. 
Representations of the CMS’s Mediterranean and Persian missions 
described a land made familiar by the attempt to revive a lost kinship 
between Britons and Eastern Orthodox Christians. “From the earli-
est days of the infant Society, the Committee’s eyes had been upon 
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‘the East,’ ” claimed one CMS historian writing in 1899, “that is, those 
Oriental lands where ancient Christian Churches were living a barely 
tolerated life under the oppressive rule of the Turk.” This afforded new 
opportunities for mission work. As he continued: “ ‘If those Churches,’ 
they said, ‘could be brought back to the knowledge and love of the sacred 
Scripture’ might they not become ‘efficient instruments of rescuing the 
Mohammedans from delusion and death?’ ”37 The CMS set out to “revive” 
these ancient Christians that had languished under Ottoman rule.38 A 
renewed Christian Orthodox church in the Holy Land advocates believed 
would also “have an effect on the Mohammedan and Heathen World.”39
This project began in earnest as British influence in the region grew in 
the period surrounding the Russo-Turkish War.40 Stories in the Gleaner 
defined the Near East as an obvious place of interest to the CMS in his-
torical and geographical terms: “It was natural that the eyes of the early 
Committee of the Church Missionary Society, surveying the vast fields of 
labour open before them, should rest with peculiar interest on the lands 
of the Bible.” These “lands of the Bible” initially included Greece, Turkey, 
Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, “and even Abyssinia,” though the CMS soon 
abandoned its failed efforts in Egypt and Abyssinia. These regions were 
seen as united as a birthplace of Christianity now under both Muslim 
rule and the influence of ancient Eastern Churches “steeped in ignorance 
and superstition.”41 This framing of mission work as an effort aimed at 
bringing back a “corrupted” Christian church to its origins required forg-
ing connections between Anglican Protestants and Eastern Orthodox 
Christians.
Coverage of the society’s “New Mission to Persia” in May 1876 rein-
forced these connections. Rev. Robert Bruce, the founder of the Persian 
mission, provided an intimate portrait of the Holy Land.42 In the pages 
of the Gleaner, Bruce invited the CMS community to travel with him 
to “see” the mission for themselves: “Dear readers, will you accompany 
me on a journey to Persia? You will never understand our Mission till 
you pay it a visit.” On this “visit” he offers an ethno-religious reimag-
ining of the region: “I must tell you first there is no such kingdom of 
Persia. Persia is a misnomer: the Shah calls himself not the Shah of Persia 
but of Iran. Persia is only a province of Iran and Iran is the same word 
as Aryan, which reminds us that the Iranians are our near of kin, and 
like all true Aryans, have great capabilities, so that if they could only 
be made Christians they would be as noble a race as their cousins the 
Anglo-Saxons.”43 Bruce’s travel tale connected Persia with Britain’s own 
story of origin. Even the geography of Persia was drawn closer to British 
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shores through the promise of bringing “Aryan” people back into the fold 
as Anglo-Saxon kin who had the potential to adopt Christianity. This 
reading drew upon Victorian understandings of the category of “Aryan” 
that could include both Muslims and Christians.44
Missionary stories of travel in the Near East mapped the region as both 
a familiar and a welcoming land. “A Holiday among the Mountains of 
Persia” represented the region as the perfect place for a missionary to take 
a much needed rest with his companions. The travels of Bruce’s successor, 
Rev. C. H. Stileman, through the mountains outside Julfa reminded him 
of home: “We could now almost imagine ourselves in Devonshire, as we 
were in a well-watered, fertile valley everything green around us, with 
narrow lanes passing between orchards full of ripening apples and plums 
and other fruit.”45 Another story, “By-Ways of the Pleasant Land” by “A 
Lady Missionary,” told of a picturesque journey taken by a female mis-
sionary and her entourage of “native helpers” on the “Sultan’s Highway.” 
Lacking geographic specificity, the tale offers a similarly idealized por-
trait of a not-unfamiliar rugged land: “Imagine a brilliant June morning,” 
she began. “The night dews only too quickly rolling away from the hills, 
but still hanging here and there in faint white vapour; vineyards in fra-
grant blossom, green with the bright, fresh verdure of early summer, a 
western breeze tempering the scorching rays of the sun.”46
Even tales of failed missionary efforts could serve to broaden the con-
nections between the Christian community in Britain and the one the 
CMS hoped to revive in the Near East. The Constantinople Mission had 
been plagued by difficulties from the beginning. Started in 1818, it was 
closed three years later “owing to an outbreak of popular fanaticism” and 
then restarted in 1858 in the wake of the Crimean War only to end again 
in 1877.47 The end of the Russo-Turkish War afforded new opportunities. 
In 1879, the Gleaner reported that “several friends urged upon the CMS 
the importance of resuming its work in Turkey and Asia Minor, in view of 
the increased opening of those countries which will probably result from 
recent political changes.”48 The CMS focused its work on existing mission 
stations where it ministered to both Eastern Orthodox Christians and 
nomadic and settler Arab populations in Palestine, despite prohibitions 
against Muslim conversions.49 The New Mission Church at Jerusalem, 
in place of the failed Mission at Constantinople, emerged as the center of 
this work in the heart of the Holy Land.50
Narratives of the challenge of conversion were accompanied by stories 
that offered small encouragements from the field. “Islam and Christian 
Missions” cast Muslims as intractable: “The Gospel in the Mission Field 
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has no more powerful or bitter foe than Islam.”51 Converts were brutally 
punished and missionaries who entered Muslim homes often quickly 
were kicked out. Stories of proselytizing efforts, however, demonstrated 
an eagerness to draw in Muslims despite strict restrictions on conversion. 
“Although we are nearly always well received,” wrote Miss J. Ellis from 
Cairo, “perhaps I ought to tell also that we have been literally turned out of 
four houses by the husbands of the women, one of them (a teacher in one of 
the Government schools) being exceedingly rude, and telling us ‘never to 
come there again’ but it is a marvel to me, visiting entirely among Moslems 
as we do, that we are not oftener subject to this kind of treatment.”52
This conceptualization of the Near East populated by a revived 
Christian church and potential Muslim converts was accompanied by a 
more concrete form of mapping in the pages of the Gleaner. “A journey to 
Iran is not so formidable an undertaking as some think it to be,” opined 
the Rev. Bruce in 1894. Much as his wife had done in her travel log pub-
lished twenty years earlier, Bruce wrote a piece that took the reader on 
a journey from London to Iran that ended in familiar territory. In this 
case, “the Northern Liverpool of Iran”: “Twenty-four hours will take you 
from London to Berlin and fifty more thence to Odessa. In from three to 
five days you will cross the Black Sea to Batoum and in thirty-six hours 
you will get across the Caucasus by train to Baku. . . . A sail of thirty-
six hours, in a good Russian steamer on the Caspian ought to complete 
the journey and land you at Enzelli, the Northern Liverpool of Iran.”53 
A journey that had taken forty-five days, thanks to improvements in 
railway communication funded in part by British capital, now could be 
completed in fewer than ten days. Bruce’s accompanying map entitled 
“Mohammedan Lands” situated the region that much closer to Britain by 
showing Persia’s proximity to both Europe and India.
A little more than ten years later, the “Moslem Fund Campaign” proj-
ect mapped this geography. “Our needs are so great and urgent that we 
must seek to enlist the help of all classes,” implored a writer in the “From 
the Home Field” column. A square collection box, the “Moslem Box,” was 
decorated with a map that split the world between Christian Europe and 
the Muslim East (figure 15). At the center lay the Near East mission proj-
ects of the CMS, with arms extending to all Muslim-ruled territory: “The 
‘octopus’ map which demonstrates very vividly the Moslem Menace, is 
in itself a powerful plea.”54 With Europe pictured above and India to the 
far right of the picture, a pie chart on the opposite side characterized the 
number of people living under Christian rule, a number augmented by 
the British Empire’s hold over India and East Africa. 
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By the eve of World War I these stories and visual representations 
added up to a portrait of the Near East that spanned from Eastern Europe 
to the borders of India and encompassed Christian minorities and 
Muslims alike. Campaigns like the “Moslem Box” provided a material 
representation of this world view to those who held, studied, passed, and 
then contributed to the cause of bringing those areas of the map “under 
Christian rule.” The extending of the geographical scope of Britain’s Near 
East thus relied in part on an ethnographic understanding of the peoples 
of this region as distant kin in need of revival in the case of Christians 
or conversion in the case of Muslims. This religious and ethnographic 
Figure 15. CMS charity “Moslem Box” to promote Christian missions in the 
Near East. Gleaner, February 1910
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reading contributed to other narratives that envisioned a Near East that 
spanned from the Balkans to the Indian border.
curzon’S Big near eaST
Political pragmatists also found something compelling in ethnographic 
and religious understandings of the Near East. A look at George 
Nathaniel Curzon’s writing reveals a view of empire deeply informed by 
such conceptualizations when it came to the Eastern Question. In the 
years just preceding his taking up of the post of viceroy of India, Curzon 
wrote three books that defined the importance of the empire in the East: 
Russia in Central Asia (1889), Persia and the Persian Question (1892), and 
Problems of the Far East (1894). In the final volume of his series on what 
he called “Asiatic Problems,” Curzon with typical hubris mapped the Near 
East at the center of the British Empire: “What I have already endeav-
oured to do for Russia and Central Asia and for Persia or the countries on 
this side of India, i.e. the Near East — what I hope to be able to do hereafter 
for two other little-known Asiatic regions, directly bordering upon India, 
i.e. the Central East — I attempt to do in this volume, and in that which 
will follow it, for the countries lying beyond India, i.e. the Far East.”55 
Here in the middle of Curzon’s map sat India. The Near East, defined 
as regions to the west of India remained distinct from those to its East, 
the Far East. The concept of the Middle East, or Central East as Curzon 
called it, was still in its infancy and included only those regions, namely 
Afghanistan, on India’s western border.
This capacious definition of the Near East proved of use to Curzon 
in making his argument that the British must increase investment in 
railways, trade, and infrastructure to thwart European and Russian com-
petition in the region. The Near East here included Persia and Arabia as 
a corridor for Britain to access India. As Curzon continued in his intro-
duction, “As I proceed with this undertaking the true fulcrum of Asiatic 
domination seems to me increasingly to lie in the Empire of Hindustan. 
The secret of the mastery of the world, is, if they only knew it, in the 
possession of the British people.”56 This idea of the lands of the Ottoman 
Empire as a gateway to India certainly did not originate with Curzon, who 
believed “without India the British Empire could not exist.”57 However, 
his travels in the region and political influence over policy, survey work, 
and mapmaking, (as a gold medalist and president of the RGS)58 popular-
ized the notion that of a big Near East.
Significantly, Curzon’s geopolitical vision of the Near East relied on 
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ethnographic imaginings. His work included an extensive discussion of 
who inhabited his Near East, contributing to discourse on the nature of 
the Muslim/Christian divide. Curzon did not seek to erase Muslims from 
his expanding Near East as Campbell had done earlier in his map of the 
Balkans, a task that even for someone like Curzon by this time would 
have proved difficult. A great believer in the salutary effects of the British 
Empire on populations under its influence, Curzon instead embraced the 
notion that Muslims as a monotheistic people shared the potential for 
kinship with the British that could be cultivated through the spread of 
English education and values. This secular conversion narrative adapted 
Rev. Bruce’s religious ideal of kinship with the Aryan peoples of Iran. 
Curzon thus populated his vision of the Near East with Aryan kin who 
shared a common ancestry with the British: “it ought not be difficult to 
interest Englishmen in the Persian people. They have the same lineage as 
ourselves. Three thousand years ago their forefathers left the uplands of 
that mysterious Asian home from which our ancestral stock had already 
gone forth . . . They were the first of the Indo-European family to embrace 
a purely monotheistic faith.”59 Curzon of course understood the peoples 
of the Near East, Christian and Muslim alike, only as distant kin. Page 
after page of his two volumes on the region are filled with descriptions 
of habits he finds appalling and customs he cannot understand, leading 
his biographer to wonder why he wrote so long about people he did not 
like very much.60 Idealizing ethnic and religious connections with both 
Christians and Muslims in the Near East was central to Curzon’s cos-
mography, however. Mapping the Near East in this way made it possible 
to cast the problem of geopolitical power in the region as an imperial 
civilizing mission.
Curzon’s vision of the Near East as stretching from the Balkan fron-
tier and into Asia and beyond tapped into a growing common sentiment. 
Guide books such as Practical Hints for Travelers in the Near East, pub-
lished in 1902, began to include North Africa, the Balkans, Turkey, Syria, 
and Palestine as part of the region. Missionaries also found opportunity 
in expanding the geography of the Near East.61 The Near East, accord-
ing to the Gleaner, encompassed “ ‘Moslum’ and Oriental lands” “which lie 
between the Mediterranean and the frontier states of India.”62 What would 
incorporate these regions for missionaries like Bruce was the potential 
for conversion, which would make them “as noble a race as their cousins 
Figure 16 (overleaf). British map of the Near East. From the Harmsworth Atlas 
and Gazetteer (London: Carmelite House, 1909).
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the Anglo-Saxons.”63 Like Curzon, Bruce’s view of the Near East relied on 
notions of distant kinship. Others like Valentine Chirol understood the 
Eastern Question in terms of Curzon’s expanded geography: “Thus in the 
brief course of some forty years — say between 1860 and 1900 — the area 
of that Eastern question, which only a generation ago appeared confined 
mainly to the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean and the 
Black Sea, has been extended, not only across the Caspian and the plains 
of Central Asia, but to the far-away coast of the Pacific.”64
This expanded geography joined geopolitical and ethnographic con-
ceptions of the Near East in a familiar revival narrative. Writing in 1907 
the traveler and journalist William LeQueux argued that “[t]he countries 
denominated by the general name of the Near East are, by their geo-
graphical position and fertility, of immense importance. They have been 
the cradle of the ancient civilization and of rich and powerful empires. 
The reason of their gloomy present does not lie either in the exhaustion 
of the soil or in the loss of their geographical importance, but only in the 
administration which the Turk has established for centuries over them. 
A change in the administration will bring resurrection.” Britain had the 
ultimate responsibility to bring these changes to the Ottoman peoples by 
“call[ing] forth in them an immense economical development” in a region 
that rival Germany had already “thrown covetous eyes.”65
The big Near East of the early twentieth century, firmly rooted in 
Victorian ethnographic understandings, offered a canvas on which to 
map geopolitical priorities. By the early twentieth century the Near East 
emerged as an important feature of conceptualizations of the British 
Empire. In 1909, the Times’s proprietor, Alfred Harmsworth (later Lord 
Northcliffe), published the Harmsworth Atlas of the World. In it he pre-
sented a vision of the Near East as a land connected to Britain by modern 
lines of communication populated by endless natural resources (figure 
16). This thematic map created by the London Geographical Institute 
included the supposed location of products that had already captured the 
British imagination. Silver, saffron, and lead from Asia Minor; wool, salt, 
opium, and tobacco from Persia; wheat, coffee, and camels from Arabia 
all lay within easy reach of British Possessions (“colored in red”). 
The future Lord Northcliffe’s geographical hubris matched and even 
exceeded that of Curzon. From the Balkans to the horn of Africa to 
Persia to India to the Malay Peninsula, the map entitled “The Near East: 
Industries and Communications” depicted the Near East at the center 
of a British Empire that knew no bounds. In the west, the national des-
ignations of Bulgaria, Turkey, and Armenia, the latter still part of the 
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Ottoman Empire, joined Asia Minor, Persia, and Afghanistan to the 
British Empire in the East. This rendering of the Near East effectively 
erased the Ottoman Empire as a designation from the map. Small black 
flags punctuated the landscape, designating the expanse of British con-
sular outposts established in the immediate wake of the Russo-Turkish 
War. These outposts lined the trade route where an abundance of rail-
ways, canals, steamship routes, and cables connected the Near East in a 
vast imperial web.
This Near East spanning from the Balkans to India and beyond pro-
jected a new authority over the people and resources of the Ottoman 
Empire during a moment when British imperial power in the “Far East” 
was at its height. The 1878 Treaty of Berlin had set the stage for the con-
ceptual dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. By the turn of the century 
maps more frequently used designations such as “Turkey in Europe” and 
“Turkey in Asia” over the term “Ottoman Empire” or, as in the case of 
Harmsworth, erased it altogether, decades before World War I brought 
the Empire itself to its actual end. Such commercial and imperial rep-
resentations were not invented in a vacuum. Rather, they came out of 
and contributed to ethnographic understandings of the Near East drawn 
along religious lines.
Geographical renderings of the Near East reflected Victorian under-
standings of the Eastern Question that shifted both the humanitarian 
and imperial gaze farther eastward. Extending the boundaries of the 
Christian Near East through the Balkans, Anatolia, and around the 
Mediterranean expanded the geography of British responsibility par-
ticularly during the Bulgarian Atrocities agitation and later during the 
Armenian massacres of the 1890s and massacres of Orthodox Christian 
populations during World War I. The next two chapters trace the insti-
tutionalization of a worldview that coupled proprietary interest with 
humanitarian responsibility.
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In May 1876 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe (formerly Sir Stratford Canning) 
presented a plan to transform the way British foreign policy worked in the 
Near East in a lengthy letter to the Times. Considered the elder statesman 
on the Eastern Question, the former ambassador outlined an ambitious 
program to establish “equality of all classes before civil law” as reports of 
unrest in Bulgaria began to reach Britain.1 He suggested a new kind of 
hands-on diplomacy where British consular representatives would over-
see the implementation of changes to Ottoman civil and legal adminis-
tration. Doubts raised about the “practicability” of such a plan led Lord 
Redcliffe to “draw up a fuller statement” six months later as the Bulgarian 
Atrocities agitation raged at home. His memorandum on “Suggestions 
for the Settlement of the Eastern Difficulty” promised to transform the 
consular service in the Near East into a network of political, military, and 
juridical posts scattered largely throughout the Christian provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire.2
For men like Redcliffe, the answer to the Eastern Question rested in 
part with a more activist foreign policy when it came to Ottoman internal 
affairs. Transforming consular work from a loose network of commercial 
agents to the wider duties envisioned by Redcliffe would do just that. 
Britain had pushed the project of reforming the Ottoman legal and civil 
code with then Ambassador Canning’s attempt to reinforce the Tanzimat 
reforms in the 1856 Crimean War settlement.3 The failure of this effort 
took on a sense of urgency in the wake of the Bulgarian Atrocities with 
calls to better enforce reforms outlined in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. This 
chapter traces the rise of new diplomatic beliefs and practices through the 
experiences of some of the agents charged with this task. Diplomats, civil 
servants, and their families served in both official and unofficial capaci-
3. Humanitarian Diplomacy
Consular work is the public face of British diplomacy.
Foreign oFFice rePorT, 2000
The Consuls in the Levant have duties of a higher description to 
discharge than those in any other part of the world.
lord PalMerSTon, May 7, 1855
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ties in the Near East while engaging in humanitarian advocacy work and 
philanthropic activities. More than mere representatives of government 
policy, their work narrated diplomatic interests in terms of a growing 
belief in humanitarian responsibility for subject populations.
The civil service began expanding in the Near East after the Crimean 
War and drew diplomats and consuls more intimately into Ottoman inter-
nal affairs. In addition to the ambassador’s residence in Constantinople, 
a network of 62 consular outposts in the Ottoman Empire employed 
in the 1860s around 350 consuls, vice consuls and consuls general. By 
1900, a well-established network of official consular posts extended from 
Belgrade to Basra.4 These agents, initially charged with protecting the 
interests of the nearly one million British subjects living in the region, 
took on another directive. Beirut Consul Elridge, for example, reported 
in 1870 that he would periodically put aside his commercial and juridical 
duties to intervene in religious and political conflicts among the local 
population.5 As one government report put it in 1871, “No body of men 
are more usefully employed in securing the extension of commercial 
enterprise, the welfare of the people among whom they live and the 
maintenance of peace.”6
A major restructuring of the consul system in the Ottoman Empire 
occurred under the title of the “Levant Consular Service” in 1877. The 
name, borrowed from the defunct crown-chartered Levant Company, 
intended to connect local administrative and peacekeeping functions of 
the consuls with their traditional role as commercial agents that dated 
back to the sixteenth century. In practice, when it came to the western-
most lands of the Ottoman Empire and Anatolia, places with the larg-
est concentration of Christian minorities, commerce took a back seat to 
political administration. The introduction of the category of “military 
consul” after the Russo-Turkish War made mediation a central duty of 
the consul. These men watched the border while they supervised the 
implementation of treaty agreements that protected minorities living in 
towns along the Russo-Turkish frontier.7 The presence of this group of 
paid agents of the crown in politically volatile areas necessarily involved 
them in work that often blurred the boundaries between civil and mili-
tary functions. The fallout from the Bulgarian Atrocities in the late 1870s 
and the Armenian massacres of the mid-1890s brought diplomats and 
consuls more deeply into local matters that included arbitration for sub-
ject populations, relief work, and legal defense. Out of this configuration 
came a diplomacy that made humanitarian advocacy a legitimate part of 
foreign policy.
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reFaShioning diPloMacy in The near eaST 
Changes in the way diplomacy operated in the Near East came out of 
debates during the Crimean War. In 1855, Lord Palmerston argued that 
the structure of diplomacy should reflect the special nature of British 
interests in the Ottoman Empire: “in the East the consul, besides his 
strictly consular duties, had certain judicial and even diplomatic, duties 
to discharge. He was the channel of communication in all matters of 
complaints within his cognizance with the centre of the Government.” 
These “higher duties,” as he called them, allowed Palmerston to argue 
on behalf of expanding both the number of consuls and their function.8 
In 1825, Ambassador Canning had set the stage for this shift by dis-
solving the Levant Company and transferring the administration of the 
consular system to the government. This opened up the possibility of 
making consuls more than commercial agents employed by a chartered 
company with a mandate to protect and promote mercantile interests. 
The outbreak of the Crimean War necessitated better defining what this 
meant. The growth of the government-run consul service to five times its 
previous size by 1856 resulted primarily from appointing representatives 
with “judicial and political functions” to areas of little commercial value 
to trade.9 “Every consul in the East,” one former consul observed in an 
interview in 1903, “bears a more or less political character and is daily 
engaged in the conduct of negotiations with the native authorities which 
require all the tact and intimate knowledge of men that are supposed to 
be the essential qualifications of the trained diplomatist.”10
Percy Ellen Algernon Frederick William Sydney Smythe, later the 
eighth Viscount Strangford (1825 – 69), was an early proponent of the new 
diplomacy. “There are other sick things in Turkey besides the sick man,” 
he wrote of the diplomatic service in 1863, “though they are not half such 
good subjects for declamation.”11 Described by one contemporary as hav-
ing a “keen Oriental-looking face and beard” with an extreme “shortness 
of sight,” Lord Strangford attended Oxford and later served as one of two 
student attachés to Constantinople in 1845, a position made official in 
1849. Later, he served as Oriental secretary during the Crimean War.12 
His expressed love of geography and knowledge of numerous languages 
including Turkish, Sanskrit, Persian, Arabic, and Greek led to the char-
acterization of him as the “the most varied linguist this country has ever 
produced.” As president of the Royal Asiatic Society Strangford promoted 
what he called the “open race for the knowledge of this part of the world” 
between Russia and Britain.13 After assuming his title on his brother’s 
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death in 1857, he split time between London and Constantinople, where 
he joined a Muslim fraternity and lived for a time the austere life of a 
dervish.
A committed ethnologist interested in the history of nations based on 
linguistic commonalities, Lord Strangford’s intellectual interests deeply 
informed his politics. His ideas about the Near East found audience in 
numerous articles published in the Pall Mall Gazette, Saturday Review, 
and Quarterly Review. He adhered to the Palmerstonian line that both 
admired the Ottomans while seeing the end of the Empire as inevitable 
and maintained that the future rested with its Christian minorities. 
Though many of his generation thought Greeks would serve this role, 
Lord Strangford held that the Bulgarians would modernize the Empire. 
At the same time he had a deep respect for the Ottoman elite, whom he 
viewed as akin to Britain’s aristocracy. This put him in line with many 
liberals of the time who believed that Christian rule would not come out 
of a revolutionary moment but as the result of a slow natural progression. 
The “Christians of European Turkey will be the ultimate masters of the 
country” by slow growth, not “convulsive” change.14 The British would 
encourage this process not through military action but rather by mak-
ing sure that Christian minorities could govern themselves, eventually 
freeing themselves from Ottoman rule. Writing in the 1860s, he argued 
that the Bulgarians, a “virtuous” and not revolutionary people, best dem-
onstrated this capability for self-government.
Lord Strangford hated the notion of the Eastern Question. “The term 
Eastern Question is in itself a convenient way of expressing the whole 
aggregate of Turkish foreign politics in two words and it cannot well be 
dispensed with. But to predicate the ‘solution’ of it is simply to miss the 
point, which is that it is insoluble by any action from without, short of 
downright brute conquest. It is high time to get rid of so misleading a for-
mula.”15 Rather, he understood what others called the Eastern Question 
as a process that would result in the eventual resolution of conflicts 
over the minority problem in the Ottoman Empire. No naïve idealist, 
Strangford exercised caution when it came to forcing reforms on the 
Ottomans that advantaged minorities. The British had an obligation to 
assist by introducing and enforcing the principles of good government 
among populations that demonstrated a readiness for democratic reform. 
As an ethnologist he argued against treating nationality “as a fixed and 
defined principle,” believing that the Bulgarians would free themselves 
from Turkish rule because of their numbers and desire for independence.16
This worldview posited proprietary knowledge as the key to effective 
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diplomacy. A. Vambery, a writer who fell under Strangford’s influence, 
summed up this belief: “England’s Perplexity in the East, her disquietude 
whenever the Eastern Question comes practically to the front, is mainly 
due to her want of true, sound knowledge of the Moslem Asiatic coun-
tries and peoples.” Lord Strangford through his writing and patronage of 
men like Vambery attempted to correct this imbalance through a knowl-
edge-based diplomacy that promoted English interests against Russia. 
As Vambery concluded, “It is from this cause and not on account of a 
superior number of troops that she is overreached by the Colossus in the 
North. What some few had done in Eastern Asia, some English diploma-
tists succeeded also in accomplishing in Western Asia, where they made 
the name ‘Ingiliz’ shine with a brilliancy which even the blunders of their 
successors have been unable altogether to obscure.”17
“Knowing” the Ottoman Empire entailed both ethnographic and 
geographic understanding. “The geography of the country is very little 
known as regards European Turkey,” Strangford argued, much in line 
with ethnographers and mapmakers of this time.18 Britain stood to take 
advantage of its rivalry with Russia through a more thorough survey 
of the ethnographic complexity of the region’s politics. “Past blindness” 
to national and religious considerations of the Eastern Question, par-
ticularly when it came to the “Christians in Turkey,” had impeded British 
diplomacy.19 Although skeptical of claims of nationality as a primary 
marker of the forms of nationhood, he maintained that Britain had to 
take this idea seriously since recognizing claims of “nationality” by 
minority groups had become a “treaty obligation” after the Crimean War. 
Strangford believed that only careful attention to ethnographic differ-
ences would allow Britain to fulfill these obligations. “Perhaps we shall 
end by having to appoint ethnological attaches and secretaries to Vienna 
and Constantinople,” he mused, “and to send colporteurs with bundles of 
Dr. Latham’s books for distribution among all our political consulates.”20
Strangford made the case for the cultivation of knowledgeable and 
experienced civil servants in an 1863 essay entitled “Chaos.” The appointed 
diplomat, he argued, “resides entirely at the capital,” leaving him out of 
touch.21 For the ambassador the “provinces are a mere abstraction,” as 
his concern rested with mollifying the Ottoman elite at the Porte and 
countering anti-Turkish feeling at home. The consuls, on the other hand, 
who resided “wholly” in Turkey’s “illgoverned provinces” “are politicians 
one day, merchants, advocates and judges the next” and often engaged 
in the protection and defense of minority interests.22 While cautioning 
against using Christian morality as a rallying cry in diplomatic dealings, 
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Strangford maintained that paying clearer attention to reforming the 
status of minorities would strengthen Britain’s proprietary claims over 
the region.
A new kind of civil servant was needed to foster administrative change 
on the ground while not alienating the Ottoman governing elite. “We 
want our nation served in Turkey . . . by the most perfect and highest type 
of English manhood,” Strangford maintained, “we want it there more than 
anywhere due to the special nature of the work.” This meant stationing 
“the best ambassadors, best attaches, best interpreters, the best consuls, 
the best railway and telegraph men” in areas “untrodden by European 
foot since Ovid.”23 Convinced that the consul system did not have enough 
good men, Strangford pushed to make the service more “English.” This 
replaced the value of regional knowledge gleaned from the experience of 
local inhabitants, or “Levantines,” who had long worked in the consular 
service with clearer ideological consistency.24 “We must have Englishmen 
in our public service,” Strangford maintained, “if we do not send out 
Englishmen then we must Anglicize our Levantines.”25 Anglicizing the 
foreign service through education to make it more “English” would give 
the government more direct control over consuls and better focus the 
message that they hoped to convey to local populations: “Freedom, broad-
ening slowly down from precedent to precedent.”26 The Times echoed this 
sentiment soon after in a series of articles calling for reforms that put 
English-educated civil servants in Near Eastern posts.27
By the time the Bulgarian crisis forced the debate over diplomatic 
reform forward, Lord Strangford had died of a brain hemorrhage at age 
forty-three in 1869. His ideas, however, continued to have currency thanks 
in part to his wife, Lady Strangford (née Emily Anne Beaufort), who 
threw her energies into bolstering his legacy by publishing his writings in 
a series of well-received books during the subsequent decade.28 Reforms 
announced by Lord Derby in July 1877 professionalized the service 
through competitive exams and linguistic education for English-trained 
consuls and interpreters. The newly minted Levant Consular Service 
would govern the civil service from the Balkans to the Chinese border. In 
the Ottoman Empire, agents took further advantage of the capitulations, 
a set of historical agreements that granted extraterritorial privileges. This 
coupled with the growth, professionalization, and increasingly national 
character of the service helped make British presence more widely felt.29 
Such changes would affect the practice of diplomacy from the ambassa-
dor’s residence to the provinces beyond the end of the century.
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auSTen henry layard and 
huManiTarian diPloMacy
When Austen Henry Layard (1817 – 94) arrived to take up his post as 
ambassador in Constantinople in spring 1877 he immediately had his 
hands full. The first cohort of six English-trained linguists of the Levant 
Consular Service arrived that November anxious to begin their work. 
With the new system barely on its feet and the anticipated extension 
of its mandate by Whitehall the Ottoman Empire’s top-ranking diplo-
mat also faced a volatile political landscape. Layard’s five-year tenure at 
Constantinople witnessed the fallout from the Bulgarian Atrocities agita-
tion, the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War, and its resolution in the 
Treaty of Berlin. How Layard executed the role of the diplomat had as 
much to do with his response to these crises as it did with the changing 
experience and structure of diplomatic practice in the Ottoman Empire.
From Huguenot stock, Layard was educated in Italy, England, France, 
and Switzerland mainly as a result of his father’s search for a cure for 
his asthma away from the damp English climate. He finished his formal 
education in England and entered his uncle’s solicitor’s office in London 
in 1834. Having read Arabian Nights as a child and motivated by a desire 
to escape the drudgery of work as a clerk, he took an overland journey 
to Ceylon with an acquaintance to join an uncle who thought life as a 
barrister in the colonies might suit him better. Layard claimed in his 
autobiography that the real reason for his journey was to get away from 
“bigoted Tories,” as he had formed “from my boyhood very liberal and 
independent opinions upon politics. These opinions extended to reli-
gious questions.”30
The promise of adventure more than politics, however, seemed to 
have inspired his early interest in the Near East. As he described his first 
glimpse of Scutari, which for him marked the dividing line between East 
and West: “This was my first glimpse of Eastern life, and the scene as 
we passed through the bazaars crowded with men and women — Turks, 
Albanians, and Greeks of various tribes and races in their varied and gay 
costumes — was to me singularly novel and interesting. . . . The change 
since passing the borders of Christian Europe was now complete, and I 
felt myself, as it were, in a new world — in a world of which I had dreamt 
from my earliest childhood. I was not, on the whole disappointed.”31 
This “new world” also afforded new opportunities. He adapted quickly 
to the demands of travel in the Ottoman Empire, taking advantage of 
the assumption by locals that “all European strangers are supposed to be 
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consuls.”32 This allowed him to move through “unexplored” parts of Asia 
Minor with relative ease, where he decided to “follow a new route through 
Asia Minor and to visit parts of it which had hitherto not been explored 
by previous travelers.” Connections with the Royal Geographical Society 
facilitated this course: “At that time the maps of the interior of Asia 
Minor, which we were about the traverse were almost a blanked, and we 
had nothing to guide us except our compass and such information as we 
could pick up in going from village to village and from the inhabitants of 
the country.”
Layard embraced the role of amateur geographer, compiling informa-
tion on the western lands of the Ottoman Empire whenever he could: 
“We passed through several flourishing villages, of which I obtained the 
names, carefully mapping our route as we went along, and keeping a 
road book, which I had marked off so as to enable me to keep a complete 
record of our progress. . . . Without the observations recorded in it being 
scientifically accurate they were sufficiently full and careful to enable 
me subsequently to lay down a fairly trustworthy map of the country 
through which we journeyed and which I afterwards sent, with a memoir 
to the Royal Geographical Society.”33 These efforts, along with his work 
“correcting” the map of Montenegro, earned him the gold medal from the 
society in 1849.
This work culminated in excavations near Mosul where he uncovered 
the Assyrian treasures that earned him fame at home and which reside 
today in the British Museum. It also initiated an enduring interest in 
the Assyrian people. He dedicated an entire section of his book Nineveh 
and Its Remains to the customs and religious beliefs of the modern-day 
Assyrians, claiming that to understand the artifacts one must understand 
the people and the “geography” of their position. “To Protestants, the doc-
trine and rites of a primitive sect of Christians, who have ever remained 
untainted by the superstitions of Rome must be of high importance,” he 
asserted. In particular, Layard wanted to bring an understanding of the 
Assyrians through “the purity of their faith” and the plight of their “suf-
fering” to the attention of the wider public. For Layard, his discoveries at 
Nineveh also unearthed a common cause: “our sympathies cannot but be 
excited in favor of a long persecuted people who have merited the title of 
the ‘Protestants of Asia.’ ”34
The launch of his political career soon followed. Knowledge of Persian 
and Arabic that he picked up living among the local Arab population, 
along with the patronage of Ambassador Canning, who funded his earli-
est expedition, earned Layard recognition as “the discoverer of Nineveh.” 
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This connection with Canning coupled with the popular success of his 
series of books on Nineveh led to Palmerston’s appointing him as a paid 
attaché at 250 pounds a year in late 1840s. He then launched a brief career 
in Parliament marked by a crusade to end venal promotions in the civil 
service and an ultimately unsuccessful campaign against what he viewed 
as the maladministration of the Crimean War.35
Conscious of his status as a man on the make with a prickly personal-
ity that often alienated even his friends, he left to seek a career away from 
England. As might be expected, a position in the diplomatic service did 
not come easily for this stocky, untitled man who waited for years under 
Canning’s encouragement for an official appointment. Aristocrats like 
Strangford had refused to take Layard seriously, poking fun at his politi-
cal ambitions as little more than an extension of his role as an adven-
turer.36 Eventually, his support of then Prime Minister Disraeli led to his 
appointment as ambassador at Constantinople in 1877. Dubbed the “first 
Liberal Imperialist” by his biographer, Layard believed Britain should 
“maintain the Turkish Empire in its present state until the Christian 
population may be ready to succeed the Mussulman.”37 “My conviction,” 
Layard declared, “is that it is possible to do so, and that this policy is the 
only hope of a favorable solution to the Eastern Question.”38 Layard was 
encouraged by the growth of Protestantism among the peoples of Turkey, 
notably the Armenians and Greeks, and he hoped “that ere long this reli-
gious movement will bring about a political one and that we shall [see] 
the Protestant Christians of this country hold a very high and honorable 
position.”39 At the same time, like others of his generation including Lord 
Strangford, Layard held the sultan in high esteem and refused to support 
any efforts to destabilize the current regime.
He believed instead that Britain should lead by example. A visit to 
India in the wake of the 1857 Mutiny offered Layard an object lesson in 
bad administration. British oppression in India sent the wrong message 
to the Ottoman elite: “Are we to hold the Bible in one hand and the sword 
in the other? If so what can we say to the Turks and other nations who 
would oppress Christians?”40 At the same time, Layard was disdainful of 
the popular agitation against the Bulgarian atrocities: “The English have 
these periodic lunacies particularly when religion is involved.”41 After 
reading Gladstone’s pamphlet that sparked the Bulgarian Atrocities agi-
tation at home, he wrote to a friend, “you cannot drive 3 millions of Turks 
out of Europe into starvation and hopeless misery. The wild humanitarian 
cry about Turkey will lead to serious mischief. It is grievous to see a man 
like Gladstone turned into a mere vulgar pamphleteer.”42 Layard, never 
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one to keep his political opinions to himself, responded to Gladstone’s 
campaign in an article in Quarterly Review, where he argued that Turkey 
should expire of its own accord, not pushed by military pressure or public 
opinion.
Layard embraced a hands-on approach to diplomacy that involved 
him in local and national Ottoman affairs. In 1856 he helped establish 
the European-modeled Ottoman Bank in order to develop the “material 
resources” of the Ottoman Empire.43 He also began supporting humani-
tarian aid projects that promoted equality among Ottoman subjects: “I 
was anxious to promote the establishment of schools amongst the indi-
gent Christian and Jewish populations of the Turkish capital — a matter 
with which Lady Canning took a very lively interest. We were able to 
open some schools in the poorest quarters of the city, and eventually one 
was founded for the education of children of the better classes without 
distinction of faith, it being meant for Christians and Mohammedans 
alike.” Such projects, he believed would curry favor with the sultan, who 
himself later supported this institution.
The Bulgarian crisis necessitated a clearer joining of humanitarian and 
diplomatic concerns. In a September 1876 letter to Lord Derby, Layard 
chronicled a long list of interventions by British officials on behalf of both 
Muslim and Christian subjects. “They prove,” Layard concluded, “that the 
case of humanity without reference to race of creed or any political inter-
est has ever been upheld by England in Turkey.” In another letter dated 
two days earlier to his mentor Lord Redcliffe he called for punishment 
for those who perpetrated the atrocities. At the same time he urged the 
government to “approach the Turkish question in a wise, moderate and 
statesmanlike spirit and not with passion and exaggerated sentiment.” “A 
false step on the part of England at the crisis,” he forebodingly concluded, 
“might be irretrievable and might be even fateful to the future of this 
country.”44
As the top ranking diplomat in the Ottoman Empire, Layard inter-
vened directly in humanitarian aid campaigns. The Stafford House 
Project, the National Aid Society, the Red Crescent Society, and the 
Turkish Compassionate Fund, along with a handful of American-run 
missionary projects, all relied on the support of the ambassador at one 
point or another. The ambassador’s example inspired others, including 
most notably the widow of Lord Strangford. While editing her husband’s 
writings, Lady Strangford had enrolled in a four year nurses’ training 
course in England. In 1874 she published “Hospital Training for Ladies” 
and waited for a call to use her skills and capital. The Bulgarian Atrocities 
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proved the perfect opportunity to use her husband’s diplomatic network 
to launch her own campaign. Work with the order of St. John’s Eastern 
Sick and Wounded Fund led to the opening of her own fund to help des-
titute Bulgarians. In August 1876, when atrocity reports began to filter 
back to England, she started the Bulgarian Peasants Relief fund pledging 
to raise 10,000 pounds to assist the homeless and went to Bulgaria to 
administer the aid personally (figure 17). 
Such an aid scheme would not have survived without the coopera-
tion of diplomats and consuls spread throughout the Ottoman Empire. 
Lady Strangford understood that the ambassador’s assistance was the 
key to successful aid work. She worked on relief efforts with Layard, 
using his position to provide emotional and material support for her 
efforts. “I must say it is a great comfort in this terrible time to have you 
at Constantinople,” wrote Lady Strangford to Layard in 1877 upon set-
ting up her relief hospital in Adrianpole.45 Over the next three years she 
used Layard to secure funds from other aid organizations, ease her pas-
sage through hostile territory, and intervene on behalf of those under 
her patronage. Layard also served as a go-between in the management 
Figure 17. Charity hospital run by Lady Strangford and supported with 
donations from Britain. Inset: Sketch portrait of Lady Strangford. Graphic, May 
26, 1877.
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of the large amounts of cash that her funds brought in thanks to his con-
nections with the Ottoman Bank and relationship with British consuls 
operating in the region.
Lady Strangford needed Layard both to help facilitate and offer diplo-
matic legitimacy for her projects. “I always give my ambassador as little 
trouble as possible,” she declared after numerous requests that included 
the purchase of supplies and an escort for her and her large party out 
of Sofia on the eve of the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War. In 1880, 
she wrote from her home to Layard regarding a new project in eastern 
Anatolia: “I was very unwilling indeed to take up the miserable state of 
Kurdistan and Armenia and for a long time would not consent to work 
with it. But I found that no one else would work and that not a penny would 
be subscribed if I did not come forward.” Funds went through Layard’s 
account at the Ottoman Bank and he then distributed them to the consuls 
at Van, Aleppo, and Erzeroom. Lady Strangford advised, “You will not . . . 
raise the hopes among the Consuls of any large fortune being at hand but 
yesterday I had the pleasure of telegraphing 400 pounds to you for the 
half of the northern districts and 300 pounds for the southern. The 400 
was paid yesterday into the Imperial Ottoman Bank . . . the 300 pounds 
will be probably arranged today.” The fund eventually raised over £13,500 
from subscribers in Britain which Strangford gave to Layard to distribute, 
knowing that he shared her sensibility: “it is best for you to decide really 
to whom it goes . . . provided it is sent to the Kurdistan or Armenian coun-
try, and provided its bestowed without any distinction or preference to 
creed or race.”46 Strangford believed that Layard’s authority as a represen-
tative of the British government would help legitimate humanitarian aid 
work as part of the larger mission: “we thought we might send the money 
through your hands, partly as a convenience to ourselves partly in order 
to give it an official flavor in the eyes of the receivers.”47
Layard similarly used Strangford to further his own agenda. During 
the Russo-Turkish War, he asked her to investigate alleged atrocities 
committed by Bulgarians against the Turkish population that he hoped 
to use to counter Gladstone’s anti-atrocity campaigns. In June and July 
of 1878 Strangford attempted to find evidence of atrocities committed 
by Bulgarians against Muslims. “I have not a single word of any ‘terrible 
crimes’; much less ‘revolting cruelties’ such as you allude to.” At Layard’s 
urging she sent out Dr. Stephenson, the head of her hospitals, “to go up 
country for me” to “enquire into the reports of the Bulgarian atrocities 
both towards Muslemans and Protestants.” Frustrated with the results of 
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her search, she requested that Layard give her “a few memoranda of the 
places where such things have happened as reported.”48 Layard received no 
satisfaction from this investigation, which seemed to have strained rela-
tions between the two. A few months later before closing her hospitals and 
leaving the country for good, she admonished Layard for not taking a more 
active interest in her recent work: “I am sorry you did not think it worth-
while to visit my hospital as it would have pleased the Turks very much.”49
By the early 1880s Layard’s fashioning of himself as defender of both 
the Ottoman administration and its dispossessed citizens was untenable. 
The mood back in Britain had changed with the landslide election that 
returned Gladstone and the Liberal Party to power. “Mr. Gladstone is 
warm glowing cordial and appreciative to everybody,” wrote Strangford 
to Layard on the eve of the election. Hoping that Gladstone would infuse 
new life into her relief projects, Strangford worried that her connection 
with Layard would not bode well for her projects: “I am in despair about 
our meeting on the 6th of May as Gladstone has given up coming, though 
that sacred cause is nearest to his heart, so he writes to the committee.”50 
Layard fared much worse. Gladstone had not forgotten Layard’s public 
rebuke and promptly dismissed him as ambassador. “My case is one of 
extraordinary hardship and cruel injustice,” he declared soon after his 
dismissal.51 It would be Layard’s last official diplomatic position.
Ironically, at the very moment of his termination Layard found him-
self involved with a campaign that even Gladstone could have loved. One 
of the last acts that he performed at Constantinople was advocating on 
behalf of a “Protestant Constitution.” This document, pushed by Great 
Britain and Germany would grant Protestants “those rights and privi-
leges which were accorded to every other religious sect in his empire,” 
according to Layard, who tried unsuccessfully over several months to 
use his personal influence to persuade the sultan to sign on. Fear that 
Ottoman Christian minorities would appeal to Russia for protection 
along with Layard’s belief in religious toleration drove these negotia-
tions. Layard argued that Christians should be appointed to higher gov-
ernment positions and after his own machinations failed went as far as 
to call on the National Assembly to pressure the sultan to accept these 
conditions.52 Looking back on his career, Layard claimed, “Although it 
was not possible to obtain for the Armenians all that Lord Beaconsfield’s 
Government desired to obtain for them, and which I was most anxious to 
secure, yet some progress was made towards granting to Armenia a bet-
ter administration, in which the Armenians themselves might share.”53
In the end, Layard’s humanitarian diplomacy produced few results. 
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“The Constitution to be conceded to the Protestants of Turkey, promised 
to me over and over again by the Sultan and his Ministers, is still unset-
tled,” Layard disappointedly wrote to Granville on the eve of the signing 
of the Berlin Treaty. “The conduct of the Porte in this matter has been 
without excuse. . . . The question has been in discussion with the Porte 
during the three years that I have been here.”54 His tenure, however, did 
have a lasting legacy. Layard embodied the idea promoted by the reforms 
to the consular service that diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire went 
beyond signing treaties and ceremonial meetings with the sultan. This 
new diplomacy posited that civil servants and diplomats had a legitimate 
mandate to gather knowledge and intervene in Ottoman minority policy 
even if that involvement rarely produced the intended effect. The fol-
lowing story of William Everett’s tenure as a provincial military consul 
offers an on the ground perspective of humanitarian diplomacy.
huManiTarian diPloMacy  
along The ruSSo-TurkiSh Border
I never have been so struck with any place in Turkey as with 
this. . . . Not the East that we know up at Erzeroom but the . . . 
East that one reads of. The East where everything is bright . . . 
where grapes, figs, pomegranates and watermelons grow. . . . It is 
quite another country that we have got into and it is curious and 
most interesting. . . . How I wish you were here darling. I have 
never tasted in my life better grapes.
WilliaM evereTT To hiS WiFe,  
during a tour of his district, October 15, 1884
Consuls like William Everett (1844 – 1908) who found themselves in 
newly created posts in the Anatolian interior after the Russo-Turkish 
War encountered a different world than that of the ambassador at 
Constantinople. The area then known as Armenia and Kurdistan located 
several hundred miles east of the seat of Ottoman administration had 
the feel of the Mediterranean, containing fertile lands, a moderate cli-
mate, and the Empire’s highest concentration of minority Christians.55 
These Armenian and to a lesser extent Assyrian and Greek minorities 
lived under the millet system that governed non-Muslim populations in 
villages that dotted the landscape of Anatolia. Despite the relative inef-
fectiveness of past attempts at administrative reform many in these vil-
lages welcomed the British consul as a potential liberator from oppressive 
taxes and unequal treatment.56
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Consular service reforms in the Near East most directly influenced 
the practice of diplomacy in eastern Anatolia. Everett as part of the new 
cohort of “military consul” was responsible for a large district which 
separated him from other officials by high desert passes, long distances, 
and bad roads. This gave him wide discretion in day-to-day functions 
and dealings with local populations. Everett, like other consuls who lived 
on the border with Russia, operated as a modern-day explorer, mapping, 
administering, and keeping a close watch on other European and espe-
cially Russian activity. In addition, the Cyprus Convention that helped 
shape the Treaty of Berlin gave Britain the special responsibility to over-
see reforms. This role as protector of minorities in these distant outposts 
superseded the traditional role of the consul as a guardian of distressed 
British citizens.57 Civil servants assigned to these posts in the interior 
served as administrators, information gatherers, aid workers, and media-
tors in local political conflicts.
In 1878, Everett was appointed vice consul at Erzeroom, a mountainous 
town of about 40,000 people with a large Armenian population on the 
Russo-Turkish border. He lived with his wife, Maria Georgina Calogeras, 
formerly of Corfu, and two daughters until he resigned from the consular 
service in 1888. A skilled draftsman with extensive military experience, 
Everett attended Sandhurst after a term at Marlborough College and 
later joined the Cameronians regiment in 1864. Life as a consul entailed 
frequent travel and interaction with the local population, American and 
British missionaries, and occasional European travelers and administra-
tors. The creation of Erzeroom as a “political” rather than “commercial” 
post defined Everett’s duties in the broadest of terms. Information gather-
ing, securing ties with local officials, and cultivating the loyalty of the 
minority Christian community rather than protecting mercantile inter-
ests necessarily involved him in the day-to-day activities of village life.
Information gathering largely involved mapping terrain and pass-
ing on knowledge of local populations. As the eyes and ears of the state, 
consuls traveled for two main reasons: district tours and survey work. 
Month-long tours over rugged territory with an entourage of local guides 
and assistants took Everett to the half-dozen Armenian millets that made 
up the core of his district. He stayed with local inhabitants along the 
way, hearing their grievances and meeting with Ottoman officials in his 
district. Although he held consul status, Everett and others like him did 
not have an official document from the Ottoman government, or firman, 
leaving him reliant on the acceptance of the local population to legiti-
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mate his role. On his way to the town of Bitlis he wrote to his wife: “The 
authorities have been excessively civil so far as we’ve got. As I daresay 
you remember I have no Firman for this villayet [sic] and was therefore a 
little [worried] as to whether they would acknowledge me as Consul, but 
there have been no difficulties.”58
Everett brought the keen eye of the surveyor to his post. Mapping was 
something that military men did starting at the end of the Napoleonic 
wars in both official and unofficial capacities.59 After the Russo-Turkish 
War this pursuit had heightened importance, particularly along the 
border between Turkey and Russia. Everett proved himself a skilled sur-
veyor. He traveled to Rumelia as part of the Turco-Bulgarian boundary 
commission to map the Russian frontier and in 1880 helped set the east-
ern boundaries of the Ottoman Empire as a member of the Turco-Persian 
frontier commission.60 As consul for Kurdistan between 1882 and 1888 
he performed survey work around Erzeroom to document a region previ-
ously unmapped by the British. Using German maps, he participated in 
the ongoing project of chronicling the geographical, ethnological, and 
physical makeup of the Russo-Turkish border.
Cultivating ties with the local Christian population came primarily 
from worries over Russia. An obsessive concern with potential Russian 
intrigue colored Everett’s dispatches to his superiors. Convinced that 
Russia was always about to invade, he kept a special watch over the 
Armenian population for any indication that they might be looking to 
Russia rather than England for protection. Armenians, he claimed were 
not “patiently awaiting the decision of Her Majesty’s Government . . . 
as to their future fate” and believed that they could prosper as “Russian 
subjects” and even “become rich under Russian rule.”61 This threat was 
used to argue that Britain should increase its influence over Christian 
populations in order to thwart a potential Russian advance. “I have rea-
son to believe,” Vice Consul Eyres in Van wrote to Everett, “the Russian 
Vice-Consul for Van was sent by his Government expressly to foster 
the sentiment of friendship manifested by the Nestorians [Assyrians] 
towards Russia, to encourage them to look to that country for protection, 
and to cement, as it were, an informal alliance.” Evidence of this intrigue 
rested on the Russian consul distributing “decorations to the Patriarch 
and other Nestorians [Assyrians].”62
Reports of the maladministration of minority communities under the 
millet system worried the Foreign Office. Granville implored his top dip-
lomats to “communicate the substance of Consular Reports to the Sultan” 
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and “point out to His Majesty the neglect to remedy the grievances of the 
Armenians is driving them into the arms of Russia.”63 Evidence suggests 
that authorities did just that. In a letter to Everett his superior reported, 
“I was very much struck both by your reports and Eyres and I had parts 
of them translated into Turkish in the hopes that if he read them in his 
native language the Grand Vizier might pay more attention to them.”64 
Although such pressure did little to ameliorate conditions for minorities, 
it reinforced the idea that to outmaneuver Russian intrigues Britain had 
to beat them at their own game. Everett’s report of Russian movements 
in his district solicited the following response from the Foreign Office: 
“Thanks to you for the interesting information contained therein relative 
to Russian proceedings in Armenia and the danger of Rumanian inter-
vention in the event of no steps being taken to ameliorate the condition 
of the population.”65
Everett responded by lobbying the British Government for a sizable 
aid package for his district. Layard meanwhile admonished Everett to 
be patient on the topic of reforms: “I am constantly pressing the ques-
tion . . . and have of an accord assurances that justice shall be done to 
the Christians. . . . I am afraid that you have little reason to be satisfied 
with the manner in which affairs are going on in your district . . . the 
Armenians must have patience but cannot expect the institution of a coun-
try to be reformed in a day and they ought to feel that England is doing all 
she can for them.”66 The ambassador’s wait-and-see attitude complicated 
diplomatic dealings with the Ottoman government on the one hand and 
minorities on the other. When mass violence did occur in the provinces 
dispatches from British consular representatives, in comparison with 
those of other eyewitnesses including missionaries and American con-
suls, often downplayed their effect.67 This approach echoed that of consuls 
serving in Bulgaria at the time of the massacres there when newspaper 
reporters and advocates for the Bulgarian cause accused consuls of telling 
the Disraeli government what they wanted to hear.68 Despite a political 
climate at home that could predispose consuls against the plight of minor-
ity populations in the communities where they were stationed, aid work 
continued as an important part of diplomatic dealings in the Near East.
On the local level, consuls, like other agents in the civil and imperial 
service, enjoyed a great deal of informal power. During his tenure Everett 
helped get rid of unpopular local officials, argued successfully on behalf 
of Armenian prisoners, mediated disputes, and administered humani-
tarian relief. In 1882, he employed the assistance of the French, Persian, 
and Russian consuls to replace officials who he believed obstructed his 
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work.69 Everett also asked his superiors for help. “I have induced them to 
get rid of the Vali of Van,” Dufferin wrote to Everett in 1884, hoping he 
had done “it in time” to help him to resolve some administrative problems 
in the village.70 Everett’s campaign to free Armenian prisoners accused 
of schemes against local administrators drew in the Earls Dufferin and 
Granville at the Foreign Office. They chose to appeal directly to the sul-
tan rather than exert pressure through the embassy to secure the release 
of a limited number of prisoners. “Had we engaged in an ostentatious 
and open advocacy of these poor people’s interests,” wrote Dufferin to 
Granville, “I have little doubt but that the Sultan would have refused to 
pardon any of them.”71 This kind of behind the scenes pressure character-
ized the diplomacy on behalf of minority rights and often alienated as 
many people as it pleased.
Overt humanitarian aid work provided a more direct route to securing 
a foothold among local populations. As Layard put it to Everett when 
famine hit his district in 1880, “if assistance came in this district from the 
English people it would greatly raise our prestige here which is waning 
fast. It is not pleasant either to be appealed to save life and to be unable 
to do anything.”72 In the background, as ever, loomed the threat of the 
Russians providing aid to those “under their protection.” Everett recruited 
American missionaries to serve on the relief committee, as Layard had 
assured him that “the Americans will help us” with the project. One 
missionary complained that American missionaries “had not been suf-
ficiently recognized in the Bluebooks” for their work. He also accused 
Everett of misappropriating funds, reportedly calling him a “conscience-
less scoundrel,” which made him furious.73
Fear of competition and mutual distrust with aid workers led Everett 
to take more direct responsibility for humanitarian work. In 1881, famine 
relief and the distribution of aid consumed Everett’s official duties. His 
decision to throw himself into famine relief certainly had much to do 
with this semi-official policy that saw aid as the way to win the hearts 
and minds of the local population. It also had a good deal to do with how 
he understood this community. The notion that some of the people he 
served “have a strong bearing to our church” must have helped Everett 
sustain the task he had before him.74 This aid was increasingly man-
aged by British consuls. When Lady Strangford set up a new appeal in 
1881, she put collected donations and supplies in the hands of consuls 
in affected areas. Everett investigated claims of starvation in his district 
in late January and received immediate approval to draw money from 
the fund administered by Layard for relief. By early February, Everett 
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started investigating the prices of goods himself after receiving letters 
from his district that “report a bad state of things.” His diary from this 
period records his constant worry that local officials would cheat him. He 
insisted always on seeing the grain before purchasing it himself. Everett 
also kept a regular record of expenditures made in each district while 
listing the price of grain, livestock and household goods, and the items 
he handed out. “Gave distribution of flour to 4 poor families,” he recorded 
on March 9, 1882.75
Balancing consular duties with humanitarian commitments eventu-
ally took their toll on his family life: “How I wish you would come back 
soon,” his daughters implored in their letters whenever he went out on 
tour.76 In 1885, Everett was badly wounded in a home invasion. Upon 
learning the Armenian Catholic identity of his assailant he came to 
believe that he had fallen victim to a murder attempt by a disgruntled 
constituent during the execution of his duties.77After the attack, Everett 
had little desire to continue on in his post. The now Colonel Everett 
returned to London, where he accepted a position as professor of mili-
tary topography at the Staff College.78 He also continued his work for 
the Foreign Office and eventually joined his old friend from the Russo-
Turkish boundary commission, Sir John Ardagh, as his assistant when 
he became director of Military Intelligence in 1896. Everett must have 
felt at home employed “in the semi-diplomatic work” of the Intelligence 
Division. Here he used his “special skill in unraveling the complicated 
tangle of frontier questions.”79
This “complicated tangle” along the frontier got worse in the coming 
years. After the Armenian massacres of the mid-1890s, popular outcry 
in Britain resulted in another expansion of the consul service along the 
border. The role of the military consul to “supervise the reforms” meant 
that he had a preventative as well as activist function. The extent of the 
massacres resulted in establishing vice consuls at Van, Sivas, Adana, 
Khurput, Mush, and Diarbekir, where the threat of more violence con-
tinued. This further bolstered the notion that consuls had a diplomatic 
function both to administer justice and to provide relief. So important 
had this role become that some consuls came to see their main function 
as intervening on behalf of minority communities in their districts.80 
This new wave of expansion in the Christian provinces broadened the 
humanitarian face of the diplomatic mission.
The “higher duties” imagined by Palmerston at mid-century would even-
tually translate into a diplomacy that encompassed more than treaty 
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negotiations, commerce, and securing the rights of British citizens. As 
part of the “wider world” of politics “diplomatic culture” during the nine-
teenth century “had to be constantly renegotiated” in the midst of chang-
ing priorities.81 In the case of Britain, these changes drew upon ethno-
graphic understandings of imperial responsibility that made diplomacy 
compatible with humanitarian advocacy. This did not happen necessarily 
by design but rather in response to activism at home and to geopolitical 
crises that brought structural changes to the practice of diplomacy in the 
Ottoman Empire. Diplomacy in this case became both a matter of con-
science and the protecting of imperial interests.
Refashioning the mission and structure of diplomacy in the Near East 
did not necessarily serve its larger military purpose. Little evidence exists 
that attempts to win the hearts and minds of the local population secured 
the border and staved off Russian influence in the region. The integra-
tion of humanitarianism into diplomatic practice, however, did change 
the way many understood foreign policy as a disinterested affair of state. 
The institutionalization of this hands-on, knowledge-based diplomacy 
came from the growth, professionalization, and increasingly national 
character of the service and made British presence more widely felt. As 
the next chapter shows, missionary philanthropists came to rely on this 
consular network and an expanded official presence to see their projects 
through while they drew on a set of beliefs that cast Ottoman Christians 
as deserving recipients of sympathy and material support.
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When Ann Mary Burgess found herself on a ship to Constantinople in 
1888 she did not anticipate the role she would play in shaping humanitar-
ian aid work in the Near East. Swept up in the evangelical fervor of late 
Victorian life, this Quaker missionary from Yorkshire found her calling 
among Eastern Christians. After learning Turkish and Armenian she set 
up a program that promoted religious education and industrial employ-
ment for the needy. Her mission at Constantinople lasted for over fifty 
years and proved emblematic of Victorian thinking about humanitarian 
service and moral responsibility abroad.
While officials tied humanitarianism to diplomacy, others like Burgess 
viewed obligations to Ottoman Christians through the lens of Gladstone’s 
liberal-radical Nonconformity. This vision found its clearest articula-
tion in missionary and philanthropic projects that aid workers started 
to ameliorate the suffering of Armenians and Assyrians. Missionary 
philanthropy had roots in the Victorian evangelical movement.1 Interest 
in the Holy Land prompted the Church of England to initiate contact with 
Eastern Christians as early as the 1830s. The Archbishop of Canterbury, 
citing common historical and religious ground between the Anglican 
and Assyrian churches, started a mission in the late 1860s on the border 
between Turkey and Persia to serve the approximately 100,000 Assyrian 
Christians living there.2 Nonconformists found an even wider audience 
in their ministry to Armenians, among whom they set up the most suc-
cessful and widely known of these missions. An estimated two million 
Armenians lived mostly in the eastern parts of Asia Minor before their 
massacre and deportation during World War I, making them the largest 
Christian minority population in the Ottoman Empire.3
Systematic massacres among these populations during the late 
4. Missionary Philanthropy
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nineteenth century created the impetus for a network of secular and 
religious humanitarian aid projects. Britain’s role in enforcing minor-
ity treaty obligations found a corollary in the work of aid organizations 
that attempted to mitigate the effects of increasing sectarian violence 
that targeted these communities. Although greater diplomatic presence 
throughout the Ottoman Empire eased the establishment of missionary-
run aid institutions, the ambitions of policymakers held little interest 
for most philanthropists and missionaries, who drew up relief schemes 
based on Victorian notions of charity and the deserving poor.4 Women 
missionaries in particular played an important role in charity and indus-
trial work schemes that supported the work of these missions.5 In the 
midst of growing geopolitical uncertainty, missionary philanthropy 
guided charity projects among a population that Britons already had 
come to know as not just Christian but an industrious and commercially 
minded people.
MiSSionary PhilanThroPy and The arMenianS
Missionary philanthropy captured the imagination of religious organi-
zations and the public by casting mission work in a broader humanitarian 
role. The goal of the Church of England Assyrian Mission, in the words 
of one early missionary, was not “to interfere” but to “afford them such 
assistance as it may be able to do, consistently with its own principles, in 
order that they themselves may be able to improve their own condition.”6 
Interest in aid programs targeted specifically at persecuted Christian 
minorities grew in the wake of the Bulgarian Atrocities agitation. This 
was particularly true in the case of women, whose plight captured the 
attention of feminists like Lady Henry Somerset during this same time. 
While Somerset engaged largely in fundraising at home to provide food, 
clothing, and shelter for the destitute, evangelicals took a more hands-on 
approach that fit in with Victorian gender norms. In 1890, the order of 
the Sisters of Bethany established a medical mission and a school for girls 
among Assyrians dedicated to the “training and education of the women 
to be the fit wives and mothers of the Assyrian race.”7 It also set up a 
school of embroidery and employed its charges in sewing and packing 
fruit to sustain the work of the mission.
Burgess’s contemporaneous Friends’ Mission stood out as the most 
successful of these projects. The Constantinople mission institutional-
ized relief work as an integral part of the missionary enterprise. Although 
not usually associated with evangelicalism, Quakers and Quaker 
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women more specifically had a significant presence in these social 
reform schemes.8 The rise of the evangelical movement within English 
Protestantism at mid-century offered new opportunities for a people best 
known for their religious introspection and Quietist philosophy.9 Foreign 
relief work globalized the reach of the Friends’ Mission. Their deserved 
reputation as business leaders lent an entrepreneurial character to the 
business of relief work.10
Providence, Burgess believed, ultimately led her to her post in 
Constantinople. She initially thought she might do zenana work among 
secluded women in India but her then employer, Priscilla Peckover, told 
her she must “wait for a more definite call.”11 This call came when she 
spotted an advertisement in the Quaker magazine, The Friend, by an 
Armenian Quaker doctor who had married an English woman advertis-
ing for a nurse to assist him with his Constantinople mission. After a 
brief training course in nursing at Banbury, Burgess began her work with 
Dr. Gabriel Dobrashian at the Friend’s Medical Mission.12
As a Quaker woman growing up in Victorian England, work among 
Ottoman Armenians would have appealed to Burgess on a number of 
levels. First, debates surrounding the Eastern Question and its relation to 
the status of Christian minorities in the Near East had shaped her gen-
eration’s perception of the Ottoman Empire. For High Churchman such 
as Gladstone the Armenians’ Orthodox faith linked them to an authentic 
Christian past.13 Their early adoption of Christianity as a national reli-
gion and highly developed ancient culture furthered this connection.14 As 
Gladstone posited, “To serve Armenia is to serve civilization.”15 Second, 
evangelical service had begun to play an important part in Quakerism’s 
attempt to increase declining membership.16 Finally, Quakers, like other 
religious denominations, had started to recruit single women as teachers 
in foreign missions with links to Britain and the Empire.17
Two events shaped the of direction Burgess’s work after she arrived 
in Constantinople: the earthquake of 1894 and the massacres of the 
mid-1890s. Requests for aid by those widowed and orphaned after the 
earthquake prompted the mission to open twelve beds for this purpose. 
Two years later, the prolonged persecution of the minority Armenian 
population in Anatolia left hundreds of thousands dead.18 W. C. Braith-
waite, then secretary of the Medical Mission, appealed to Friends to 
provide the £700 a year needed to keep the medical mission going and 
“continue this body and soul saving work.”19 The massacres targeted 
the male population and forced the leader of the medical mission, 
Dr. Dobrashian, to flee to England with his family. Burgess along with 
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two other English women “stayed at the mission and undertook relief 
work among the suffering women and children, as bread-winners had 
become very scarce.”20
The combination of a lack of qualified doctors and Burgess’s own lim-
ited medical training eventually forced her to close the hospital. Medical 
missionary work often provided a first point of entry into the profession 
but a lack of training and institutional support for female doctors led 
many to abandon medicine in favor of other humanitarian enterprises.21 
Burgess developed organizational, business, and fundraising skills to 
connect the mission with other aid workers in the region. This network 
of philanthropic and religious relief work spanned from Constantinople 
to the villages of eastern Anatolia to Cambridge, where the mission was 
headquartered. Here a team of Quakers that included W. C. Braithwaite, 
J. Hingston Fox, and William Henry Crook coordinated efforts in England 
for Burgess’s work in the Ottoman Empire. Funding the orphanage and 
building the program of the mission became a top priority, though secur-
ing the necessary funding proved difficult at best.
The search for resources led Burgess to cultivate ties with secular phil-
anthropic organizations and government institutions. The London-based 
branch of the International Organization of the Friends of Armenia set 
up operations in eastern Anatolia in 1897. Initially started to assist vic-
tims of the massacres, it soon developed its own network of patrons that 
Burgess would use to support her work in Constantinople. Women made 
up twelve of the fifteen members of the executive committee; they also 
held the majority of the forty-five positions on the general committee. 
The organization represented a who’s who of nineteenth-century philan-
thropists and was run by Lady Frederick Cavendish with contributions 
and organizational support coming from women including the Cadbury 
sisters, Lady Henry Somerset, and a host of titled ladies. Twenty-seven 
branches of the British Women’s Temperance Association also donated to 
the general fund.22
These women recognized Burgess as an important resource for their 
own work. Similarly, Burgess used the nascent organization’s fundraising 
networks to lend publicity and raise much-needed capital for Armenian 
widows and orphans.23 Burgess also employed her connections with 
the British consular staff at Constantinople, including Andrew Ryan 
and Robert Graves, to further her cause, attending embassy dinners in 
dresses made with material sent to her by supporters in England who 
recognized the value of cultivating political connections.24
By the late nineteenth century, Burgess emerged at the center of 
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a network that joined missionary and philanthropic work. This shift 
from relying on religious institutional support to forging connections 
with secular humanitarian organizations and government institutions 
emphasized what Andrew Porter has called the “humanitarian character 
of Christian service.”25 Focus on humanitarian relief work over religious 
conversions shaped the evolution of the two related goals of the mission. 
As one supporter observed, Burgess wanted to “strengthen and revivify 
the spiritual life of the Armenian Church” rather than convert her sub-
jects to the Quaker faith.26 She also supported education to promote 
minority demands for civil and administrative reform.
The crisis years of the mid-1890s necessitated what amounted to a 
mixing of religion and politics. In the aftermath of the 1896 massacres, 
W. C. Braithwaite described how the mission bridged the roles of politi-
cal advocate and spiritual guide, helping “prisoners in obtaining their 
release, in visiting and caring for the sick, in clothing the naked and 
in feeding the starving ones around us.” As Braithwaite concluded, “It 
has been our blessed privilege, also as of old, to see that the poor have 
the gospel preached unto them.”27 Evangelicalism in this way served a 
larger humanitarian purpose. This also worked in the reverse. Secular 
organizations like the Friends of Armenia had little trouble support-
ing the attempt to revivify the Eastern Orthodox Church, recognizing 
the important role that religious organizations, both Protestant and 
Orthodox, played in providing aid to massacre victims and maintain-
ing community ties.28 Rather than understanding conversion itself as the 
goal, Burgess put evangelical activism in the service of humanitarian 
relief and political advocacy.
PhilanThroPic neTWorkS
The Armenian massacres made Burgess anxious to find a way to protect 
and offer long term financial support for the survivors, primarily women 
and children. As she recalled, “In the first weeks that followed this politi-
cal out-burst of hate and fury, we could do little else besides giving out 
bread to women and children and listening to tales of woe. But seeing 
the distress would be of long duration, and that in a day not far distant 
relief funds would cease, and our power to relieve distress would end 
too, we opened our Industrial work in the way of Needlework, Knitting 
and Oriental Embroideries. We soon discovered that work for the people 
was the best healer, as well as a means of [earning a] living.”29 “Industrial 
work” generated funds through the production and sale of artisan crafts 
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made by the needy. After the massacres Burgess completely transformed 
the buildings of the medical mission into a multifunction campus. She 
retained a resident English builder at a cost of £1,940 to create a “Meeting 
Hall, two Schoolrooms, Workrooms for the Industrial Department, 
Dining and Sitting Rooms for the Workers in the Home, Bedrooms for 
Orphans and Workers, a Washhouse and Laundry, Office, and improved 
sanitary arrangements.”30 The mission now had three main functions: 
industrial, educational and religious. Money generated from industrial 
work primarily funded the educational work of the mission though it 
occasionally supplemented capital improvements to mission facilities. 
Religious functions were not funded by industrial work, in accordance 
with Burgess’s philosophy of keeping these elements separate.
Burgess’s network of philanthropists, businessmen, government con-
suls, and workers helped her to realize her vision of a self-sustaining 
mission project. Her large number of contacts and donors included the 
philanthropists who ordered the goods from Burgess’s factory, the mid-
dlemen who took them to Britain, and the people who sold the work to 
supporters in Britain, America, Europe, and locally in Constantinople.31 
Andrew Ryan, a member of the Levant Consular Service at the embassy, 
helped her get goods through customs while the Friends of Armenia 
and Friends’ Armenian Mission donated money and helped sell goods 
abroad.32 At the mission itself, Burgess employed a small but dedicated 
circle of English and “native” women, as she called them, to help her to 
run and sustain the day-to-day operations of the mission.33
Mission work, as Burgess herself recognized, began to look like a 
corporation, stretching well beyond Constantinople. “I shall grow into 
a merchant and missionary in one before I close my career,” Burgess 
reflected. She had “a college trained gentleman of great business experi-
ence doing type writing for me and accounts and custom house work and 
taking journey to buy raw materials from Albania and parts of Greece.”34 
The American Bible house in Constantinople served as a storage facility 
where Burgess had goods held and then shipped to customers.35 From 
there, she sent goods to England and America for sale through contacts 
made through Friends that included the Peckovers and others whom 
she cultivated while on leave in England. In its 1899 annual report, the 
Friends of Armenia reported that sales of Burgess’s factory goods were 
doing well in Germany.36 The most desirable items, artisan rugs, sold for 
£100 apiece. Even after World War I, when difficulty producing and ship-
ping goods would have strained any business venture, Burgess and her 
400 Armenian factory workers were producing and selling over £4,000 
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worth of “silk and wool rugs and embroidery of the highest quality” to 
customers in England and America annually.37
This industrial work scheme represented what I call self-help philan-
thropy that cast Ottoman Christians in the role of the deserving poor. 
Burgess’s network of artisanal workers, middlemen and -women, and 
customers did not write checks or make donations to feed and clothe the 
destitute but rather expected a material return on their investment in 
the form of consumer goods. “We were glad to hear that the chair backs 
gave satisfaction,” Burgess wrote in 1903 to Algerina Peckover, the sister 
of her former employer in Wisbech and a longtime supporter of the mis-
sion. “We were pleased with them too. We will send you the remainder of 
your order next week if possible or the week after. With warm greeting 
to your household. I love to think of you all!”38 Peckover served as an able 
middlewoman in the coming years, facilitating sales between Burgess 
and her customers in Britain.
The supporters Burgess gathered around her physically at the mission 
site and virtually through her contacts in England defined humanitarian-
ism in relation to production and consumption. This use of the market-
place to support philanthropic and religious enterprises was certainly not 
unique to relief work in the Ottoman Empire. The profession of philan-
thropic work for women that relied on selling goods to raise money, in 
particular, had deep roots in Victorian culture. As Brian Harrison has 
argued, “The link between Victorian entrepreneurship, humanitarian-
ism, and philanthropy was close.” Charity bazaars often run by female 
members of church and secular organizations would sell goods to raise 
money for causes that included education, poverty relief, and supporting 
foreign missions.39 Using commerce to benefit society allowed Victorians 
to reconcile what some historians have considered a deeply ambivalent 
relationship to the marketplace.40 The fear that capitalism was undoing 
the moral fiber of society by enriching the few at the expense of the many 
led to a doctrine of self-reliance that cast the needy into categories of 
deserving and undeserving based on their willingness to help themselves 
through work and discipline.
Schemes like those created so many thousands of miles away from 
the metropolis by Burgess and the Friends of Armenia connected foreign 
aid work with the marketplace. Such notions of self-help philanthropy 
guided the business of relief work among a needy Armenian population 
with whom Britons had cultivated an imagined kinship. By the early 
1900s, Burgess had created a thriving industry that supported over 700 
women workers and generated sales between £8,000 and £10,000 a 
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year.41 She decided first to manufacture toys and received £25 from the 
British consul in Constantinople for startup costs.42 “An oriental swing-
bed called a ‘Salanjack’ sold well at first but only proved to have nov-
elty appeal,” reported one source.43 Likewise, knitting stockings proved 
unsustainable due to the high cost of materials, which made them 
uncompetitive in the local market.
High-end embroidery, by contrast, had a niche appeal from both 
a producer and a consumer standpoint. The Near East had long been 
associated in the minds of British consumers with luxury items such as 
finished goods including silks and rugs. Consumers in Constantinople 
and England valued these products as an authentic expression of a 
regional art form that used quality materials associated with the Near 
East. Armenian women had engaged in artisanal craftwork for centuries, 
making it a natural fit for Burgess’s project.44 Ironically, since each region 
had its own style of embroidery, the women and girls at the factory had to 
be taught specialized patterns “of fine quality . . . taken from old Turkish, 
Persian and Armenian needlework” that Burgess believed would most 
appeal to British consumers.45 Miss Maud Binns, one of Burgess’s English 
helpers, was responsible for teaching “the older girls one of the Eastern 
arts, an embroidery called ‘Heesab.’ ”46 Rug making at the mission fol-
lowed similar lines.
This attempt to revive ancient patterns no longer produced by 
Armenian artisans lent the work done in her factory an air of authen-
ticity and rare value. Customers purchased what they believed repre-
sented genuine expressions of the art of an ancient people threatened 
with extinction by a despotic state. In addition, these objects, produced 
during the height of the Arts and Crafts movement in Britain, had the 
advantage of seeming disconnected from mass production and thus the 
perceived evils of urban factory life.47 The shops that displayed these 
goods carefully cultivated these consumer desires. “It is no unskilled 
task this of choosing goods to win the approval of some unknown well 
wisher,” declared the chair of the Friends of Armenia Industrial com-
mittee. “Quickly drawers are opened, bales untied — for this one only 
native materials must be sent that one likes drawn thread on Irish linen; 
another always wants rich colours typical of Armenia’s ancient skill.”48 Of 
course, the reality of the origins of these consumer products was much 
more complicated. Not only did the products fail to accurately represent 
contemporary Anatolian craftsmanship, to produce these goods Burgess 
set up industrial workrooms in the mission. In the case of rug making, 
she built an actual factory with looms, regular hours, and an army of 
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workers who produced these goods under the watchful eye of Burgess 
and her staff (see figure 18). 
Self-help philanthropy sometimes unconsciously failed to provide for 
the immediate wants of those it purported to serve. Burgess’s descrip-
tion of the needs of her mission to patrons in the pages of The Friend of 
Armenia, a newspaper published by the organization of the same name, 
reveals how business and humanitarian interests could work at cross-
purposes. “I hope someday the flannelette, stockings, cotton and print, if 
possible, for overalls for children and underwear for women may come 
out to us,” Burgess appealed to potential donors. “Some of the poor people 
even suffer disease from want of clean underwear.”49 She then went on to 
describe the items being made from the fabric on hand for sale: Slipper 
tops from old materials and toy rabbits, dolls, and donkeys from cotton 
remnants. Every day Burgess made decisions about whether to use mate-
rials to keep women busy working in the factory or for making items that 
women themselves needed. In this case, she asked donors in England to 
provide clothing for workers so that materials available on the premises 
could provide work for potentially idle hands.
Figure 18. Ann Mary Burgess overseeing Armenian female workers at her 
factory. Courtesy of the Library of the Religious Society of Friends in Britain, 
Temp MSS 387/5/9.
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The toys, embroideries, and rugs produced by workers found their way 
to customers through Burgess’s business and philanthropic networks in 
the Ottoman Empire, Britain, and abroad. There were two work depots 
in Constantinople, one in the old city Stamboul at Mission House and the 
other in the new city Pera, in the European side of the city. Depots in the 
North and South of England also sold these products, and the Friends of 
Armenia distributed them in London, Ireland, and Scotland. However, 
according to Burgess her most important salespeople came from the 
“Drawingroom Sales made by the many kind ladies in England who make 
a display of the work, and invite their friends to come and buy.”50
Burgess’s success inspired others. The mission itself grew into what 
one supporter called “one of the largest and most successful Industrial 
Mission centres in the world.”51 The Friends of Armenia came to use this 
method to fund their work in the villages of eastern Anatolia.52 Another 
such factory linked to the mission school was set up in connection with 
The Church of England’s Assyrian Mission in 1902. Management prob-
lems meant that the mission factory only lasted for a few years selling 
carpets made by Assyrian girls to American and British consumers. 
American missionaries started small-scale industrial work schemes dur-
ing this time as well.53 Between 1897 and 1914 the Friends of Armenia 
started over a dozen industrial work centers in Anatolian villages and set 
up a permanent shop called “Armenian Industries” to sell these goods at 
their headquarters at 47 Victoria Street, Westminster.
These organizations shared a common sense of purpose. The Friends 
of Armenia cast the “Aims of the Society” this way: “With the temporary 
cessation of widespread massacre the needs of Armenia have changed. 
What is wanted today is not prompt succor for the wounded and the 
starving, but such continuous and systematic relief as shall make all 
who can work self-supporting, and provide for the thousands of helpless 
orphans. The Friends of Armenia keep this point steadily in view. By 
supporting industrial centers in many parts of Armenia, and opening a 
central depot in London for the sale of work, they enable many women 
who have lost every male relative to provide for themselves and even for 
their children.”54 In 1909 The Friend of Armenia published a manifesto 
and list of supporters that included British and American missionary 
organizations.55 As one appeal for funds asked, “Perhaps you will know 
of people who will be willing to invest money in such a business (not 
donate it) for a term of years without interest. If we could get a little 
capital together for such a purpose, I feel sure we could make profitable 
use of it for the orphan girls.”56
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iMPerial PaTronage 
The orphans and widows who received aid and worked in the factories and 
workrooms came increasingly to rely on these institutions for patron-
age in a world where few other opportunities existed. In some ways, the 
structure of these industrial work schemes for Armenian women work-
ers and their British women managers mimicked those undertaken by 
philanthropic-minded Victorian women in England.57 What most distin-
guished these schemes from those in England, of course, was that in the 
Ottoman Empire humanitarianism operated in the midst of social and 
political instability.
Local women looked to aid workers to fulfill their material needs by 
providing employment, patronage, and, in times of crisis, physical pro-
tection. Although little evidence exists regarding what adult Armenian 
women factory workers thought of industrial work, both Burgess and 
the Friends of Armenia recorded the stories of children for the benefit 
of patrons. The story of the orphan girl Sara Crecorian illustrates how 
gender and patronage shaped the business of relief work. Crecorian 
attended the American Mount Holyoke school in the interior village of 
Bitlis in the early 1900s.58 Needing funds to continue her education, she 
contacted the Friends of Armenia for help. This organization, closely 
associated with Burgess’s own enterprise, found in Algerina Peckover a 
willing patron. In a letter to her “beloved Benefactor” the sixteen-year-old 
Crecorian declared that Peckover had “fulfilled a parents’ obligation for 
me, an unknown and needy one, bearing in your breast a heart of fatherly 
tenderness and love for an orphan.” Her desire to complete her studies led 
Crecorian to continue, “I earnestly entreat you not to forget me.”59
Missionary philanthropists did not limit their advocacy work to girls. 
Religious education rather than industrial work, however, defined the 
mission’s service to boys. Here, too, the notion of a family structure 
with Burgess and her single female workers at the shared head pervaded: 
“Some of our scholars in the Sunday School, who have been attending 
ever since we began ten years ago, are now grown up. . . . We call these 
boys, or rather young men ‘ours’ and they consider they belong to us.”60 
Rituals at the mission provided the opportunity to cement these ties in 
sometimes strange and proprietary ways. During a pageant where chil-
dren were reenacting the Christmas story, Burgess remarked: “I have 
been in a hurry to make angels of our school girls” (see figure 19). 
This surrogate family structure cast single women aid workers in 
the role of both mother and father to orphans. Girls like Sara Crecorian 
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adopted European names and forged new “family ties” to their patrons. 
For children who had parents still living, usually a widowed mother, 
work provided for family needs. Widows worked for women missionar-
ies at the mission to provide subsistence for their children. They also 
sought patrons to support an education that would further a child’s status 
in the mission community. The boys who “belonged” to the mission after 
attending Sunday School for ten years thus came to rely on the support of 
their English “mothers and fathers” to offer them work, status, and bread 
as a sort of birthright.
Similar stories published in the Friend of Armenia from those living 
under this imagined imperial family provide a glimpse of what recipients 
might have thought of these aid efforts and how they used this assis-
tance. The column “Letters Received from Orphans” connected orphans 
with their “adoptive mothers/fathers.” “Dear Little Mother,” started one 
letter from a child called Vartanoosh living in Van, “We were very hun-
gry, we had no clothing upon us, we had not shoes. We had not fathers 
to give them to us. God said you to be father and mother for us, and you 
gave food and clothing to cover our nakedness. . . . We thank you for the 
orphan house you opened for us.”61 Orphans, while having little power to 
control how their stories were used, learned quickly how grateful decla-
rations could evoke empathy and keep donations flowing.62
Figure 19. Burgess’s orphan “angels” 
performing at a Christmas pageant. 
Courtesy of the Library of the 
Religious Society of Friends in 
Britain, Temp MSS 387/5/16.
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Patronage of the kind experienced by Crecorian and others forged 
new dependent relationships.63 The Friend of Armenia connected orphans 
with patrons and often included “before and after” photos of orphans 
helped by aid. For orphans like Vartanoosh, donors provided the neces-
sities like food and clothing but some expected more. Education proved 
a central motivator. “My Dear Benefactor,” started another letter, “I was 
an orphan and miserable boy. . . . Now I am very happy and am study-
ing in the school Armenian, the Bible and Arithmetic.”64 Some orphans 
used education to build status and gain entry into European society. “I 
personally was left an orphan by the massacres of 1895 and was cared for 
in a missionary orphanage and thus received High School and College 
education,” wrote K. K. Khayiguian from Marseilles, where he served as 
president of the Armenian Evangelical Churches in France.65
“Adoption” for orphans always meant work. The orphanage at 
Kharpoot in 1900, for example, reported training orphans “in indus-
trial work” to make them “self-supporting.” Those with disabilities also 
found employment; a picture of one orphan, “Blind Mary,” appeared in 
the pages of the Friend of Armenia working at a transcribing machine 
in European-style dress.66 She had attended the School for the Blind in 
Urfa. A similar institution existed in Adana. This work, while intended 
to benefit the child worker in the long term, also brought in income for 
the institution. “The Reward of Labour” described work for orphan boys 
that included shoemaking, ironwork, tailoring, and cabinetmaking. “The 
shop for native shoes is carried on largely for the purpose of teaching our 
boys the value of time and of having something as an extra trade whereby 
they could support themselves even if they are not strong physically. This 
being light work, our smallest boys are learning it, but we believe this in 
a short time will bring in a little gain.”67 The institution thus used child 
labor to “reward” the institution with revenue and the child with a skill. 
No mention of child workers being paid wages appears in the archive.
These relationships clearly opened up the possibility of exploitation. 
Mission work invited single women like Peckover and Burgess to take 
a maternalist role in their interaction with the women and children 
that they served.68 Evidence suggests that the women and children 
who worked in the Burgess’s factory and those set up by the Friends of 
Armenia served voluntarily and entered the “family” willingly. However, 
aid workers’ status as privileged British women who had the backing of 
diplomatic authorities and philanthropic organizations gave women like 
Burgess an unusual power over their charges. Factory work most often 
was done in exchange for bread or for educational opportunities. To what 
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extent this labor became a precondition for support is not entirely clear. 
The Armenian women and children who worked at the handlooms and 
in the embroidery studio were introduced to a Protestant religious ethic 
that linked hard work with piousness. For many who survived the earth-
quake and massacres of the 1890s, their very lives depended on embrac-
ing this model.
Authority over Burgess’s mission family was strengthened during 
times of crisis. During the massacres, she refused to take shelter with 
the British consul, choosing instead to stay at the mission, where she put 
up a makeshift Union Jack in plain sight. When questioned by Turkish 
officers on whose authority she acted, she asserted that the flag was there 
by the command of the British Embassy and that it served as a warning 
against attacking the Armenians taking refugee at the mission. Several 
days later, Burgess went accompanied by the British ambassador’s drago-
man to “every part of the city where Armenians had been slain, and to 
collect reliable information and statistics” for the British government.69
The action of Burgess and her staff during this episode brought her 
increasing respect from the Armenian community in Constantinople 
and her supporters at home. It also brought her fledgling mission much 
needed money. When Sir James Reckitt heard that a packet of his Reckitt’s 
Blue dye had been used to fashion the flag that hung over the mission 
during the crisis, he was reported to have been so pleased that he “sent 
the Mission a check for 100 pounds with the message that he believed the 
product of his firm had never done such a good service before.”70
geoPoliTicS and MiSSionary PhilanThroPy
On the occasion of Burgess’s “semi-jubilee” at the mission in 1914, a cel-
ebration was held and attended by business, political, and religious lead-
ers of the Armenian and expatriate British community. Sir Louis Mallet, 
the British ambassador, heartily expressed his congratulations and good 
wishes. A long list of Armenian community leaders further praised what 
they called Burgess’s important work on behalf of Armenians. Even the 
Armenian patriarch, the head of the Orthodox Church who had actively 
opposed the efforts of evangelical Protestants to convert Armenians, 
embraced Burgess’s humanitarian efforts. In a prepared statement read 
by one of his representative, he expressed “the gratitude of his people to 
Miss Burgess” and prayed for “God’s blessing on all of her work.”71
Although those attending the festivities had no way of knowing it, 
two new crises were on the horizon: World War I and the 1915 Armenian 
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Genocide that killed approximately one million Ottoman Armenians and 
displaced three-quarter million others.72 Running such a business in a 
foreign country that served a persecuted minority in peacetime proved 
difficult at best. The crisis of world war made it almost impossible. By 
the time World War I broke out in 1914, Burgess had maintained her 
industrial work scheme for almost twenty years. Her influence in official 
British government circles led to a reversal of an Ottoman governmental 
order to leave the country in November 1915. Turkish authorities, how-
ever, had commandeered the school for army barracks, leaving Burgess 
to take refuge in the nearby British Hospital. After the army took over 
the hospital Burgess moved back to the orphanage, a part of the Friends 
campus left unoccupied by the Turkish troops.73
Her experiences in the wake of the 1896 massacres prepared her, in 
part, to deal with the coming war. Her status as an Englishwoman and 
her work on behalf of the Armenians made Burgess particularly mind-
ful of not attracting the attention of Ottoman authorities. At first, she 
worked with the Red Cross to sustain the day-to-day activities of the 
mission. When the Armenian Genocide commenced in 1915, however, 
Burgess again put her factories to work to ameliorate what she called the 
“sorrow surging round”: “In this time of sorrow and poverty, our work 
has been a great boon. Of course the women can only have enough work 
given them to cover the cost of their bread, seeing the numbers are so 
high. At this moment about 400 pounds is required to fill up the deficit of 
accounts. Of course there is a great stack of work on hand — if ever a way 
opens for disposing it, even at low prices, we shall be able to go on after 
the war closes if that happy event ever reaches us.”74 The twin problems 
of serving those she defined as truly needy (work was given to women 
literally to earn bread) and selling the goods to her patrons back home 
led Burgess to rely even more heavily on her network of supporters and 
unflagging belief in her mission.
As conditions worsened on the ground, Burges did what she could. 
“Raw materials are so scarce and expensive,” one of her American help-
ers, Hetty Rowe, explained in a letter to a patron. “[Burgess] has even 
ripped the calico covers off of her mattresses to use. Spool cotton was 
sold at twenty-five cents and silks for embroidery had greatly increased 
in value. Fortunately, Miss Burgess had a lot of material on hand. As 
soon as the work is completed she stores it in large packing boxes at the 
Bible House.”75 Rather than rely on donations Burgess used all available 
resources to continue to fill orders for Anatolian-made goods still coming 
in despite the war. Rowe described the appeal of self-help philanthropy in 
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the midst of war and genocide in almost social Darwinian terms: “Of the 
various kinds of work among the people, the industrial appealed strongly 
to me. And when the war broke out, it was more needed than ever before. 
Gifts of money direct seemed like pampering the people while work gave 
them new hope and made them more self-respecting.”76 The idea that 
refugees fleeing persecution were better off working in a factory than 
receiving direct aid reveals how these twin crises made business, reli-
gious, and humanitarian interests almost indistinguishable.
Managing political crisis through humanitarian intervention gave 
missionary philanthropy a heightened sense of purpose. Burgess clearly 
took pride in her skills as a businesswoman while embracing her role as 
humanitarian aid worker. A letter written in 1922 to Algerina Peckover 
provides a look into how Burgess had come to combine these roles at the 
mission:
The sad thing is Armenians in Asia Minor are still suffering worse 
things than death. We have had a whole week of prayer meetings 
with a great crowd every night. We are still having Industrial sales 
we sold £130 worth of toys this last two days. We have a room full 
of widows and orphans who make dolls, donkeys, elephants, rabbits, 
etc. all day long. . . . We also have a rug factory and then add on all 
the religious exercises. Sunday school, bible classes, mission meet-
ings, social gatherings, evening classes and you will see we are not 
likely to rest and I do not think we shall wear out for some time yet 
if when we do I trust the work will go on.77
Empathy, prayer meetings, and industrial work combined work at a rug 
factory and in the workrooms with “religious exercises.”78 This business 
of relief work made it possible for the humanitarian and religious work 
to “go on.”
Burgess’s reputation as an honest broker and member of the com-
munity allowed her to stay on throughout the crisis and play her part 
as a humanitarian aid worker along with the Friends of Armenia. The 
expatriate community living in Constantinople continued to show their 
support, while well-placed Armenian middlemen made sure industrial 
goods reached customers in America, Britain, and Europe. In December 
1922, in the wake of the burning of Smyrna by Turkish nationalists that 
eliminated the remaining Armenian, Greek, and Assyrian populations 
from Anatolia, Burgess moved her operations to Greece with the help 
of a £500 check from the Friends of Armenia. Taking her factory fur-
niture and industrial goods along with 130 workers, she set up shop on 
the island of Corfu in “an old Fortress built by the British.”79 There the 
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Friends’ Mission in Constantinople transformed into a refugee camp in 
Greece where the art of rug making served Ottoman Christians displaced 
by world war and genocide.
Burgess’s story reveals a world of women’s philanthropic aid work that 
joined currents of Victorian evangelicalism, philanthropy, and humani-
tarian intervention in the Near East. It did so by making relief work an 
exchange between patron and client. This approach proved influential 
up through World War I. When the Lord Mayor’s Fund set its sights on 
assisting genocide survivors in 1917 a leader of the Friends of Armenia 
offered the following advice: “I am certain that the most useful form [aid] 
can take is the provision of employment especially to women who have 
no men to aid in their support. Industrial relief has the great advantage 
over other methods that it does not tend to demoralize the recipients and 
make them dependent on charity, an effect which the giving of money 
inevitable produces.”80
The success of this philosophy, in the case of Burgess’s mission in 
Constantinople, hinged on the ability to fuse missionary religious inter-
ests with secular humanitarian and philanthropic concerns. Other aid 
organizations, including the Friends of Armenia and the Lord Mayor’s 
Fund, would rely on this same formulation. From a missionary outpost 
in Constantinople, Burgess and her circle engaged Britons in economic, 
humanitarian, and religious relationships in a region increasingly impor-
tant to imperial politics. Ultimately the networks created by Burgess dur-
ing her decades of industrial and religious work tied together a commu-
nity of unlikely allies that included aid workers, missionaries, diplomats, 
orphans, widows, and commercial and philanthropic patrons.
Missionary philanthropy like humanitarian diplomacy necessarily 
conformed to geopolitical realities. The rise of relief work as a busi-
ness in the service of those who suffered in the late nineteenth century 
contributed to a sense of proprietorship over the Near East by tying aid 
workers to their charges in a dependent web of relationships. In this way, 
humanitarianism developed as a moral ideal driven forward by an evan-
gelical religious imperative and sense of imperial obligation. The chal-
lenges faced by Burgess would prove emblematic of the wider difficulties 
that World War I would pose for those acting on behalf of this Victorian 
humanitarian ethos during the Armenian Genocide.
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Allied forces landed at Gallipoli on April 25, 1915. The night before 
the invasion, the Ottoman government rounded up an estimated 250 
Armenian intellectuals and religious leaders in Constantinople on 
unnamed charges, marking the beginning of the Armenian Genocide.1 
The British soon came to experience World War I on the Eastern Front 
as a series of military and humanitarian disasters from Gallipoli to the 
villages of eastern Anatolia. For First Lord of the Admiralty Winston 
Churchill, defeating the Central Powers’ newest ally would check German 
power in the East. Others cast the war in more ideological terms, raising 
the possibility that an Allied victory would liberate minority populations. 
As J. Ellis Barker put it in the Fortnightly Review, “The present war is a 
war against German militarism and a war of liberation. If it should end 
in a victory of the Allied Powers it should not merely lead to the freeing 
of the subjected and oppressed . . . in Europe, but also to the freeing of the 
nationalities who live under Turkish tyranny in Asia.”2
The unprecedented devastation of the Armenian population along with 
the Assyrians and Greeks in the Ottoman Empire shaped British percep-
tions of the Eastern Front throughout the war.3 Fighting the Ottoman 
Empire as a member of the Central Powers meant, in part, the liberation 
of this group.4 Such concerns solicited a significant political and humani-
tarian response. By November 1915, widespread reporting of continued 
civilian massacres led one commentator to conclude: “Avowedly one of 
the chief objects of the present war is to advantage small nationalities. In 
this war Armenians are playing no unimportant part.”5
At end of the war, a more uneven narrative of genocide and “small 
nationalities” emerged. Massive civilian displacements, massacres, and 
deportations that occurred under the cover of war revealed how com-
5.  The Armenian Genocide 
and the Great War
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pletely humanitarian diplomacy had failed. The inability to stop the 
Armenian massacres and mitigate the suffering of victims left many 
disillusioned about Britain’s assumed role as a defender of minority inter-
ests, which dated back to the Crimean War. Here on the battlefronts and 
killing fields of the Ottoman Empire, the moral certainty that had guided 
British foreign policy in the Near East came unhinged.
Historians have argued that Great Power politics had long worked at 
cross-purposes with humanitarianism in the Ottoman Empire.6 Britain 
deployed the image of Armenia as a “victim nation” to provide just cause 
for the war in the East in the hopes of drawing its American ally into the 
conflict.7 This chapter offers a less determinist portrayal of a humanitar-
ian movement that often intersected with and informed the world of high 
politics during and immediately following World War I. Stories from 
relief workers, government officials, war crimes tribunals, and the cin-
ema present a view of this tragedy from above and below, revealing the 
humane and sometimes cynical responses of Britons and their govern-
ment to war and genocide in the Near East.
BriTain’S arMenianS
The shocking scale and scope of the Genocide, graphically detailed in the 
press and by eyewitnesses, raised the stakes for those who understood 
Britain’s obligations to minority Christians as part of a larger humani-
tarian crusade. Soon after the killings began, organizations stepped up 
advocacy work, holding public meetings and disseminating a host of 
publications that made the Armenian cause Britain’s cause. These groups 
had roots in Victorian political culture that had grown up around W. E. 
Gladstone’s untiring support of humanitarian causes that was later taken 
up by his son. Religious and secular advocacy organizations such as the 
Eastern Question Association, the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Assyrian 
Mission, and the Anglo-Armenian Association helped sustain this 
interest.
Advocacy work on behalf of minority Christians merged humanitar-
ian and geopolitical concerns. Activists argued that that war urgently 
required that Britain honor its diplomatic obligations under the 1878 
Treaty of Berlin to better secure ties with Near Eastern Christians and 
reward those who sided with the Allied cause. James Bryce’s Anglo-
Armenian Association, for example, cast Armenians as loyal allies in the 
fight against despotism. The founding of the British Armenia Committee 
at the end of the Balkan Wars of 1912 – 13 by group of influential politi-
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cians and private citizens with “first-hand knowledge of Armenia and the 
East” made the case that supporting Armenians bolstered British inter-
ests.8 The committee came out of the 1903 Balkan Committee, which lob-
bied on behalf of Ottoman minorities. Buoyed by success in negotiating 
settlements in favor of Balkan Christians after the wars, members turned 
their attention to Armenia. The chair of the newly fashioned commit-
tee, Aneurin Williams, gathered around him members of Parliament, 
opinion makers, and Armenian representatives in order to pressure the 
British government to enforce the protections for minorities outlined at 
Berlin. Williams, a Liberal MP, had a “deeply religious” sensibility and 
offered a “devoted, almost impassioned service” to the cause of minority 
protection during his more than ten years of service.9
Relief organizations built on the momentum of parliamentary advo-
cacy. Inaugurated in December 1914 in Kensington where “tea and musi-
cal entertainment closed the afternoon,” the Armenian Red Cross soon 
attracted a small but loyal base of support by giving lantern lectures 
and holding other events in private homes.10 Viscountess Bryce served 
as president alongside almost two dozen vice presidents that included 
well-known advocates for Armenia such as the viscountess’s husband, 
James Bryce, Lady Henry Somerset, Lady Frederick Cavendish, MPs 
Noel Buxton and Aneurin Williams, and the journalist Edwin Pears. The 
crisis of the massacres brought increased focus to the organization. By 
summer 1915, the organization began work in two main areas: refugee 
relief and aid to Armenian volunteers helping the Allied cause.
The Armenian Red Cross made relief work on the Eastern Front patri-
otic by uniting the humanitarian and military causes. As one appeal put 
it: “The Armenian Red Cross and Refugee Fund was organized . . . to 
stem in some degree the torrent of misery caused by the war among the 
Armenian population of Turkey and Persia . . . and to provide medical 
necessaries for the Armenian volunteers fighting on behalf of Russia.”11 
This heightened sense of purpose cast the Eastern Question as a war-
time cause: “Those who are acquainted with Near Eastern affairs know 
that the horrible massacres, ill-treatment and deportation of the helpless 
Armenian population of Turkey which occurred in 1915 were brought 
about indirectly at any rate by the jealousies and intrigues of the Great 
Powers, Great Britain being prominent among these. This being the case, 
surely the very least Great Britain can do is to try and make amends to 
the innocent survivors, who after enduring persecution from their birth, 
have, from no fault of their own, lost their homes, together with all that 
made life worth living.”12 In the first year more than 1,800 subscribers 
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raised thousands of pounds for relief work, which the organization sent 
to the British consul general in Moscow, who then forwarded aid to the 
head of the Armenian Orthodox Church, the Catholicos at Etchmiadzin, 
and the mayor of the Armenian-dominated city of Tiflis for dispersal by 
local relief committees.13
Word of the fund got out through newspaper advertisements, ser-
mons, and public lectures. The organization took photos of refugees 
“being fed by members of the Moscow committee” in order to “appeal 
to British hearts and consciences more than any words can do.”14 It sent 
supplies to affected areas via allied transport ships located on the Russo-
Turkish border, where most of the refugees had settled. Items included 
drugs, bandages, and surgical dressings sent via Sweden and warm gar-
ments carried free of charge on Russian steamships. Parcels came from 
“British sympathizers” in places as far away as New Zealand and Japan. 
British schools, colleges, and working parties also donated materials. 
Children wrote to say that they “forego coveted treats or prizes that 
they might send the equivalent for feeding refugees.” One woman donor 
offered to adopt a baby but “had to be told that the difficulties of import-
ing one from the Caucasus were insuperable.”15 Another requested that 
an “Armenian General” be sent as a companion for a devoted Armenian 
nurse. Armenian refugees from Belgium came to the organization seek-
ing work, while others wrote asking if the organization could help them 
find lost relatives.
Emily Robinson stood as the steady force behind the Armenian Red 
Cross. Her convictions belonged to a Gladstonian age that understood 
the Eastern Question as a moral and religious imperative. Her father ran 
the Daily News and had sent out correspondents to cover the Armenian 
massacres during the mid-1890s.16 Before serving as the secretary for the 
Armenian Red Cross she published “The Truth About Armenia” in 1913 
and later, during the war, published two other short pamphlets, “Armenia 
and the Armenians” (1916) and “The Armenians” (1918). The latter, priced 
at threepence, called Armenia “the last rampart of Christendom in the 
East” and argued that Britain and her allies were fighting the war to 
secure a “lasting peace” guaranteed “not by a Treaty of Paris, London, 
Vienna or Berlin but by a consensus of opinion in civilized Europe and 
the United States.” For Robinson and those who advocated the Armenian 
cause, the aftermath of the war would forge a “new Armenia” as “the cen-
tre of civilization and culture in the Near East.”
The dual military and humanitarian crises on the Eastern Front 
required a shift in how advocates represented the cause of Christian 
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minorities. Robinson’s brand of nineteenth-century liberal humanitari-
anism would only go so far with a new generation confronted with the 
brutality of Total War. The Armenian Red Cross forged moral and stra-
tegic arguments on behalf of Christian minorities in a new key. The first 
strategy equated the Armenian cause with Belgium.17 “Armenians are our 
allies as much as the Belgians,” one early appeal argued. “The only differ-
ence being that whereas Belgium has suffered for seven months, Armenia 
has suffered for five centuries.” The widely reported rape, murder and 
kidnapping of Armenian girls during the Genocide made the parallel to 
Belgium more powerful.18 Ottoman atrocities evoked the outrage over 
the “Rape of Belgium” that had helped rally the British to war in 1914.19
The story of thousands of kidnapped girls further linked the brutality 
of Germany with that of its ally, the Ottoman Empire. Humanitarian 
work on behalf of these girls led to the setting up of a special commission 
after the war by the League of Nations to reunite families torn apart by 
mass deportations.20 As Robinson wrote in a letter to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury about this campaign: “I have been working for the libera-
tion of the Christian women and children forcibly detained since 1915 in 
Turkish harems. . . . White slave traffic is a crime here and is punished 
as such in European countries. It seems it has only to be conducted on 
a wholesale scale and by Turks to be quite permissible.”21 Echoing W. T. 
Stead’s earlier campaign against the white slave trade, Robinson deployed 
harem slavery as a trope to argue that Britain had a moral obligation to 
protect and defend women and children in the Near East.
The Armenian Red Cross effectively cast Armenia as both victim and 
defender of the faith in the wake of the Genocide, raising tens of thou-
sands of pounds for relief work. As “the last stronghold of Christianity in 
the Near East,” the Red Cross argued, Armenians “have ever to struggle 
patiently and bravely in the face of the greatest privations and suffer-
ings . . . simply because they are consistent Christians.”22 Funds like the 
Armenian Red Cross further represented Armenians as allies fighting 
alongside Britain on the Eastern Front. This had little foundation in fact. 
Spiritual and secular leaders issued a statement at the beginning of the 
war upon receiving an Allied request for help, declaring that Armenians 
as loyal Ottoman subjects would not rise up against the empire. However, 
European-diaspora Armenians and some living across the Russian border 
did organize. Though effective symbols of British-Armenian unity, the 
heroes of the Red Cross narrative were little more than an ill-equipped 
and poorly organized band of international volunteers.23
Aid organizations used this small group of mainly Russian national 
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volunteers for propaganda efforts, encouraging patrons to see Armenia as 
an actual military ally. “If a reason is wanted which will come more nearly 
home to Britons,” a Red Cross report from late in the war declared, “after 
the disruption and collapse of the Russian-Caucasian Army, Armenian 
volunteers rushed to Transcaucasia to the rescue from all parts of the 
world and manfully stopped the breach at fearful sacrifice to themselves 
thus effectively protecting the flank of the British Mesopotamian army 
from attack by the Turks.” For the Red Cross, “This important service of 
theirs deserves the highest reward the Allies can give.” Contributors to 
the fund could also do their part by assisting “us in helping a nation which 
has done so much to help itself.”24 Ironically, although publicizing the 
Armenian volunteers functioned well as propaganda for the humanitar-
ian cause, it also fueled claims, still made today, that the presence of Rus-
sian volunteers justified the Ottoman massacre of over a million civilians 
from Constantinople to the Russo-Turkish border during the war.25
Informally encouraged in their efforts by high-ranking officials at 
the Foreign Office, the Armenian volunteers were largely supported by 
private relief funds. The Allies needed to find a way to keep Russia in 
the war but worried about arming an untested and badly organized force 
of volunteers north of the Russo-Turkish border. Britain’s military lead-
ers saw the Gallipoli campaign rather than the Caucuses as critical to 
keeping Russia a viable ally, since opening up the Dardanelles would free 
Russian movement and take pressure off the Western Front.26 When the 
Gallipoli campaign seemed doomed to failure by late summer 1915, how-
ever, they did not discourage the use of these volunteers to help Russia in 
the Caucasus.27 The lack of official support from the British government 
rendered this international brigade of men of Armenian ethnicity largely 
ineffective. As one Armenian Red Cross appeal claimed: “There are now 
more than 8,000 of these volunteers and their number is continually 
being added to. By the spring it is estimated that there will be between 
20 – 25,000. They have been equipped and are maintained by Armenians 
all over the world at a cost of £6,000 per day. At the present they have 
no doctor and there are only five untrained Armenian ladies assisting as 
nurses.”28 The organization declared that it would split all money raised 
between four columns of volunteers and the more than 100,000 destitute 
refugees living just over the Russo-Turkish border.29
The seamless link between strategic and humanitarian concerns 
made relief work part of a common cause during the war. The Armenian 
Refugees Fund (Lord Mayor’s Fund, LMF), founded in October 1915, 
emerged as the largest of these relief organizations.30 Started to respond 
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to the humanitarian crisis of the massacres, it defined its purpose in terms 
of what it called “[t]he wave of indignation and horror that has swept 
across Great Britain in connection with the treatment of Armenians in 
Turkish provinces.” The fund worked closely with other political advocacy 
organizations during the war, gaining recognition as the “national fund.” 
The Armenian Red Cross, Save the Children, and Friends of Armenia 
published appeals on its behalf and even contributed money to the fund. 
Its leadership, which included politicians, private citizens, and relief 
workers, broadened the appeal of its work by including other refugee 
groups. “Though our fund is formed primarily for the relief of Armenian 
refugees,” wrote chairman Aneurin Williams in a letter to the Times, “we 
have laid it down from the first that any others facing the same awful 
fate should be entitled to share in the relief.”31 The fund cooperated in 
this task with the well-funded American relief organization Near East 
Relief, which had a network of missionaries, consuls, and philanthropic 
organizations on the ground to help distribute aid.32
The LMF leadership effectively tied Britain’s wartime interests to per-
secuted minorities. Recognizing the importance of eyewitness accounts 
for raising money, the organization funded a British Relief Expedition to 
the Caucasus “to supervise and coordinate the medical and relief work” 
among Armenian refugees, which was led by a prominent member of the 
committee, Noel Buxton. A four-page fundraising flyer from December 
1916 made the case for immediate intervention. The response to the 
question of why “Turks attempted to exterminate them” hinged on ethnic 
hatred, imperial politics, and German intrigue. The Ottoman Empire 
was “jealous of Armenian energy and ability. . . . The Armenians both by 
character and religion are impossible to assimilate in Turkey. And more-
over they stand as the direct obstacle in the way of the Pan-Turanian 
ideas encouraged by Germany.”33 This plea for immediate assistance 
listed the fund’s work up to that point, which included founding orphan-
ages, setting up industrial work centers to employ refugees, and starting 
hospitals and schools.
As a result of these efforts the LMF reported collecting tens of 
thousands of pounds during its first year of operation from individual 
small donations made by donors in Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, 
Edinburgh, and London. One fundraising meeting used Buxton’s pres-
ence in the Caucuses to raise funds for the repatriation of refugees and 
for rebuilding efforts after the massacres. As Aneurin Williams declared 
of Armenian and Assyrian refugees in a public meeting, “These people 
are going back. We are not sending them back (hear, hear) but they are 
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going back to their own districts; and being back, if we can do something 
to help them to avoid famine in the coming winter, I take it is our duty 
to do so. (Applause).” The Earl Beauchamp, evoking the 1896 massacres, 
summed up the purpose of wartime relief work: “English people have 
always taken an interest in the Armenian nation and the sums of money 
that have been raised . . . show that the people of this country however 
great the present needs may be in other directions have not lost sight of 
such a worthy cause in the face of new needs.”34 A nominal amount of 
£1,000 did go to displaced Muslims to demonstrate that the fund “drew 
no distinction of race and religion.”
The LMF understood World War I primarily as a war of liberation 
for “small nationalities” along religious lines. Advocates included Mark 
Sykes, T. P. O’Connor, and Lady Ramsey, the latter arguing that Armenia 
was worthy of support as “the first Christian nation.” Sykes, at that time 
engaged in his official capacity in carving up the Near East between 
Britain and France, introduced the possibility of a national solution. To 
his mind, “the connection of religion and nationality in Armenian coun-
tries is so tied up that their persecution is not exactly or purely a religious 
persecution.”35
The appeal on behalf of religious minorities, particularly those dis-
placed by the 1915 massacres, drove relief organizations beyond the war. 
“The Armenian nation has lost during the war as many lives as the great 
British Nation,” read one 1919 LMF pamphlet.36 This humanitarian crisis 
demanded both political advocacy and personal sacrifice. “What ought 
we do?” asked one appeal: “It is for us 1) To make facts known and to 
arouse public opinion to support the Government in any relief measures 
they may propose to undertake 2) To Abstain from every kind of ‘luxury 
foods” in order that more labour, more transport and more supplies 
may be available for the starving peoples 3) To give generously to the 
Lord Mayors Fund or to similar Agencies so that the clothing materials 
and medical supplies which are so desperately needed may be sent out 
immediately.”37 News of progress was reported to donors in bulletins that 
provided “recent news from our agents” who distributed aid in Damascus, 
Aleppo, Constantinople, and other areas where refugees had gathered. 
Homes for orphans, clothing appeals, and fund-raising for homes for kid-
napped women (“[t]he whereabouts of most of them is already known”) 
filled the pages of these reports, assuring donors that they had a role to 
play in mitigating civilian suffering.38
In addition to the organizations discussed above, advocacy groups 
active during World War I included: The Friends of Armenia, with 
branches in Ireland, Scotland, Wales and England; the Armenian Bureau 
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of Information; the Lord Mayor’s Fund of Manchester; Armenian Orphans 
Fund (Manchester); The Religious Society of Friends, Armenian Mission; 
The Armenian Refugees Relief Fund, run by the Armenian United 
Association of London; and the Armenian Ladies Guild of London.39 
These organizations raised hundreds of thousands of pounds for relief 
work and thousands more for political advocacy and education programs, 
keeping the Eastern Front on the minds of Britons during some of the 
worst years of the war.40
Together wartime advocacy organizations shaped both the way offi-
cials and the public at large understood the humanitarian crisis in the 
Near East. So important had this understanding of the Eastern Question 
become that some worried it overshadowed the grave military situation 
of the war. The historian J. A. R. Marriott, in “Factors in the Problem of 
the Near East: Germany,” published in the Fortnightly Review in 1916, 
argued that the war necessitated that the public pay greater heed to diplo-
matic rather than humanitarian concerns. As he concluded:
To the mass of the people in this country the “Eastern Question” 
has signified for the last twenty years, the unhappy condition of the 
Christian subjects of the Sultan . . . This concentration of interest was 
more creditable to our hearts than our heads. But it is noteworthy 
mainly because it is essentially symptomatic of our general outlook 
upon foreign affairs. The Armenian massacres provide a topic on 
which it is possible to arouse popular passion; it is well adapted to 
treatment on the platform or in the pulpit. . . . But to follow closely 
and intelligently the course of diplomacy requires not merely sym-
pathy but knowledge; a real study of foreign affairs demands, not the 
gifts of the rhetorician but clear thinking and wide reading.41
The overwhelming response to the civilian massacres in the Near East 
opened up a discursive space that made it possible to link humanitarian 
with military wartime objectives. Marriott’s concern stemmed from the 
increasing attention given to advocacy groups and their power to shape 
public opinion. In this way, the fallout from the Armenian Genocide 
proved an important lens through which to view the war in the East. Five 
months after Marriott warned against fighting a humanitarian war of 
liberation came a powerful rejoinder that ignited outrage over the han-
dling of the Eastern Question during the war.
Bryce’S Blue Book
No document had as great an effect on wartime opinion in Britain and 
other Allied countries as the one published by Lord James Bryce (1838 – 
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1922) in October 1916. The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire: 1915 – 1916 contained evidence from over one hundred sources 
that chronicled Turkish atrocities during the Genocide. Issued as a 
Parliamentary Blue Book, the 733-page document was the most complete 
set of testimonies to date on the massacre of Armenian civilians that 
started in the spring of 1915. Although Bryce claimed that it avoided 
“questions of future policy,” the evidence contained in the report drew 
upon a compelling set of humanitarian arguments that made the case for 
political intervention.42 Buoyed in part by the international response to 
Bryce’s report, the campaign on behalf of Armenian victims took shape 
as a national effort that drove debates over the Eastern Question during 
the remaining years of the war and beyond.
Bryce’s interest in Armenia dated back to a life-changing trek up 
Mount Ararat that he undertook in 1876. His ascent up the 14,000-foot 
mountain, considered the resting place of Noah’s Ark and the center of 
historical Armenia, provided the basis for a book and a set of lectures on 
Armenia. This trip, according to his biographer, marked the beginning of 
a lifelong career as advocate for Armenian causes.43 As early as 1878, the 
“Armenian Community of Constantinople” had written to Bryce thank-
ing him for a Royal Geographical Society lecture he gave “favoring the 
free development of the Armenian nation.”44 Closer to home, his election 
to Parliament in 1880 for Tower Hamlets (1880 – 85) and South Aberdeen 
(1885 – 1906) brought his work on behalf of Armenians to the political 
stage.45 By the time he founded the Anglo-Armenian Association in 
1890 he had secured a network of supporters in Britain and abroad that 
advocated for the minority reforms first laid out in the Treaty of Berlin. 
Considered heir to W. E. Gladstone’s campaigns on behalf of Ottoman 
minorities, Bryce stepped up his advocacy on behalf of Armenians as 
soon as news of the Genocide began to reach Britain.46
Immediately after the war started, Bryce, by now a viscount with a 
seat in the House of Lords, chaired a committee of lawyers and histo-
rians investigating reports of atrocities against Belgian civilians by the 
Germans.47 His report chronicling the brutal treatment of women and 
children at the hands of German soldiers was translated into twenty-
seven languages and had a tremendous effect on public opinion, serving 
as a rallying point for the war effort on the Western Front.48 One year 
later, when news of the Ottoman massacres began to reach Britain, Bryce 
and others began compiling evidence from travelers, missionaries, civil-
ians, aid workers and political representatives of atrocities committed 
against Armenian civilians in the empire.
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News of the slaughter reached home by May 2, 1915, when Aneurin 
Williams wrote to a colleague of “new massacres” committed in Tiflis.49 
Nine days later Sir G. Buchanan informed Sir Edward Grey that the 
“Minister of Foreign Affairs thinks that we ought to let it be known that 
we shall hold Turkey responsible at the end of the war for any massacre 
of Armenians.”50 A joint European declaration of May 24 promised to 
hold the Ottoman government personally responsible for “new crimes of 
Turkey against humanity and civilization.”51 Bryce immediately began 
collecting material documenting the massacres for what would become 
the Blue Book. By June 1916 Bryce had secured the assistance of lawyers 
and historians to review the documents and gave the task of editing and 
organizing to the young Oxford historian Arnold Toynbee.
The Blue Book and Toynbee’s other writings on the genocide con-
solidated a body of evidence on Armenian atrocities collected from 
observers and victims. In addition to the Blue Book, Toynbee published 
two long, inexpensive pamphlets: Armenian Atrocities: The Murder of a 
Nation (1915) and The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks (1917). Together 
these texts marshaled a set of arguments that would shape future dis-
course on the Armenian Genocide. Armenian Atrocities made the case 
for genocide for the first time. In it Toynbee argued that the “exceedingly 
systematic” nature of the massacres set them apart from nineteenth-
century antecedents. Citing evidence taken from fifty different places, 
Toynbee established a pattern of premeditated mass violence in a chapter 
entitled “The Plan of the Massacres.” Other chapters chronicled deporta-
tions and the death toll. The final chapter, “The Attitude of Germany,” 
implicated Germany as an accomplice to the massacres, a role that histo-
rians have began to interrogate more closely in recent years.52 German 
culpability for atrocities on both the Western and Eastern Fronts, how-
ever, went unquestioned at the time.53 As Toynbee ended the pamphlet: 
“This shameful and terrible page of modern history which is unfolding 
in distant Armenia is nothing but an echo and an extension of the main 
story, the central narrative which must describe the German incursion 
into Belgium fourteen months ago. . . . What she has done is to bring us 
all back in the Twentieth Century to the condition of the dark ages. That 
is the indictment. Let Germany cease to deserve it.”54
The publication of the Blue Book the next fall, intended as an impartial 
representation of the facts of the Genocide, inevitably reflected British 
wartime concerns. A speech given by Bryce in the House of Lords in 
October 1915, reprinted in Armenian Atrocities, summed up his under-
standing of the motivations behind the killings and deportations. The 
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massacres of 1915, Bryce argued, had political rather than religious ori-
gins: “There was no Moslem passion against the Armenian Christians. 
All was done by the will of the Government and done not from any 
religious fanaticism, but simply because they wished for reasons purely 
political to get rid of a non-Moslem element which impaired the homo-
geneity of the Empire, and constituted an element that might not always 
submit to oppression.”55 Bryce’s emphasis on political over religious 
motivations, the latter so central to Victorian understandings of the 
Eastern Question, proved important in the wartime context. Concerns 
over angering Muslim leaders in the empire animated arguments against 
intervening in Ottoman internal affairs since the signing of the Treaty 
of Berlin. A small but vocal constituency had argued that “England is 
the greatest Mohammedan Power upon earth” and should not alienate 
Muslim opinion by bowing to “British Christian opinion.”56
Portraying the massacres as state-sponsored terror dispelled notions 
that Britain’s Eastern policy worked against its own imperial interests by 
alienating Muslim subjects. The Blue Book charted the systematic nature 
of the massacres by the government, documenting the presence of con-
current massacres throughout the whole of Anatolia. Organized along 
regional lines with a map of “affected districts,” each of the twenty sec-
tions contained multiple eyewitness and secondhand reports, dispatches, 
news articles, and letters. The appendix cited evidence to refute claims 
made by Ottoman officials that Armenian disloyalty to the empire justi-
fied the massacre of civilians on defensive grounds.57
The repetition of evidence in the more than one hundred documents 
made the case for the systematic nature of the massacres but, according 
to Toynbee, also made for rather “dull reading.” This along with the size 
of the volume considerably worried Bryce, who first and foremost wanted 
the Blue Book to be read. Toynbee decided that rather than edit down the 
documents, a move that would risk calling into question their authentic-
ity, he would provide a guide that highlighted the most important testi-
monies. As he made the case to Bryce in a letter:
[I]n publishing a more or less exhaustive collection of material it is 
almost impossible to make the essential things stand out clearly. I 
believe the best remedy will be to insert a slip in every copy giving 
a selected list of the really interesting and important documents and 
suggesting that readers who cannot digest the whole should turn to 
these first. I imagine, indeed, that practically no one will read the 
volume straight through. As to the question of shortening the 5th 
section . . . cutting down of documents might give the wrong impres-
sion; it might suggest that we had omitted or suppressed material in 
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other places, not merely to save space but to modify the effect of the 
evidence.58
Bryce agreed to a “Reader’s Guide,” which summed up about one in three 
documents using one-line descriptive statements at the beginning of the 
volume. The first item cited, Document 9, simply read, “Letter conveyed 
out of Turkey in the sole of a refugee’s shoe.”
Toynbee, in deciding against abridging any of the documents, was not 
just worried about maintaining the authenticity of the source material. 
He also drew upon nineteenth-century tropes that cast Armenians as 
distant kin who shared a common past with his Anglo and American 
readers. What made the deportations particular hard on Armenians, he 
argued, was their removal from their homes in a European-like setting: 
“The Anatolian highlands are physiologically akin to Europe and the 
Armenians who dwell in them are not only Europeans in their civilization 
but are accustomed to an essential European climate.”59 Armenians’ will-
ingness to help themselves joined geographic with cultural ties. Toynbee 
made this point to Bryce when asked to take out one set of documents in 
the interest of space: “the subject of these three consular memoranda is to 
the point, as it is chiefly concerned with the relief work of the Caucasian 
Armenians, and it may be well to show that the Armenians are doing 
things for each other and not merely depending on other people’s help.”60 
They printed the three reports in their entirety.
In this way the Blue Book served as a source of documentary evidence 
and a tool for shaping public opinion and future policy. As Bryce con-
cluded his preface to the collection: “It is evidently desirable not only 
that ascertained facts should be put on record for the sake of future his-
torians, while the events are still fresh in living memory, but also that 
the public opinion of the belligerent nations — and, I may add of neutral 
peoples also — should be able by a knowledge of what has happened in 
Asia Minor and Armenia to exercise its judgment on the course proper to 
be followed when, at the end of the present war, a political resettlement 
of the Nearer East has to be undertaken.”61 By raising the specter of the 
minority question in the postwar settlement the Blue Book effectively 
politicized future considerations of the Genocide. “Political resettlement” 
implied something very specific in the minds of Bryce and his supporters. 
Politicians had touted the idea of a national solution as a panacea for the 
Near East as early as the Berlin treaty, when the map of the Balkans was 
redrawn as a series of ethnically and religiously constituted states. The 
massacres lent a new urgency to calls to recreate an Armenian homeland 
in eastern Turkey and Cilicia in the south.
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In terms of the war itself, the Blue Book served a much more specific 
purpose. As Akaby Nassibian has shown, the British government used 
news of the massacres to influence public opinion in the United States 
and neutral countries like Bulgaria as early as fall 1915.62 The Blue Book, 
H. H. Asquith and Stanley Baldwin declared in a joint memorandum pub-
lished after the war, was “widely used for Allied propaganda in 1916 – 17 
and had an important influence upon American opinion and upon the 
ultimate decision of President Wilson to enter the war.”63 Bryce’s research 
when placed in the hands of the government could easily transform 
from a piece of documentary evidence into a propaganda tool. Bryce and 
Toynbee came to see the benefits and potential drawbacks of publishing 
the book as a parliamentary document.
Charles Masterman, a politician and journalist in charge of the War 
Propaganda Bureau, which had published Bryce’s “Report on Alleged 
German Outrages,” had a special interest in the Blue Book’s propaganda 
potential. As he wrote to Bryce in June 1916: “I have read through the 
whole of the proposed blue book on Armenia. It is certainly an amazing 
work, telling one of the most appalling stories I should think since the 
beginning of civilization. I am very anxious that it should be published 
as soon as possible for general reasons connected with the influencing of 
public opinion, especially in regard to any ultimate settlement in the near 
East, and am continually urging Toynbee to fresh efforts to get the book 
through the press.” Masterman informed Bryce that the Foreign Office 
agreed to publish it as “an official blue book” after which “[w]e shall then 
try and get it the widest possible circulation.”64 The staging of the presen-
tation was important for Masterman, suggesting that the Foreign Office 
review the documents and that Aneurin Williams ask “a question . . . in 
the House and the book be laid before the House in answer.”65
The government paid particular attention to the timing of the release 
and worried that Bryce’s decision to corroborate the facts might cause 
delay. “As to submitting the documents to historians and Oriental 
Scholars, I have been talking to Toynbee about it. If you can suggest 
any names, we will send proofs at once to them. I should only be anx-
ious, however, that the publication of the work should not be delayed 
by such examination.” Even the month of release was carefully consid-
ered. Masterman, “in agreement with the Foreign Office,” thought that 
“the next few months of Summer in America it would probably be not 
much use to send anyone to report upon or to influence opinion there.”66 
Instead, he would use one of his contacts in “the United States press” to 
publish the work concurrently in the United States and Britain as soon 
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as possible in the fall. Parts of the report were reprinted in American 
magazines as well.67
Despite pressure from the Foreign Office to get the book out quickly, 
Toynbee and Bryce took the time to authenticate their documents during 
the next five months. Bryce insisted on having the evidence reviewed 
“by persons of experience” before publication and confirming the original 
sources.68 “I have been going through all the documents and find that 
we have 138 altogether,” Toynbee wrote to Bryce in June 1916: “There are 
still thirty four of which we do not know the authorship, five of these 
being statements in newspapers of which the ultimate authorship would 
probably be impossible to unravel. The remaining twenty nine, however, 
are definite documents by individual witnesses, or people who have had 
communication with witnesses, and I am going to make a great effort 
to obtain in confidence as many of these names as possible.”69 Toynbee 
persisted in authenticating the documents, though expressed frustration 
when one source prevaricated: “I do not think he quite realizes the impor-
tance of being able to say in the preface that the names suppressed are 
actually in the editor’s hands. I am writing to him again.” In the end, he 
sent the collection to scholars in the United States, France, and England 
for review.70 Toynbee continued to look for ways to corroborate evidence 
in the Blue Book after publication. In 1920, he asked the British Armenian 
Committee to undertake translating and publishing a German book that 
had recently come to his attention that “remarkably” confirmed the find-
ings of the Blue Book.71
While furthering war aims abroad, the Blue Book added momentum 
to the humanitarian movement at home. Advocacy organizations evoked 
the Blue Book in meetings held throughout Britain that helped fund 
relief work. The Armenian Orphans Fund started by the Lord Mayor 
of Manchester and registered under the War Charities Act of 1916 used 
evidence found in the Blue Book to legitimate its claims of obligation and 
friendship: “It is our patriotic duty to do whatever is possible because they 
have suffered not as Armenians but as friends of the Allied cause. . . . 
The Armenians volunteered in great numbers for Russia and repeatedly 
rendered most valuable service to the Allied cause. And it is for these 
services that . . . the Turks proceeded to wreak on the whole community 
the vengeance described in the British Blue Book, an authority which 
does not admit impeachment.”72 The Armenian community in London 
and abroad understandably took particular notice. Arshak Safrastian, 
a later leader of the Armenian Bureau advocacy organization, wrote to 
Bryce from his office at the London School of Economics in March 1917, 
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“My countrymen in the Caucasus are highly elated over the Armenian 
Blue Book. The press is full of it.”73
The publicity surrounding the Blue Book served as a rallying point for 
the cause of Christian minorities. Although the Ottoman government 
centrally targeted Armenians for extermination, the minority Greek and 
especially Assyrian populations also suffered mass violence and mas-
sacres throughout Anatolia.74 The Archbishop of Canterbury drew atten-
tion to the massacre and deportation of thousands of Assyrians along 
the Persian border, leading the Anglican Church to widen the scope of its 
advocacy efforts.75 The Archbishop of York wrote in letter from October 
1915 that after speaking with Bryce and reading the news accounts of the 
massacres that he found the whole thing “appalling”: “There is, I believe 
to be a Mansion House Meeting on the subject quite soon and I have 
authorized Bryce to add my name to those promoting it. Very likely that 
would be the best time for us to give a little money if we could, and at 
least we can express our horror at what is going on.”76
A month and a half after the publication of Armenian Atrocities the 
Archbishop of Canterbury wrote to the Archbishop of York of “being 
bombarded about the Armenians and indeed the horrors are beyond 
words.” When Harold Buxton, the secretary for the Armenian Refugee 
Fund, approached him to hold a special collection “for the Armenians 
throughout all the churches,” however, he at first equivocated: “With the 
Armenians are associated the Assyrians for whom I have some special 
responsibility and who are in terrible need. The Fund helps both. I have 
this morning a telegram from Buxton stating that Cardinal ( ) [sic] is 
going to order Collection in all the Roman Churches on Feb. 6th and urg-
ing that we do the same. My own feeling is that we cannot multiply these 
special Sundays.”77 A year later, the archbishop authorized the inaugural 
“Armenia Sunday” “for the expression of our common sympathy and ear-
nest prayer on behalf of our Armenians and Syro-Chaldean [Assyrian] 
brethren.” One year later, on February 2, 1917, a second Armenia Sunday 
was adopted throughout the “Free Churches of Britain,” where a two-page 
brochure on the plight of Assyrians and Armenians was distributed.78 
The years 1918 and 1919 witnessed repeats of the event, with all money 
collected going toward refugee relief in the Near East.
The publication and subsequent response to Bryce’s Blue Book had 
implications beyond its wartime reception. As a collection of verifiable 
documents it provided clear evidence of the first large-scale genocide of 
the twentieth century. The power of its influence, however, rested more in 
how it was used to serve military and humanitarian agendas. In the hands 
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of the government propaganda machine the book proved a particularly 
malleable instrument, inciting outrage intended to influence the British 
and American public in general and the American president in particular. 
For aid organizations, the publication bolstered the case for humanitarian 
intervention, helping to raise funds and keep relief schemes in the public 
eye. Bryce himself had his own agenda, to be sure. Coming out of the 
Gladstonian liberal tradition, he saw the Armenian cause as both a moral 
and a political issue. According to his biographer, “Bryce was concerned 
to establish the facts: but he was still more interested in the moral to be 
drawn from them.”79
Toynbee, a generation removed from Bryce (he was twenty-six when he 
first met the seventy-seven-year-old Bryce), came to question the stance 
of the Victorian moralist, eventually becoming disillusioned with the 
advocacy campaign he had helped promote.80 In his memoir he claimed 
that “he was unaware of the politics” that lay behind the government’s 
issuing of the Blue Book: “Lord Bryce’s concern, and mine, was to estab-
lish the facts and to make them public, in the hope that eventually some 
action might be taken in the light of them. The dead — and the deportees 
had been dying in their thousands — could not be brought back to life, but 
we hoped (vain hope) that at least something might be done to ensure, 
for the survivors, that there should never be a repetition of the barbari-
ties that had been the death of so many of their kinsmen.”81 As Toynbee 
would come to recognize, the evidence that he painstakingly had readied 
for publication could not speak for itself. Rather this tragedy of human 
suffering had already been scripted: a group of innocent civilians aligned 
with Britain massacred by a despotic state. This narrative, taken from a 
bygone Victorian era, compellingly intertwined humanitarian and geo-
political interests in a powerful, moralizing vision that linked the defeat 
of Germany with the liberation of “small nationalities.” Eventually, the 
postwar fallout from the failed campaigns in Gallipoli and Mesopotamia 
and the Genocide itself would leave little room to remember the story of 
the Eastern Front as part of the heroic narrative of the Great War.
“criMeS againST huManiTy”
Calls to prosecute those behind the Armenian massacres emerged long 
before the end of the war. “The Armenian race in Asia Minor has been 
virtually destroyed,” Lewis Einstein announced in the Contemporary 
Review in 1917. “England, France, and Russia should, at the proper 
time, realize what they have suffered as victims of the ill-success of the 
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Dardanelles expedition.”82 The failed invasion of Gallipoli implicated 
the Allies in the humanitarian disaster that happened in its wake. For 
Britain, this responsibility loomed particularly large. Bryce’s Blue Book 
cemented its long-held status as protector of Ottoman minorities. This in 
addition to the more than one million troops still on Ottoman soil after 
the conclusion of the war poised Britain from both a humanitarian and 
military standpoint to take the lead in Allied efforts at a peace settlement 
on the Eastern Front. This responsibility included the prosecution of war 
criminals.
At war’s end the British had the military infrastructure and the politi-
cal will to launch an inquiry into the massacres. Initially, they placed 
hopes in the time-tested but ultimately futile course of humanitarian 
diplomacy. “Everyone in Constantinople is discussing sweeping mea-
sures of reform,” approvingly declared the Times shortly after the signing 
of the armistice. The prosecution of “those responsible for the massa-
cres would come as a matter of course” out of fear of harsher measures 
“imposed by the Allies.”83 News of continued massacres and pressure 
from humanitarian organizations at home in the following months con-
vinced Britain to take action.84 The Constantinople War Crimes Trials, 
a historically unprecedented court martial set up to prosecute Turkish 
officials for the Armenian massacres, was the result.85 By spring 1919, the 
Ottoman government, under intense British pressure, arrested over 100 
high-profile suspects, including government ministers, governors, and 
military officers.86
The ultimately short-lived series of four trials resulted in the execution 
of three minor officials for “crimes against humanity,” a term deployed for 
the first time in reference to an international proceeding to describe the 
Armenian Genocide.87 The failure to fully prosecute those responsible 
for the genocide revealed the muddled sense of mission that accompa-
nied this early attempt at human rights justice. Understood by historians 
as a turning point that refused to turn, the Constantinople War Crimes 
Trials had limited success due in part to the broad application of the new 
category of “war crimes” to British military and Armenian civilian popu-
lations.88 Specifically, the plan to prosecute Ottoman leaders for the mas-
sacres emerged alongside another wartime outrage that long had worried 
officials: the treatment of British prisoners captured on the Eastern Front. 
Ambassador Louis Mallet directly linked these concerns in a letter to Sir 
R. Graham after the armistice: “It will be necessary to provide for the 
punishment of any Turks who can be proved to have been responsible for 
the perpetration of instigation of 1) Armenian massacres 2) outrages com-
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mitted on any other subject races, Greeks, Nestorian Christians etc 3) ill-
treatment of prisoners. On the latter point I am writing to the Prisoners of 
War Department who have kept a black list.”89 No such “black list” existed 
for those accused of the massacres. This left prosecutors to rely on the 
Ottoman government to conduct its own investigations. Faith was placed 
in officials who demonstrated a willingness to arrest alleged perpetrators. 
One new governor appointed at Angora reportedly had fifteen suspects 
arrested. The “Situation Report” by a British officer charged with tracking 
arrests sounded a cautiously hopeful note: “I believe the Vali has arranged 
for a Court Martial to be sent here from Constantinople in order to try 
all those in the Vilayet who were implicated in the Armenian massacres. 
If this is correct it will be a very good thing.”90 Such uncertainties about 
both who was being prosecuted and what they were being prosecuted for 
plagued the trials from their initial conception until the end.
Attention inevitably turned to Britain’s enemy Germany, further 
complicating the prosecution at Constantinople. Laying the blame for the 
massacres at Germany’s feet had proved a useful tactic during the war 
and continued during the trials. This added another level of difficulty to 
gathering evidence and getting the trials off the ground. In making the 
case for the Armenian massacres as a war crime, Admiral Calthorpe, the 
High Commissioner at Constantinople and a key force in the proceedings, 
argued that German officers should also be held responsible: “If Allies 
decide to bring to trial those guilty of crimes against humanity during 
late war I desire to point out that name of Liman von Sanders should 
be borne in mind.” The long list of crimes listed by Calthorpe included 
the charge that in his role as inspector general of the Ottoman army, a 
post he held starting with the end of the Balkan wars, von Sanders used 
his “autocratic power as Military dictator” to order the mass deportation 
of Armenians and Greeks. Another of his “crimes against humanity,” as 
Calthorpe captured the phrase, included his ordering of a “trench sys-
tem deliberately cut through British cemeteries at Gallipoli.”91 Calthorpe 
did not deal with the question of where or under which jurisdiction, the 
German or Ottoman war crimes tribunals, von Sanders should be tried. 
Eventually, von Sanders was arrested and later released.
Following through with the maze of prosecutions for those accused 
of massacring civilians and mistreating prisoners of war put pressure on 
officials to manage public opinion while applying pressure on Ottoman 
officials. In relating an interview with one such official the British high 
commissioner turned to “the question of the Armenian massacres and the 
treatment of British Prisoners”:
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I said that the released prisoners were now arriving in England 
and were relating their experiences, and that the same indigna-
tion which I had felt myself was already showing itself as prevalent 
throughout public opinion in England as evidenced by the news 
telegrams which were reaching this country. . . . With regard to the 
Armenians, knowledge of what had happened was only now becom-
ing really known. In this case also, the signs of public indignation 
were perfectly clear. I was certain, speaking as a private Englishman 
and without any instructions, that there were matters on which His 
Majesty’s Government had an inflexible resolve: the authors of both 
would have to be punished with all rigour.
The official, Rechid Pasha, responded with assurances that the Ottoman 
government planned to punish those responsible: “He said that he himself 
was insisting on the infliction of proper punishment and that he would 
resign from the cabinet if this were not done.”92 Calthorpe remained 
skeptical, leaving the interview with a strong message: “what we looked 
for was more than good will; it was for actual results. . . . I warned him 
again that the question of the prisoners of war and of the Armenians 
were most important and that he would do well to devote to them his 
utmost attention.”
Such admonitions proved as ineffective after World War I as they had 
after the signing of the Treaty of Berlin. By the end of January Calthorpe, 
frustrated that the Sultans “timorous” behavior had prevented the arrest 
of sixty men on the minister of interior’s list of war criminals, declared 
in a telegram to the Foreign Office marked “Very Urgent”: “It is of course 
high time that action should be taken; there has already been too much 
delay.”93 Four days later news of the escape of a key suspect hit Calthorpe’s 
desk. He immediately sent his representative, the long-time Levant 
Consular Service agent Andrew Ryan, to visit the vizier, who informed 
him that Calthorpe “took gravest possible view of incident which was 
a direct challenge not only to his government but to Entente Powers.” 
Ryan, in a confidential memo, attempted to mollify Calthorpe, claim-
ing that both the vizier and minister of interior understood the gravity 
of matter and that they promised to try to recapture the prisoner. Still, 
Ryan worried that there were still so many other criminals at large that 
the “present unsatisfactory situation cannot be allowed to continue.”94 A 
series of subsequent releases of accused prisoners by the Ottoman gov-
ernment in May forced a response. On May 28, 1919, all of the prisoners 
awaiting trial at Constantinople were transferred to British custody in 
Malta.95
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By taking the prisoners into custody Britain tried to salvage what 
already seemed a doomed effort. Without access to official Ottoman 
records and a reluctant sultan frightened by a looming nationalist back-
lash, the trials had little hope of going forward. The invasion of Smyrna 
by the Greeks in May 1919 galvanized anger toward the Allies, further 
limiting the possibility of Ottoman cooperation.96 Yet officials pressed 
on, citing British honor and prestige as a factor in this decision. As 
Calthorpe argued, “It was pointed out to the Grand Vizier that when the 
massacres became known in England British statesmen had promised the 
civilized world that persons concerned would be held personally respon-
sible and that it was firm intention of His Majesty’s Government to fulfill 
this promise.”97 Ultimately, the glacial pace of the peace settlement with 
the Ottoman Empire, still four years away, and the drawing down of 
troops in Anatolia began to throw doubt on the entire enterprise. Turkish 
prisoners languished in British jails as the War Crime Trials came to an 
abrupt halt. By summer 1919 the British reduced its force in the region 
from 1,000,000 to 320,000.98
Eventually something would have to be done. The resolution of ter-
ritorial adjustments and the signing of a peace treaty with the Ottoman 
Empire hung in the balance. Two years after the transfer of prisoners 
to Malta, now War Secretary Winston Churchill stepped in with a pro-
posal intended to satisfy a war-weary population: a prisoner exchange. 
Although a number of protests were heard from within the government 
most came around, however reluctantly, to the idea that Britain would 
exchange all but the worst offenders of the prisoners at Malta for a group 
of twenty-nine British soldiers recently captured by the Nationalist 
Army, which was gaining strength in Anatolia.99 An “all for all” exchange 
ultimately took place. The Foreign Office justified this about-face by 
maintaining “that it is vastly more important to save the lives of these 
British subjects than to bind ourselves by the strict letter of the law as 
regards the Turkish prisoners at Malta.”100
The exchange, set for fall 1921, incited public outrage. The Times asked 
why the “eight war criminal accused of the gravest offenses” were not 
tried when the evidence was fresh in 1919 and argued that it was still not 
too late to gather evidence as was done in the case of German war crimi-
nals.101 A letter to the editor by an advocate for  prisoners of war argued 
against a prisoner exchange due to the terrible crimes of the accused.102 
At the root of this criticism lay the issue of British prestige, which some 
believed an unconditional release of men accused of war crimes would 
diminish: “Our dawdling, hesitating, ambiguous Near Eastern policy has 
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involved us in no greater humiliation than this. Our prestige is evapo-
rating in the futility of our councils. Throughout the East our assertion 
of right and not mere force of arms has been our strength. If by such a 
pitiful surrender we abandon this weapon how shall we cope with the 
growing dangers?”103
The high-profile campaign for the release of Colonel Alfred Rawlinson 
gave a face to the story of the twenty-nine soldiers exchanged with the 
Ottomans in November 1921. Rawlinson, the younger brother of the 
commander of the British forces in India, had been captured in Anatolia 
shortly after the war. While a prisoner he witnessed the horrific treat-
ment of Ottoman civilians and prisoners of war.104 He himself suffered at 
the hands of his captors, given few rations and confined in dirty, miser-
able conditions. In 1923, he published a popular memoir, Adventures in 
the Near East, in which he offered a nihilistic view of Britain’s historical 
treatment of the Eastern Question:
It appeared to me, also, that there is nothing new to be found in the 
bad treatment of their prisoners by the Turks, or in their traditional 
persecution of the Christian minorities who have so long and with 
such difficulty contrived to exist in many of the districts under 
Turkish rule; and that unless we were in a position to back up any agi-
tation with respect to these matters by not only a display, but by an 
application, of force, which would be capable of being followed up, if 
necessary by serious and active military operations, it would be to the 
last degree unwise to bring such question forward at all.105
Britain remained unwilling during the war, as it had in the past, to stop 
the “traditional persecution of Christian minorities” through military 
force. Legal prosecution had also failed. Despite his own experiences as a 
prisoner of war Rawlinson told his readers that Britain should maintain 
good relations with Turkey and worried that evidence of his ill treatment 
would help fuel the humanitarian argument in favor of continued inter-
vention. Rawlinson had other more immediate things to worry about, 
as it turned out. About to have his meager government pension cut off, 
Rawlinson’s book opened with an appeal to the public by Admiral Sir 
Percy Scott for adequate compensation to men “who have readily given 
all they had to give for the service of their country.”
Somehow the war of liberation had gotten off track. The collapse 
of the Constantinople War Crimes Trials in the face of a rising tide of 
Turkish nationalist sentiment opposed to Allied intervention offered 
little hope for justice for genocide victims.106 In terms of prestige, the 
British could only watch as the men who perpetrated civilian massacres 
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and crimes against their own soldiers were set free. By the early 1920s a 
war-weary population that understood humanitarianism as intimately 
tied to geopolitics began to question the moral certainty of the prewar 
generation.
aTrociTy on FilM
While the storm over the War Crimes Trials brewed in Constantinople 
and Whitehall, the British went to the movies. The screening of the 
graphic atrocity film Auction of Souls in October 1919 created a sensa-
tion. Over the course of the following year the book of the same title went 
into at least twenty-six printings as the film found its way into provincial 
and urban theaters from London to Belfast. The book and film told the 
story of a teenage girl, Aurora Mardiganian, who survived the Armenian 
massacres. In 1917, she made her way to the United States, where appeals 
published on her behalf to find her brother caught the attention of a 
Hollywood writer and producer. Harvey Gates maneuvered to become 
Mardiganian’s guardian, translated her story, published it under the title 
Ravished Armenia in 1918, and made it into a feature film with that same 
title that same year. This Hollywood production came to Britain from the 
United States on a wave of publicity that promised audiences a real-life 
drama of the 1915 massacres.
Auction of Souls, as it was called in Britain, straddled the unsteady 
divide between history and entertainment. It offered viewers a visual 
spectacle of wartime atrocity while at the same time claimed authentic-
ity as a historical document, starring Mardiganian in the lead role. This 
“carefully orchestrated commercial production,” according to Anthony 
Slide, exploited the story of the Armenian massacres and Mardiganian 
herself for financial gain. Although most viewers in the United States 
treated the film “with respect and dignity” due to “its subject matter that 
made it above reproach,” one critic condemned the “cheap sensationalism” 
surrounding the film, claiming to be “heartily sick of the screen’s exploi-
tation of atrocities under any guise.”107
In October 1919 a series of private screenings in London introduced 
the film to British audiences. The initial reaction reinforced the combina-
tion of horror and sympathy for massacre victims expressed by advo-
cacy groups and the public during the war. An invitation-only event at 
the premises of the film’s British distributor, the General Film Renting 
Company in Soho, drew a notable crowd that included a number of reli-
gious and secular leaders. “I wish that this finely set up film might be 
136    /    The Armenian Genocide and the Great War
seen by all thinking men and women in this country,” remarked Rev. 
F. B. Meyer after the screening. Rev. Bernard Vaughan offered his opinion 
to those present when he took to the stage after the presentation: “We 
have followed this picture with agonizing interest, but awful as were the 
atrocities depicted I am very sorry to have to say that they fall far short of 
the realities.” The dozens of journalists who attended a subsequent press 
screening at the London Coliseum gave the public its first glimpse of the 
film through movie review columns. Reviews in the urban and provincial 
press called the film “enthralling and terrible” while using the opportu-
nity to throw blame on Germany for the Genocide and even going as far 
as to call for the “urgent need for the independence of Christian Armenia.” 
A final private showing at Queens Hall on October 29 included “a num-
ber of prominent public and private people,” including James Bryce, H. J. 
Gladstone, and Church of England bishops and other members of the 
clergy. When asked his opinion of the film, Lord Gladstone replied, much 
as his father might have, “Most excellent, just the film to create and army 
of Crusaders.”108
The last thing the government wanted in 1919 was a crusade. Worries 
over the film surfaced when the distributor set the film for general release. 
“This film must be stopped,” declared one Home Office memo.109 The con-
siderable buzz surrounding a film that only a select group of people had 
as yet seen coupled with plans to release it in over fifty provincial the-
aters triggered a response by the British Board of Film Censors (BBFC). 
Despite its name, the board served only an advisory function and did not 
have the power to censor a film outright. Rather, this industry-appointed 
body gave its seal of approval by issuing a certificate. Having offices a few 
doors down from the distribution company on Wardour Street in Soho 
allowed the board to keep a particularly close eye on the distribution of 
the film. A handful of public showings in November and December of 
that year already had alarmed members of the board. The Middlesex 
County Council took action against the Gaiety Cinema, Twickenham, 
for showing the film in November 1920 without a certificate from the 
BBFC.110 A month later, Auction of Souls played to a capacity audience at 
the Carlisle Theater in an edited form approved by the Carlisle police that 
“slightly curtailed” a scene that depicted a woman being dragged to death 
behind a horse. In December, the board decided to withhold its certificate 
for the edited version of the film.111
Unease over the potential effect of Auction of Souls on the public drove 
this controversy. Two issues topped concerns: indecency and the ques-
tion of prestige, particularly in the British Empire. When the Criminal 
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Investigation Department of New Scotland Yard visited Sidney Arnold, 
the proprietor of the General Film Renting Company, in January 1920 
they informed him that Auction of Souls constituted an “indecent exhibi-
tion.” Arnold demurred, arguing that it had been shown without objec-
tion in the United States and that stopping the release of the film would 
cost him £25,000: “On Monday next posters would be coming out on the 
trams and buses . . . throughout London.” Having just rented the Albert 
Hall the following week at the cost of £5,000 per showing, he hoped to 
sell out at the price of £1 per ticket. To defend his position Arnold pro-
duced testimonials speaking to the value of the film and readily agreed to 
any changes that the Home Office might require.112
The charge of “indecency” rightly surprised Arnold. He soon came to 
understand that the government clearly did not want the film shown at 
all. Concerned that the withholding of the BBFC certificate would not 
curtail “the indiscriminate public exhibition of the film,” it sent the case 
to the Foreign Office for review. Prosecutors concluded that the Obscene 
Publications Act of 1857 gave the government the authority to charge 
Arnold with a misdemeanor for displaying a movie that threatened public 
morals by depicting naked, crucified girls. Eventually they brought the 
Ministry of Health into the discussion, claiming that sexual content in 
the film raised questions about venereal disease. The state of undress 
of the American actresses stood at the crux of the government’s case. 
“The most horrible incident is the display of a long line of crosses bearing 
the crucified bodes of stark naked young girls. This I believe was true to 
fact, but was none the less distressing to look upon on that account: the 
fact that the originals of this picture were not dead Armenians but live 
American girls exposed thus to the operators’ camera hardly improves 
matters.”113
The inability to prove that the actresses were truly naked, despite the 
repeated close scrutiny of Foreign Office moviegoers, threatened to derail 
the prosecution’s case. Scotland Yard worried that with only one scene in 
question they would not be able to assure a conviction. Even that scene 
upon closer examination did not seem to meet the criteria of indecency. 
As one official put it, “the renters told us at the close of the exhibition that 
when photographed the girls were entirely covered by tights fitting very 
closely to the contours of the skin. Superintendent Thomas said that this 
was a common device and that he had noticed certain wrinkles when the 
picture was shown. I did not notice any wrinkles on the two occasions on 
which I saw the picture, and I do not think any ordinary person seeing 
the film would think there was any covering; but no doubt the covering 
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was there.”114 In the end, Arnold agreed to delete the scene, wrinkles and 
all, succumbing to police pressure rather than face prosecution.
The crucifixions troubled the Foreign Office for another reason. The 
image of young girls nailed to crosses symbolized the oppression of 
Christian minorities by the Muslim majority. This evocative scene sug-
gested that religious, not political, motives stood behind the massacres. 
This idea had been one that officials and humanitarian groups had tried to 
counter during the war in order not to alienate Muslim public opinion in 
the wake of the recent Amritsar Massacre in India. As one Foreign Office 
official put it: “The film is neither vulgar nor — in the strict sense — immoral 
but of necessity it abounds in horrors and as it stands is calculated to 
offend the religious feelings of any Moslem. We may not be inclined 
at this moment to consider unduly the susceptibilities of the Turk, but 
our Indian and Egyptian dominions contain many Moslem subjects (at 
present far from contented) and it is here that the religious danger — if 
any — lurks.”115 Representatives of the Muslim community, to whom the 
Foreign Office attached “much importance,” wrote objecting to the film 
on the grounds that it would incite “anger and indignation . . . among 
His Majesty’s Muslim Subjects.”116 Objections continued even after the 
decision to remove the crucifixion scene was made: “Should permission, 
however, be granted for such exhibition my Committee entertains seri-
ous apprehension of disturbances.”117 The timing of the film had special 
significance, according to another source, threatening to cause tensions 
after the war between Christians and Muslims at “such a critical hour.”118
Accusations of indecency ultimately proved cover for imperial con-
cerns. When the India Office became involved in early January, Lord 
Curzon argued that the Foreign Office and the BBFC should use any 
means necessary to get the film stopped if alterations were not made:
Lord Curzon understands that some of the letter press dwells unduly 
on the religious aspect of the Armenian massacres and is calculated 
to give offence in India. In view of the apparent intention, as indi-
cated in the enclosed letter, to exhibit the film without suppressing 
the passages referred to above or making the alterations in the film 
itself deemed essential by the British Board of Film Censors, Lord 
Curzon would suggest that the Home Office be asked to take the 
necessary action in order to prevent on the ground of public morals, 
the appearance of the film unless the producers are ready to submit to 
censorship.119
Articles in the Times followed the controversy, presenting the govern-
ment line to the public and chronicling “police objections,” “alterations,” 
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and “exhibitions.”120 The politicization of the film diminished the power 
of calls to hold the perpetrators of the Genocide accountable due to reli-
gious considerations. The indecency charge, used for purely political pur-
poses, cast a long shadow over representations of the massacres as mere 
cinematic sensationalism.
In the end, the Foreign Office agreed to let the film, in its edited form, 
be shown under certain conditions. In addition to removing the crucifix-
ion scene, officials excised all references to “Christian” from the subtitles 
in order “to give them a political rather than a religious aspect.”121 This 
altered the meaning of some parts of the film very little, such as remov-
ing “Christian” before the word “missionaries.” Removing Christian from 
one subtitle, “I intend to kill every [Christian] man and woman and every 
child over three,” however, erased any sense of motive for the massa-
cre that ensued in the subsequent scene.122 The film distributors agreed 
to a limited engagement at the Royal Albert Hall, two shows a day for 
three weeks. Some argued that its humanitarian message would not be 
diminished by the cuts: “Few lengths of the 8000 feet of which the film 
consists would survive the censors’ shears if this were a film produced in 
the ordinary way for recreation of the public. It is here that the censors 
are in difficulties. The film is not . . . put forward in the ordinary way: it 
is one that is put forward to the purposes of propaganda in a good cause: 
it is largely backed by honest and reputable societies and individuals. The 
religious crux can be overcome.”123 The film’s support among “reputable 
societies and individuals” eventually dissipated the government’s pur-
ported “moral and religious concerns.” The Foreign Office had sought in 
vain to get Bryce’s and Gladstone’s approval when it started efforts to 
suppress the film. The Archbishop of Canterbury had written the Foreign 
Office wanting information on the film’s suppression. Emily Robinson 
also lobbied on behalf of the Armenian Red Cross for its showing.
As the terms of the debate over the film were set, the British pub-
lic began to take sides.124 “I would like (as a mother) in the name of the 
womanhood of the country,” wrote Lady Baird to the Home Office, “to 
protest against the revolting exhibition now proposed to be held at Albert 
Hall.”125 A reviewer for Evening Standard disagreed: “Every Englishwoman 
should make it her business to see Auction of Souls, the film depicting 
a percentage of the least revolting atrocities practiced on the Armenian 
Christians as soon as it is released.”126 One man wrote that he “should like 
to take my wife to see it.”127 Another correspondent argued that showing 
the film constituted “an affair of Empire,” since showing the film would 
anger Muslim opinion and thus assist Britain’s enemies.128 Erin Johnson 
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from the London Bridge YMCA believed the film sent a different mes-
sage: “What an awful charge lies at the door of the British Government 
for upholding the Turkish Empire all these years and thereby passively 
permitting such inhuman actions. It made me feel like getting a club and 
starting out for Downing Street. I hope the film may be sent out to all the 
colonies so that the whole Empire can see for themselves what ‘Defender 
of the Faith’ really means. I was sitting next to two ladies and I was so 
mad I started swearing. When I apologized to them, they replied, ‘We feel 
the same way.’ ”129
The film continued to draw heated responses after the end of its Albert 
Hall engagement. Subsequent screenings of the film concerned one offi-
cial who wanted to know if the Home Office “was aware that film called 
the ‘Auction of Souls,’ reinforced by pamphlets and books on the same 
subject is being exhibited in this Country; and whether the attention of 
the Censor should be directed to the matter in view of the Peace Treaty not 
yet concluded with the Ottoman empire.”130 The Home Office secretary 
sent a brief reply: the government did not censor films. Some mistakenly 
believed Armenian advocacy groups to be behind the film. One official 
wrote to Lord Bryce questioning whether he and Lord Gladstone had been 
involved in the production and claiming that “the film had been prepared 
under the auspices of the Armenian Relief Committee.” Bryce quickly 
disavowed him of his suspicions, claiming to have had no involvement 
with its production or promotion. Sponsorship by the League of Nations 
Union, an organization with the patronage of government officials and 
prominent citizens, added to the further politicization of the film. An 
editorial in the Times claimed that the League showed it in Albert Hall 
rather than in cinemas both to overcome objections that the film did not 
constitute suitable “entertainment” and because “the film which leaves 
little to the imagination will be the best possible argument in favour of a 
League for the protection of weak countries.”131
The controversy over the release of Auction of Souls painted the story 
of the massacres with a jaundiced face, allowing a censored and sensa-
tionalized film to masquerade as history. Advertisements for the film 
promised that it represented “the Great Exposure of Turkish Atrocities in 
Armenia” based on the Mardiganian’s book and Bryce’s Blue Book, and 
was supported by the League of Nations Union. A crucified girl under 
a black crow served as a titillating symbol in the ad, even though the 
scene itself had been cut from the British version (see figure 20). A pocket 
version published by Odhams replaced the hard-to-find privately pub-
lished American version of the book, which was timed to coincide with 
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the release of the film in British theaters. The “first large impression” was 
reported to have sold out on the first day.132 By the time a new edition 
appeared in 1934 over 360,000 copies of the book already were in circula-
tion. A lecture tour planned for Mardiganian offered, in the words of one 
reviewer, another “fillip” to the film. 
The controversy also influenced the film’s reception by critics and the 
public. A reviewer for the Universe claimed that the “realistic fidelity of 
the film” made it worth seeing: “While the film altogether is of the high-
est merit, it possesses an added interest in the fact that the persecuted 
Christian heroine Miss Aurora Mardiganian portrays thrilling scenes 
and incidents in which she took personal part during the massacres — a 
very rare combination to imagine.”133 “We repeat this is a dreadful drama 
of real life, of real happenings in our own time, which every thinking 
person should make a point of seeing.” The “thrilling scenes” may have 
made Auction of Souls more interesting for the above reviewer, but the 
sensationalism also blurred the line between history and fiction, a point 
not lost on the film’s critics. One Muslim community leader argued that 
it was “a work of fiction acted by Americans” and therefore should not be 
shown to British audiences.134
Some critics blamed the medium. The English Review saw the movies 
Figure 20. Advertisement for Auction of Souls, depicting the cruci-
fixion scene deleted from the censored version of the film. Times, 
January 26, 1920.
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as a “new form of illusion,” calling Auction of Souls a work of propaganda 
and blasting what it called “bestiality” at the heart of a film that claimed to 
be “presented to the public on behalf of ‘Christianity.’ ”135 For the reviewer 
Sidney Low of the Fortnightly Review, Auction of Souls was part of a group 
of “political films which failed to convey the lesson intended. The specta-
tor who went into the Albert Hall with a shudder came out with a yawn. 
A performance which might have been intolerably painful turned out to 
be rather dull; it assuredly did not evoke that fever of pity and resentment 
which it was, I presume, designed to arouse.” The book he considered 
not much better but at least it conveyed the desired effect: “Nobody who 
has gone through its pages will regret that the Allied Council insists on 
bringing Enver and Talaat to trial.” However, “in the Auction of Souls film 
the crusading spirit evaporates. The attack on Turkish oppression misses 
fire. To the majority of the audience the licentious pashas and beys and 
the persecuted Christians are only characters in trite fairy tale, like the 
wicked noblemen and virtuous poor folks of the serial novel. It is just a 
story; not as I have said, in this case a good story. But how is it possible to 
impose a sense of reality if your medium compels you to satisfy a craving 
for sensational incident and familiar cheap sentiment?” The effect was 
worse than denying that the tragedy happened; it erased it from history. 
Any lessons from the massacres, as Low put it, were “reduced to triviality 
or passe[d] by unnoticed.”136
In this changed postwar landscape the moral outrage that had ral-
lied Britons to the cause of a small group of persecuted peoples during 
the time of Gladstone and Stead failed to solicit the same response. The 
storm over Auction of Souls eventually passed. Only bits of the film have 
survived in private archives, including the powerful and controversial 
crucifixion scene.137 A large file catalogued under the innocuous title 
of “Entertainments: Objectionable Films: 1916 – 1920” at the National 
Archives that contains newspapers articles and reviews serves as the 
only evidence of its existence. With the film seemingly best forgotten as a 
piece of postwar sensationalism, the nation soon got on with the business 
of piecing things together at home after a devastating war.
War on the Eastern Front offered humanitarianism its greatest chal-
lenge to date, leaving the memory of the Armenian Genocide as one of 
its most lasting victims. Before the failure of the Constantinople War 
Crimes Tribunals, victory in the East was cast as a moral and military 
victory. This notion drew upon an almost century-long obsession with 
British claims over the Near East as its protector and heir. The humani-
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tarianism that emerged as a language of the Eastern Question, however, 
faltered when it came to doing something to stop and later prosecute 
the war crimes on the Eastern Front. Wartime leaders like David Lloyd 
George showed little leadership on this count, tepidly embracing W. E. 
Gladstone’s moralizing foreign policy only to use it to further their own 
political ends.138 “Four years of a World War altered the Eastern Question 
out of all recognition,” wrote the redoubtable historian R. W. Seton-
Watson in 1935.139 The ineffective response to the humanitarian crises of 
the war had not a little to do with this transformation.
Wartime discussions of the Eastern Question on the surface replicated 
old debates over Britain’s engagements in the Near East. One side under-
stood defeating the Ottoman Empire as a matter of empire while the 
other urged immediate involvement on behalf of persecuted Christian 
minorities. The war, however, had changed the tenor of these debates by 
entangling the moral, political, and religious issues at a moment when 
the resolution of military questions seemed most pressing. In the end, 
the brutality of the crimes committed during the conflict temporarily 
brought home the inhumanity of modern war that made civilians vic-
tims. This reading of the war reveals the marginal place of the Eastern 
Front in considerations of the human costs of Total War.140 New mas-
sacres committed at Smyrna in 1922 would place Britain’s long-standing 
geopolitical priorities and humanitarian commitments to persecuted 
minorities in the Near East on even more uncertain ground.
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Howes and Swinley, along with hundreds of other military men sta-
tioned along the Smyrna quay in September 1922, witnessed the final 
chapter of the war in the East unfold with the destruction of the Ottoman 
Empire’s key commercial Mediterranean port city along with its entire 
population of non-Muslim inhabitants. “It was not long after our stay 
in Constantinople with our Fleet that we had a sudden call to sail to 
Smyrna where the Turks were raiding and devastating the City,” one 
sailor recalled while stationed on the hospital ship, Maine. “The carnage 
and cruelty to the Greek civilians was indescribable. We saw from where 
we were just off the shore the Turks bayoneting bodies, men, women and 
children through the windows of their homes. Hundreds of Greek civil-
ians as well as troops hanging over the dock water side and the Turkish 
soldier coming along and deliberately severing the victims’ arms result-
ing in hundreds of bodies falling to their deaths in the sea.”1 “Fire has 
broken out in the Armenian quarter of the town, aided by strong wind is 
spreading rapidly,” recorded another eyewitness stationed in Smyrna on 
September 13 (see figure 21).2 The fire spread westward to the Greek and 
European quarters, making it to the American settlement of “Paradise,” 
leaving only the Turkish quarter untouched. “The stench of human flesh 
burning was appalling and the streets were stacked with dead, men, 
women, children and dogs,” Howes wrote. His commander, Sir John de 
Brook, concluded: “The spectacle was magnificently terrible.”3 Within a 
matter of days, one of the most cosmopolitan and multiethnic cities of the 
Ottoman Empire had disappeared from the map. 
6. Smyrna’s Ashes
I wonder how many Britishers were at the evacuation of Smyrna? 
If there were any they will hear me out in any statements set 
below and having emerged safely from that hell make them 
realize whether this was a horrible nightmare or reality, when we 
arrived on Sunday 3rd September 1922.
c. J. hoWeS, chief petty officer, HMS Diligence
Civilization in 1922 is a mockery!
lieuTenanT c. S. B. SWinley, HMS Curacoa,  
letter to his mother, September 30, 1922
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The men who watched Smyrna’s destruction from their ships moored 
in the harbor could do little to stop the slaughter. While life got back to 
normal in Europe after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, 
Smyrna offered a terrible reminder that World War I continued in the 
East. Here on the Smyrna quayside civilians and military men witnessed 
the last act of the Ottoman Empire’s solution to the minority problem. 
The Allies’ ill-conceived response to the rising tide of Turkish nation-
alism, coupled with a wait and see attitude to the events at Smyrna, 
exacerbated the humanitarian crisis unfolding in the Mediterranean.4 
Eventually, many did take a turn as heroes by participating in rescue 
efforts. This helped ease the suffering of civilian victims while reveal-
ing other uncomfortable truths about the reality of Total War on Eastern 
Front.
The international crisis of the 1920s that would displace over one 
million Greek, Armenian, Assyrian, and European inhabitants of the 
Ottoman Empire put in sharp relief the failure of humanitarian diplo-
macy in the face of genocidal nationalism.5 It also marked a symbolic 
Figure 21. Smyrna ablaze, September 1922. Reproduced from film footage 
of the Smyrna fire from the Sherman Grinberg Film Library, courtesy of the 
Armenian Film Foundation.
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end to the connection between British humanitarianism and Eastern 
Christians. The peace settlement signed at Lausanne in summer 1923 
codified a vision of the Near East mapped along ethnic and religious lines. 
With the final elimination of the Christian population from the region, 
the burning of Smyrna dramatically erased the impetus for protection of 
subject minority populations that had made foreign policy when it came 
to the Eastern Question a matter of conscience.
Allied ships called to the Smyrna harbor in early September 1922 
included American, French, Italian, and British destroyers, battleships, 
and aid vessels with orders of strict neutrality. “Our duty is to watch the 
pier and landing places for refugees, and if British to bring them off,” one 
sailor recorded in his diary.6 The British consul at Smyrna, Sir Henry 
Lamb, initially sounded the alarm, requesting that evacuation ships be 
sent as soon as word reached him of the Greek defeat in the interior at the 
hands of Turkish nationalist forces. Greece had occupied Smyrna since 
their 1919 invasion, supported by David Lloyd George’s government. 
Reports of Greek atrocities against Muslim subjects during the occupa-
tion fueled an already tense postwar situation, one made worse when 
victorious Turkish nationalist forces replaced the retreating Greek army 
in 1922.7
The forces of the nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal, operating out-
side the sanction of the Ottoman government at Constantinople, fully 
controlled the city by early September. The “inability of Greek army 
to defend town from invasion” according to a Foreign Office telegram, 
prompted orders for the “Evacuation of the British Colony at Smyrna” 
on September 2.8 Lord Curzon proposed the “[c]omplete evacuation of 
Asia Minor” the next day. “His Majesty’s Government are  . . . anxious 
to terminate disastrous warfare and to avoid further shedding of blood,” 
wrote Curzon to a British official in Constantinople, and “will gladly take 
any steps in conjunction with their allies to secure these objects.” Curzon 
cautioned that the government must also “consider political conditions 
under which evacuation will take” place, which included, he believed, the 
“Protection of Christian populations.”9
By September 4, however, plans had been secured only for the evacu-
ation of British nationals, whom the government would provide with 
food for the voyage but no accommodation upon arrival in either Malta 
or Cyprus.10 When the Iron Duke arrived in the Smyrna harbor on 
September 4, it had the charge of collecting approximately 1,200 refugees 
from 4 designated locations along the coast. Heavily armed soldiers in 
“Khaki fighting kit and shrapnel helmets” would ensure the prevention of 
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“any but British subjects from embarking.”11 The order of strict neutral-
ity excluded assisting or taking any non-British nationals onboard ships. 
This placed military men in an unenviable position of having to turn 
away desperate civilians marked for elimination by Turkish nationalists.
Even before the fire started the sailors who arrived in Smyrna in 
early September realized that this would not be a routine evacuation. 
The presence of regular Turkish cavalry and armed irregulars called 
“chettes” increased the tension among an already nervous populace in a 
place where Greeks, Armenians, and Europeans historically dominated.12 
Anxious residents already filled the harbor when the first British ships 
arrived. Those stationed on the HMS Tribune watched the scene from its 
mooring on the Custom House wharf: “Ferry boats crowded with terrified 
Greeks — one passenger not understanding our neutrality and evidently 
disappointed at us taking no action, shouted out at us as the ferry passed, 
‘Thank you very much, kill us like lot chickens’ — this was accompanied 
by the suggestive motion of drawing the hand across the throat.” This 
comic gesture found its tragic counterpoint in the scene on shore where 
the crew witnessed a series of brutal murders in broad daylight.13
Many suspected that the violence would get worse, but few anticipated 
that the nationalist army would set fire to the city. Eyewitnesses reported 
seeing Turkish soldiers deliberately starting the fires that would leave the 
city in ruins. Howes recorded the fate of refugees who had taken cover in 
an Armenian church: “an American eye-witness declared that the regular 
Turks set fire to the church and then surrounded it.”14 Numerous other 
sources corroborated these observations. Members of the Smyrna Fire 
Brigade testified in a trial against the Guardian Assurance Company after 
the war that they witnessed barrels of petroleum unloaded by Turkish 
soldiers and purposefully set ablaze.15 By September 14 arson had spread 
to the port offices. “Eyewitnesses from the HMS Cardiff state that these 
offices were deliberately set on fire by Turkish soldiers who were going 
round the building with torches,” reported one sailor who believed the 
fires had been set “to cover up traces of more massacred Armenians.”16
In the days preceding the fire, British ships, like their American and 
Italian counterparts, remained “fully occupied” evacuating their own 
nationals. “Most of us of my vintage were used to evacuations,” Captain 
Swinley of the HMS Curacoa, a ship stationed in the Mediterranean, later 
recalled.17 Disturbing signs, however, suggested that this one would be 
different. “At noon a dead body appeared, in an upright position (tied in 
a sack, which was evidently weighted at the bottom) and floated to the 
ship’s side, where it remained owing to the direction of the wind. A sec-
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ond body appeared an hour later, and as there was no prospect of these 
floating away, they were weighted and sank.” Those refugees who made 
it to ship alive fared little better. “At 2330 a man was seen swimming 
towards the ship he hailed us with ‘I am a Greek officer’ we were unable 
to assist him but he clung to our cable for an hour and a half, eventu-
ally swimming off and we hope succeeded in reaching the shore again.”18 
By following orders of neutrality, the British only added to what Officer 
Drage described as a “very muddled evacuation.” The outbreak of the fire 
added to the confusion, driving an estimated half-million refugees to 
the two-mile-long Smyrna quayside. A day after the fire devastated the 
Armenian and Greek quarters of the city, sailors reported that “scores of 
people were swimming round the ship imploring to be saved, some of 
them holding the ship’s side after we had got under way.”19 Sailors, Officer 
Drage related in an interview after the war, had orders to do all they 
could to “take off refugees.” This included “beating women over the head 
to stop them from swamping my whaler.”20
Suddenly, on September 14 “a signal was made by the Commander in 
chief — ’away all boats’ ” and the mission transformed into a rescue effort 
(figure 22).21 Although the record of the original order has disappeared 
from the National Archives, the recollection of observers and news 
reports tell a story of an ad hoc rescue mission executed in response to 
circumstances on the ground, not orders from London. When Admiral 
de Roebuck gave the order to start evacuating non-British refugees, he 
did so by arguing “that the agreement not to take any refugees on board 
British ships could no longer be binding.”22 Duncan Gardner Wallace, a 
member of a prominent Levantine family called up as a reservist officer 
in the Royal Navy at the outbreak of the war, served on the Iron Duke at 
the time of the fire. “The situation was obviously horrifying for the crews 
and those in command of the British ships,” his son remembered his 
father saying, “particularly in the light of our own country’s political and 
moral responsibility for what was happening.”23 Wallace, having lived 
and worked in Smyrna, implored the Admiral to abandon the policy of 
“strict neutrality.” “Whether or not assisted by press or diplomatic reports 
which were probably now reaching allied governments of developing 
events,” Wallace recalled, “the orders were at last changed and British 
ships authorized to take off refugees of all nationalities who were in dan-
ger.” Soon after, the admiral gave Wallace a small landing party to evacu-
ate a makeshift hospital of evacuees set up in the European area of the 
city.24 The coordination of this effort extended beyond the military, with 
the Board of Trade helping to organize transportation for the evacuees 
Figure 22. Smyrna harbor patrolled by Turkish soldiers on shore, with Allied 
ships waiting. Reproduced by permission of D. W. Vereker. Private collection.
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“to suitable destinations where supplies will be available.”25 Not long after 
Wallace’s own family disembarked in Alexandria “as penniless refugees.” 
The humanitarian crisis caused by the fire turned others of the dozens 
of Allied ships in the harbor from observers into participants.26 For many 
victims, however, the rescue effort came too late. One of the ships moored 
along the dock described the scene: “Thousands must have been saved by 
the fleet. Owing to the roaring of the fire, the cries of the people, and the 
crashing of falling beams, rescue work was very difficult. A horse caught 
fire and galloped madly into the crowd — its end was not seen.”27 The ships’ 
decks heaved with refugees who later were forced to disembark on nearby 
Karnac. The uncoordinated nature of the effort made the response inad-
equate at best. “There are still large numbers of refugees ashore, and the 
French and Italians are continuing the embarkation of their subjects. If 
we still need a reminder of what has taken place, we get it in the corpses 
that constantly float past the ship. Men, women and children drift past 
and we are thankful they do not hang round the ship as they did when we 
were secured to the wall.”28 Those serving at Smyrna described the task of 
evacuating hundreds of thousands of refugees as overwhelming. Initially 
sent to evacuate 1,200 British nationals, they found themselves ill-
equipped to deal with the crisis (see figure 23). Officer Drage remembered 
during this tumultuous time pulling an infant from the water, shocked 
that it had survived the scene. This often led to half-measures including 
picking up and leaving refugees anywhere that would take them. Drage’s 
rescued baby ended up at a nearby monastery.29 Immediately after leav-
ing Smyrna, Howes wrote, “as hard as our boats and sailors worked 
during the night in rescues we didn’t seem to make much impression in 
diminishing the crowd. Old women of 80 and upwards had all the house-
hold goods they had managed to rescue on their humped backs, cripples 
were staggering along the burning beach, and were dropping on the way. 
Skeletons and remains of crutches testifying to their fate.”30
In the absence of a coordinated effort by officials on the scene and in 
London the humanitarian mission faltered. This had important political 
implications. As the Allies struggled to gain control of the refugee situ-
ation, Mustafa Kemal’s hold on the city tightened. Kemal informed the 
Allies that all evacuations would cease on October 1 and Turkish com-
mander Nourredin Pasha claimed, according to Rear Admiral Tyrwhitt, 
that after that date “any refugees remaining after that date would be mas-
sacred.”31 According to one newspaper report, “No reply has been given to 
the request made to the Turks for an extension of time, but the work was 
still proceeding and was not stopped on September 30 as threatened by 
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the Turkish authorities.” Greek ships under American control and British 
ships took part in evacuating 177,000 “refugees of all nationalities,” with 
most of the majority, 146,700, taking place between September 26 and 
29.32 Having “completely cleared the town of Greeks and Armenians,” one 
official wrote, “The Turks claim to have solved the problem of minorities. 
Large numbers left by sea, but many thousands of males especially have 
been marched to the interior.”33
The “problem of minorities,” however, continued for the Allies. Lt. 
Swinley described the scene of the rushed evacuation under Kemalist 
dictates from his vantage point on the HMS Curacoa in late September:
The town appeared quiet except for smoke rising from two smoulder-
ing fires. . . . On the 26th the evacuation commenced. Every avail-
able hand in the ship was landed and arrangements were made for 
dealing with the baggage and were sorted out by the Turkish Guard 
who kept back men of military age. . . . Many of these unfortunate 
refugees, chiefly Greeks and Armenians, were in a pitiable state and 
several died on board or fell exhausted on reaching the gangways  . . . 
Figure 23. Smyrna refugees awaiting their fate. Young men were deported 
to the interior, while others were transported to various destinations in the 
Mediterranean on Allied ships. Reproduced by permission of David Vereker. 
Private collection.
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Families became separated and the shrieking and crying of women 
and children whose husbands and fathers had been seized by the 
Turks at the barriers was truly pitiful. Each ship was crammed and 
there was hardly room to move on deck.34
After four-and-a-half days of loading rescue ships, “the flow suddenly 
ceased and we learned that the evacuation was to all intents and purposes 
finished.”35 Those who made it on board were taken to Mitilini on the 
Greek island of Lesbos while the men of “military age” separated from 
their families were deported into the interior where many were killed or 
died of exposure or starvation. The Foreign Office reported that the HMS 
Cardiff and HMS Curacoa evacuated approximately 30,000 per day (it 
was “impossible to give exact figures”), and that by the end of September 
“there is no apparent diminution in the numbers clamoring for admission 
to the embarkation jetty.”36
The Allied position in the East continued to deteriorate in October and 
November, though one official reported that “[w]hile openly rejoicing in 
the disappearance of the Armenians and the departure of the Greeks, 
certain Turkish officials continue to deplore the absence of the British 
in their capital.”37 Conditions in Smyrna, however, suggested that the 
British might not be welcome either. In October, Acting Vice-Consul 
Urquhart reported to Sir H. Rumbold in Constantinople that along with 
Greek churches being “systematically razed to the ground” the “British 
cemetery at Bournabat [a Smyrna suburb] had been entered and the 
graves defiled.” Urquhart concluded: “It is becoming increasingly clear 
that the military are out of hand.”38 For those who wanted to come back 
to reclaim their property Urquhart had little to offer. “So far as trade is 
concerned the outlook is perplexing. . . . The conclusion is that the Turks 
have no commercial or fiscal policy whatsoever,” he wrote to Rumbold.39 
By mid-November Rumbold informed Curzon that the “Situation is less 
satisfactory. Military attitude increasingly aggressive. . . . Seriously con-
sidering both advising British subjects to leave Smyrna and preventing 
others landing.”40 Urquhart agreed. He himself had faced harassment by 
Turkish soldiers who took his diplomatic pass away and threatened him 
with violence when he tried to embark on a ship to communicate with his 
superiors. By the end of November only a handful of Britons and Maltese 
nationals who refused to leave remained in Smyrna.
Confrontations with Kemalist forces over the civilian evacuations 
made it clear that peace on the Eastern Front hinged on letting the nation-
alists resolve the minority question their way. Such a capitulation showed 
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how little purchase a once self-confident humanitarianism, which drove 
nineteenth-century foreign policy, held after the disaster at Smyrna. 
Within a matter of months, Britain was forced to the table to renego-
tiate the ill-fated Treaty of Sevres. This first attempt at peace with the 
Ottoman Empire contained strong protections for Christian minorities. 
The “strained but absentminded” arguments of the Lausanne conference, 
as one historian characterized the negotiations that would ultimately 
revise Sevres, led to a new treaty that weakened minority protection 
provisions.41 With Britain’s pro-Greek policy in ruins with its architect, 
Lloyd George, and his coalition government out of office, nationalists 
considered the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in July 1923 “the great-
est diplomatic victory” in Turkish history.42 In the end, the haphazard 
humanitarian relief effort weakened the effect of the military victory 
over the Central Powers on the Eastern Front while doing little to stem 
the chaos of the refugee crisis.
The total devastation of Smyrna and the subsequent evacuations 
indicated that the price of enforcing the dictates of a foreign policy that 
pledged to protect minorities would be continuing a war that no one 
wanted to fight. As Howes concluded the chronicle of his days in Smyrna 
in September 1922, “Although the British navy landed with arms but did 
not fire, and so plunge England into the War the greatest credit is due to 
them for the splendid way the controlled themselves whilst these atroci-
ties were committed all round them.”43 The atrocities offered another 
sailor a different lesson. As he left Smyrna for Constantinople less than a 
week after the fire began, he concluded in his journal that it would “be a 
long time before we forget the experiences of the last few days, and above 
everything else we are thankful that we were not born Armenians.”44
The road To SMyrna
The events of September 1922 marked the lowest point in more than 
three years of clumsy military and diplomatic maneuvering that had 
failed to bring peace to the Near East. Fear of continued violence between 
Christians and Muslims informed early discussions of the peace settle-
ment with the Ottoman Empire. The Allies decided that Greece should 
take over the Christian-dominated west coast of Anatolia. On May 11, 
1919, Foreign Secretary Balfour sent a secret dispatch from Paris out-
lining Allied plans for the protection of Smyrna’s Christian inhabitants: 
“with a view to avoiding disorders and massacres of Christians and its 
environs, the occupation of the town and forts by Allied Forces has been 
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decided upon by President, P.M. and M. Clemenceau. Greek troops are 
on their way to Smyrna and Turks will be summoned to hand over forts 
to a landing party.” This plan, put into action within forty-eight hours’ 
time, was not revealed to either the Turkish or Italian delegation.45 Lloyd 
George’s support of the invasion had at its core the belief that leaving the 
administration of Christian minorities to the Greeks would best serve 
minorities and British imperial interests.
The Greek invasion and massacres committed by the Greek army 
against Muslim civilians after landing, however, emboldened Turkish 
nationalists, who blocked the implementation of the Treaty of Sevres 
signed in August 1920. Significantly, the failure of Sevres meant that 
fighting between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire on the Eastern 
Front continued well beyond the signing of the Armistice at Mudros 
in October 1918. Military confrontations included not only the Greek 
invasion of Smyrna and subsequent reconquest by Turkish troops led by 
Mustafa Kemal but also the Allied offensive in Cilicia, the historic site of 
Armenia in southern Anatolia that the Allies failed to reconstitute after 
two years of French occupation, and the maneuverings of Britain’s “Hush 
Hush army,” which had a mission to check Russian ambitions and win the 
support of minority populations living in eastern Anatolia.
These years of continued fighting and sectarian violence fueled wor-
ries over instability in the region. “Turks have shown themselves inca-
pable of governing,” wrote one nervous British resident early in 1919 who 
did not believe that the Greeks would do much better. Smyrna stood at 
the center of these discussions due to its position as an important out-
let and center for global trade. One Foreign Office report cited that the 
majority of shipping interests historically had rested in British hands, 
as did the cloth and carpet making industries. A representative for the 
British Chamber of Commerce in Smyrna confirmed this and asked that 
the government help safeguard commercial interests.46 The presence of 
Allied troops did not satisfy some who hoped that Britain, France, or the 
United States would take charge of the city. In the end, the high com-
missioner at Constantinople, Admiral Calthorpe, best summed up the 
situation in Smyrna, claiming that conflicting interests among the Greek, 
British, French, American, Italian, and Ottoman forces meant that “[g]
overnment is rendered almost hopeless by uncertainty.”
International mandates supported by the League of Nations led to more 
uncertainty when it came to the question of minorities. An important 
part of Allied efforts to resolve the war in the East centered on finding 
a diplomatic solution to the problem of Muslim-Christian violence. As 
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Bruce Clark has shown, the postwar treaties set out to solve the divisive 
issue of religion by using “religion as a criterion” in the peacemaking pro-
cess.47 At the center was the League of Nations and the negotiation and 
enforcement of so-called Minority Treaties, provisions to protect “those 
elements of the population who differ from the majority of their coun-
trymen in race, creed, or tongue” within individual treaties negotiated 
between the powers after the war.48 Sevres and Lausanne both contained 
minority provisions. Transnational commitments to the protection of 
minority rights after the war required the consent of individual nations 
to treaty agreements legitimated by the League. Even though the League 
of Nations covenant included no mention of minorities itself it would 
eventually be left to the League, not Britain, to enforce internationally 
agreed-upon provisions that protected minorities living in disputed 
territories.49
Post – World War I minority treaties, like their nineteenth-century 
predecessors including the Treaty of Berlin, promised much and delivered 
little. Regardless, postwar negotiators viewed such agreements as the best 
hope to resolve the ongoing problem of sectarian violence. As one analysis 
of these agreements concluded in 1925, “The idea underlying the minority 
treaties is clearly the child of another period. It was conceived in the throes 
of the world struggle, amidst the destruction which brought about the war, 
which the war condemned but which the peace has unfortunately revived.” 
Nevertheless, it was concluded, “These treaties are, with the League itself, 
the main hope of Europe and the world.”50 Between 1920 and 1923 the 
Allies held over two dozen conferences throughout the capitals of Europe 
touting an outmoded treaty system as the solution to resolving the ethnic 
and religious hatred exacerbated by a protracted world war.
Although the rise of the League of Nations would eventually interna-
tionalize the minority question, Britain initially took its traditional lead-
ership role as guarantor of minority rights after the signing of the armi-
stice with Turkey. Considerations of these questions fell to the “Eastern 
Committee” first set up by the War Cabinet in March 1918. Here Lord 
Curzon, Robert Cecil, General Smuts, Sir Louis Mallet, and other Eastern 
Question veterans coordinated British policy on the “Eastern Front,” an 
extremely broad category that included any “enemy movement or action 
in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and Trans Caucasus, Armenia, Persia, the 
Caspian, Transcaspia, Turkestan, Afghanistan, Sinai, Palestine, Syria the 
Hejaz, Arabia, Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf.”51 When discussions in 
this catchall committee of Near Eastern affairs turned to the Ottoman 
settlement in December after the armistice, Curzon opened the meet-
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ing by citing Britain’s obligation to Christian minorities in the Treaty of 
Berlin. His plan to create an Armenian state in Cilicia came out of strate-
gic considerations, as he believed it would serve as a barrier to the spread 
of a nationalist-driven Pan-Turanism. Other committee members wanted 
a bigger Armenian state set up in eastern Turkey that would include more 
territory beyond that of the historically Armenian-dominated vilayets in 
Anatolia.52
These discussions kept a keen eye on public opinion. As Robert Cecil 
acknowledged to his Eastern Committee colleagues at the December 
meeting: “This question of Armenian relief is one which excites a great 
deal of feeling.”53 Concerns over the rising power of the United States also 
came into play. Cecil’s support for an American proposal for humani-
tarian aid that he claimed “can do no harm” met with immediate objec-
tions. This aid, some argued, would lead America to set up a “commercial 
enterprise” in the region that would challenge British trade interests. In 
the end, the committee decided that it had little choice but to cooperate 
with the relief effort and to send money and ground support, leaving the 
Americans to supply food aid through organizations like the U.S.-based 
Near East Relief.
The maze of political and humanitarian interests governing the 
peace settlement generated confusion as the Treaty of Sevres unraveled, 
shaking the moral certainty that had guided nineteenth-century treaty 
negotiations with the Ottoman Empire. In a 1921 letter to Lord Curzon, 
Montagu at the Foreign Office expressed his frustration with the ongoing 
war between Turkey and Greece: “I am so very much at sea as to what 
exactly is the position with regard to the Turkish treaty that I do not 
know how to answer it. Are we still awaiting a reply from the Greeks and 
the Turks to the offers finally made to them? Are they to be left to stew 
in their own juice? Are we to allow fighting to go on forever? What is the 
end of this business? If you could find time to suggest an answer to this 
letter, it would help me very much.”54 The minority issue, in particular, 
clouded attempts at a settlement. The politician T. P. O’Connor wrote 
Curzon on Christmas Eve that he believed that despite signs of waning 
interest, public opinion remained “unanimous” in favoring the liberation 
of “every Christian race from the dominion of Turkey.”55
huManiTarianiSM and The eaSTern SeTTleMenT
O’Connor’s observation that Britons still understood Near Eastern 
Christian minorities as their special responsibility found expression in 
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humanitarian advocacy work. Activists from religious and secular relief 
organizations continued to lobby the government and provide aid to 
civilian victims after the war including the Lord Mayor’s Fund (LMF), 
the Friends of Armenia, and the British Armenian Committee (BAC). 
To bolster support for their cause, these organizations used reports from 
representatives sent to the Caucasus to do relief work, the media, and 
fund-raising appeals.56 Political pressure groups hoped that talk of an 
American mandate for Armenia would come to pass and ease Britain’s 
sense of moral and financial responsibility. The BAC put pressure on 
the government to encourage the American mandate while organizing 
efforts to increase pledges of aid for refugees.
The attempt to find a political solution rallied humanitarian efforts 
uniting national and international aid organizations like the LMF, the 
BAC, and American philanthropic groups. Joint public meetings and dep-
utations to the Foreign Office and House of Commons by the LMF and 
BAC had become commonplace as early as 1918 and continued through 
the early 1920s.57 The BAC also encouraged meetings held by Free and 
Established Churches advocating for a favorable postwar settlement for 
Armenia.58 The formation of the Armenian Bureau of Information, a 
publishing arm run by prominent London-based Armenian advocates, 
that same year kept the work of these committees before the public. BAC 
members also relentlessly pursued press coverage of Armenian issues 
in the American and British press. In August 1920 the BAC reported in 
their weekly meeting that they had placed stories and letters to the edi-
tor in over a hundred newspapers in order “to gain more sympathy for 
Armenia” from “the British public.”59 Pledges of financial support came 
in from individual contributors, the Armenian communities in London, 
Manchester, and Liverpool and aid organizations abroad.
Advocacy efforts continued throughout the crisis. As late as the 
1930s some philanthropists still maintained that “[t]he Armenians are 
really our national responsibility.”60 The Assyrian cause, supported by 
the Archbishop of Canterbury, achieved greater visibility after the war 
despite their smaller numbers and the lack of a significant Assyrian 
community in Britain itself. Greeks also had advocates in Britain. The 
most notable “Philhellenes,” of course, had been W. E. Gladstone himself 
and later Lloyd George, whose support of the Greek invasion of Anatolia 
caused his downfall in October 1922. The Greek nation, some believed, 
would best represent the interests of Pontic, or Ottoman, Greeks. Yet 
advocates also maintained that Britain bore responsibility for this group 
as well. “The Greek military disaster in Asia Minor, followed by the burn-
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ing of Smyrna, led to a general flight of Greek inhabitants from Asia to 
Greece,” wrote one aid worker in the Fortnightly Review, and “the suffering 
of these helpless multitudes might well strike a note of pity in our lan-
guid hearts. England, through her politicians, has too much responsibil-
ity for encouraging the Greeks on their desperate Asia Minor adventure 
for the national conscience to be without burden on this matter.”61 The 
Archbishop of Canterbury encouraged the government to loan money 
to Greece for refugee resettlement.62 During the early 1920s, the Anglo-
Hellenic League and BAC issued a pamphlet on the deportations in Asia 
Minor in an attempt to make the case of persecuted minorities one.63
For skeptics, the Smyrna disaster served as a warning against further 
humanitarian intervention, one that called into question Britain’s historical 
role as a defender of minority rights. One writer for the Saturday Review 
called the minority problem a sad case, yet implored, “is the whole world to 
go to war again because of that misfortune?”64 E. N. Bennett in the English 
Review sounded a siren against sympathizing too much with Ottoman 
Christians, claiming that “religious bigotry, faked atrocity films, and reck-
less newspaper propaganda” would help drive “our debt-burdened, war 
weary nation into fresh campaigns and heavy expenditure.”65 At the same 
time pro-Ottoman organizations like the Near and Middle East Association 
mobilized on behalf of cultivating stronger commercial relations with the 
region by supporting Muslim interests in the peace settlement.66
Probably the most prominent critique came from Arnold Toynbee, 
the co-author of the Bryce Report, who claimed that his earlier work 
later made him “lean over backwards” to give the Turkish case a hear-
ing.67 In 1921 he served as a correspondent for the Manchester Guardian 
in Anatolia, taking pains to represent himself as an “impartial observer” 
of Eastern affairs. Toynbee argued that “the ineptitude of Western diplo-
macy” brought the current refugee crisis and war to a head and ultimately 
resulted in a fire that could have been prevented by keeping the Greeks 
out of Anatolia in the first place. “The blood of their slain and the smoke 
of their burning cry out to Heaven and the Recording Angel has cer-
tainly entered these items against the names of Mr. Lloyd George and 
his French and Italian colleagues.”68 At the root of this analysis rested 
Toynbee’s belief that the humanitarian disaster at Smyrna, which 
included both Muslim and Christian victims, only exacerbated political 
tensions at home: “Who indeed would have believed beforehand that the 
tragedy in Anatolia would become good copy for a newspaper stunt or 
that the Conservative Party in Great Britain would be able to turn it to 
account for getting rid of Lloyd George?”69
Peace negotiations with the Ottoman Empire put new pressure on the 
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old question of British responsibility for the protection of Near Eastern 
Christians. The government keenly understood the difficulty of answer-
ing to a public that both continued to give generously to the LMF, Friends 
of Armenia, and other aid organizations and wanted the war to end. 
Political lobbying organizations like the BAC tried to square the circle by 
supporting a national solution enforced by Britain that offered protection 
for minority populations within ethnically organized nation-states. In 
1921 Aneurin Williams wrote to Lord Curzon in support of this plan, but 
Curzon dismissed it as naïve: “You cannot expect this country (or indeed 
any other) arbitrarily to select a portion of Turkey, to eject all other 
races, to concentrate within a ring of British bayonets a large number of 
destitute refugees and so to organise an Armenian national existence at 
immense expense to the British taxpayer.” As Curzon patronizingly con-
cluded, “You really must trust the government who are just as humane 
as you are, to do their best. Quite the worst thing, I am sure, is to despair 
either of your own country or of the race in whose fate you have always 
shown so devoted and passionate an interest.”70
reviSing The Peace
Lausanne put Curzon’s “humane” Near Eastern policy to the test. The 
failure of Sevres made a new treaty inevitable, a process that languished 
until after the burning of Smyrna. Less than two months after the last 
fires died out the Allies were back at the table with the new nationalist-
led Turkish government and ready to make the necessary concessions for 
peace. The final agreement reflected the new reality. “Though Turkey had 
shared the final defeat of the Central Powers, the nationalists had never 
ceased fighting,” one commentator observed. “In peace conferences there 
should be a victor and a vanquished, but at Lausanne the vanquished had 
become victorious and the partner of the former victors had been woe-
fully defeated.”71 The powerful position of the new Kemalist government, 
on the heels of its victory over Greek forces, meant that Britain occupied a 
much weaker position than it had at the time of the 1918 Armistice. Over 
the seven months of negotiations at Lausanne the entire Sevres agree-
ment came under scrutiny, particularly the minority treaty section. The 
ending of the Allied occupation of Constantinople and the so-called free-
dom of the Straits, which sought to keep open key shipping waterways 
that connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, also topped the agenda. 
On the eve of the opening of the Lausanne Conference, one newspaper 
headline summed up the British position: “Constantinople must not be 
allowed to be a second Smyrna.”72
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Key to the revision process was sorting out claims and defining the 
status of Christian minorities in the Near East. The experiences of two 
consular officials who worked on the minority provisions reveal how 
Britain came to define this responsibility. Sir Andrew Ryan and Sir 
Robert Graves came of age in the early days of the Levant Consular 
Service. Graves, a member of a prominent Anglo-Irish family, was part 
of a first generation of Levant trainees. After completing a student-
interpreter training course in Constantinople in 1879 he served under 
Henry Layard at Constantinople and later in the consulates at Sofia and 
Erzeroom. Ryan, the son of an Irish candle maker, entered consular 
service twenty years later, attending Queen’s College in Cork and Kings 
College London before being sent by the Foreign Office to Cambridge 
in April 1897 for further language training.73 He moved from dealing 
with the woes of the British and Maltese colony at Constantinople, which 
he called a “chronicle of trifling affairs,” to service at the embassy in 
1907, serving under Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. Though Ryan described his 
tasks as “still non-political” they put him in touch with “the affairs of 
the numerous British churches, schools and charitable institutions in the 
Turkish Empire.” Eventually, Ryan came to spend more and more time at 
the seat of Ottoman government affairs at the Sublime Porte.74
The war offered new challenges for these two old hands. Graves served 
as an interpreter for the army at Gallipoli and later came to join the 
Constantinople staff at the time of the Greek landing in Smyrna in 1919. 
Meanwhile, Ryan waited for an opportunity at Constantinople in his new 
post at the Foreign Office, which had taken on more responsibility coor-
dinating the war effort. The defeat at Gallipoli forced Ryan to wait his 
time out in London. The signing of the Armistice with Turkey brought 
this period to an “abrupt end” and that day he found himself on his way to 
Constantinople. “We had fancy titles to mark the fact that Great Britain 
was still in a state of war with Turkey,” he recalled of his early days at 
the embassy.75 Affairs in Constantinople after the Armistice continued 
in a state of flux. Allied diplomats descended on the scene, adding to the 
confusion: “There were large numbers of Allied warships in the port. The 
presence of so many authorities was all the more confusing as their posi-
tion in relation to each other and to the Turkish Government had still to 
be defined.”76
Ryan was assigned to a special section of the High Commission 
designed to “deal with the affairs of Armenian and Greek victims of 
persecution.” As Ryan understood his role, “The Greeks had suffered 
greatly before the war and probably during it, though anything they 
Smyrna’s Ashes   /    161
suffered from 1915 to 1918 was overshadowed by the persecution of the 
Armenians, most of whom had been deported or massacred. We had in 
the British High Commission an Armenian and Greek section for the 
purpose of redressing their wrongs.”77 Graves upon his arrival in 1919 
joined the Armenian and Greek Section (AGS), as it came to be called, 
as a military attaché with special responsibilities that included the “res-
cue of Armenian and Greek women and children who had been forcibly 
converted to Islam from the Turkish houses and institutions into which 
they had been taken, and also obtain the restitution of their rights to 
owners of Christian properties which had been arbitrarily confiscated.” 
The AGS also employed “Relief Officers with knowledge of the country 
and the languages” to report “on the condition of the native Christians 
who had remained in the interior, and in ministering to their needs as 
far as they were able.”78 Ryan took part in similar efforts; corresponding 
with relief workers and taking part in British and American efforts to 
repatriate Armenian girls.79
This work deeply involved these two relatively minor officials in 
treaty negotiations over the minority question. Graves had witnessed 
the opening drama of the Constantinople War Crimes tribunals in May 
of 1919, when the British “arrested and deported to Malta . . . the leading 
members of the Committee of Union and Progress.”80 In July, after being 
put in charge of the AGS he exercised influence over responses to U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson’s scheme for Armenia and Kurdistan. Graves 
“was not a little pleased to find that Admiral Webb concurred entirely 
in my views on a subject with which I had been familiar for more than 
a quarter century and to know that they went to Paris as his own con-
sidered opinion.”81 Ryan, too, took a role in Sevres. As he claimed of his 
own motivations regarding the minority issue: “We were dealing with a 
country which under its then rulers, had stabbed us in the back in 1914 
which had shown hostility to foreign interests, which seemed unlikely to 
be able to work out its own financial and economic salvation, and which 
above all (in my view) could not be trusted with the fate of its minorities, 
to judge by the merciless persecution of the Armenians during the war. 
Rightly or wrongly, these were the ideas which inspired all discussions in 
responsible Allied circles.”82
Focus on the minority question as a problem of reform ultimately 
failed to sustain Sevres just as it had the Treaty of Berlin a generation 
earlier. Graves remembered that as early as 1919 that “[o]wing to the 
reduction of relief funds things were going badly with the Armenian and 
Greek Section and reports from our Relief Officers told of growing inse-
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curity in the interior and difficulties in obtaining the release of Islamized 
women and children and the restitution of confiscated Christian prop-
erty.”83 By the end of the year, the Supreme Council of the Allies had 
rejected appeals from the Armenian and Greek patriarchs for relief funds 
just as word of new massacres in Cilicia reached the embassy after a visit 
from the Bishop of Gibraltar and two American aid workers. “The year 
1919 had ended with the rejection by the Supreme Council of the Allies 
of an appeal from the Armenian and Greek Patriarchates for an advance 
of funds for their distressed communities,” Graves remembered. “I began 
the New Year with a sense of depression and the fear that the hopes 
which I had founded on our victory in the East were in danger of being 
disappointed.”84
Under these changed conditions, Graves continued his work on the 
minority sections of Sevres: “[I]n my capacity as head of the Armenian 
and Greek section I drafted proposals for the protection of Minorities 
and the restitution of confiscated Christian property in Turkey as well 
as for the exemption of the properties of Christian Ottoman subjects in 
the territories of the Allied Powers from seizure and liquidation for the 
payment of reparations.” Graves was informed that his proposal had been 
recommended for inclusion in the treaty. His memoirs, like Ryan’s, show 
a keen connection to the work that he performed for the AGS. Later he 
reflected that he regretted turning down a post in Bulgaria (a country 
that he “retained a lingering sympathy for”), having thought that he 
“might yet do useful service in the work which had been the chief inter-
est in my life for so many years, namely the protection of the Christian 
minorities in Turkey.”85
Peace negotiations started at Sevres had little hope for going for-
ward as the new nationalist government took hold of the city of 
Ankara. Meanwhile, the Allies shuffled top diplomatic posts in far-off 
Constantinople in the futile hope of regaining influence.86 The failure of 
the London Conference in February 1921 between the Turkish nationalist 
government and Allied representatives made the British give up on the 
possibility of leading the charge in brokering a settlement regarding the 
minority question. Disappointment with the outcome of the conference 
coupled with budgetary constraints “marked [the AGS] for suppression at 
the end of the year 1921.” It also ended Graves’s more than forty years of 
continuous service with the Foreign Office.87 After retirement he worked 
with the LMF and later joined Ann Mary Burgess at Corfu, where along 
with his sons he supported her rug factory and work with Armenian and 
Greek refugees.88 During the mid-1920s he served on the Greek Refugee 
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Settlement Commission. Ryan, however, remained a steady presence in 
peace negotiations through to the Lausanne Conference. His role as a 
delegate made him “mostly occupied with questions concerning minori-
ties and the position of foreigners and their interests in Turkey.” In one of 
his final acts in Constantinople he served as interpreter to the last sultan 
in a meeting with Rumbold immediately before the two men departed for 
Lausanne on November 15.
At Lausanne, diplomats led by Lord Curzon kept pressure on the 
minority question. Historians have focused on Curzon’s obsession at 
the conference with grabbing hold of the administration of oil-rich 
Mesopotamia, which according to G. D. Clayton paved the way for “a new 
British Middle Eastern empire  . . . between the Mediterranean and the 
Persian Gulf.”89 This certainly played a role in British perceptions of its 
role in the region. Curzon’s understandings of the minority question at 
the conference also loomed large. Determined to serve as the conference’s 
president, Curzon provided the moral argument for what he called the 
“unmixing populations” that he claimed would protect survivors of the 
Genocide and Smyrna disaster. The dividing of states along religious 
lines he argued would also best serve British political interests in the 
“changed conditions in the Near East.”90
Lausanne was Curzon’s conference, but it was the League of Nations 
that had the final say regarding minorities. In a changing geopoliti-
cal order international bodies like the League would eventually sup-
plant the British Empire’s historical leadership on the issue of minority 
protection. Curzon dedicated three sittings of the conference to the 
problem of minorities although, according to Harold Nicolson, he fully 
realized that Turkish negotiators would not agree to outside interfer-
ence, British or otherwise, regarding how to deal with the remaining 
Christian population.91 The League of Nations’ High Commissioner 
for Refugees Dr.  Fridtjof Nansen offered Curzon a way out that fit 
neatly with Curzon’s own geopolitical and ethnographic world view. 
Nansen proposed a population exchange between European Muslims 
and Ottoman Christians. His plan ultimately would be responsible for 
displacing approximately 1.2 million Orthodox Christians and 400,000 
Muslims. The plan called for Christian and Muslims to switch places, 
with Christian minorities going to Greece and Muslim minorities going 
to Turkey.92
This proposal reflected a subtle but important difference in how 
Lausanne categorized minorities. In the Lausanne Treaty the category 
of “Moslem and non-Moslem” replaced a more diverse characterization 
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of minority communities embodied in Sevres that favored the use of 
the term “racial minorities” and “non-Turkish” as categories over specifi-
cally religious characterizations.93 These new categorizations drew upon 
timeworn Victorian understandings of ethnographical difference. At the 
same time Lausanne’s architects refined categories of difference to make 
religion distinct from ethnicity. Understanding the conflict in the stark 
terms of Muslim versus non-Muslim obscured the referent that had ani-
mated British humanitarianism in the Near East starting in the Crimean 
War. The Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks became part of a catchall 
category of minority victims defined in opposition to Islam.
After arriving in Constantinople early in 1923 Ryan remarked that “[w]
e found the city greatly changed. The Allied occupation still continued in 
theory, but, apart from the presence of troops and warships, it had little 
life in it.” Back in Britain, a similar sentiment pervaded. In July 1923, 
the Daily Express caricatured the conference in a cartoon entitled “The 
Woman of No Importance.” The image depicted “a dejected goddess car-
rying a cage in which was a dove shedding copious tears through the 
wires.”94 Peace with Turkey excited little interest at home with the excep-
tion of those who, like Ryan, worried that the price of ending the war 
at Lausanne was the “final death-blow” to the possibility of coexistence 
between Muslims and Christians in the Near East. “We took home peace 
without great honour,” Ryan concluded, “Still it was peace, after close on 
five years of armistice.”95
Back in Smyrna, one British observer watched the Turkish buildup of 
arms along the coast: “Tomorrow will see the end of the Allied Occupation 
and we shall have a division moving in on the 5th and 6th.. The Christians 
are, as you can imagine very anxious as to what will happen to them.”96 
By this time, however, the vast majority of Turkey’s Christian inhabit-
ants had succumbed to deportations, massacres, and the fire at Smyrna. 
The remainder faced a new life as refugees exiled by a peace treaty that 
legitimated the nationalist solution to the minority problem enacted by a 
dying Ottoman Empire.
diSPlaced PeoPleS
The more than one million Greek, Armenian, and Assyrian refugees that 
flooded Greece from the Ottoman Empire served as a grim reminder that 
the minority question still lingered as a humanitarian and political prob-
lem. After Smyrna, “Christian Minorities,” according to one observer, 
“became synonymous with the word refugees.” Greece willingly took 
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in all refugees expelled from the Ottoman Empire as a condition of the 
Lausanne negotiations but now faced its own crisis, with twenty percent 
of its population during the mid-1920s holding refugee status.97 Greece 
and the League of Nations looked for help mainly from Britain, France, 
and the United States, countries with strong ties to these new stateless 
peoples. The British government accepted relatively few refugees from 
this category and funded even fewer projects related to resettlement. 
The public, however, continued to give. Private charities like Save the 
Children, the Lord Mayor’s Fund, and the Society of Friends Relief orga-
nization scrambled to fund projects that served a population of displaced 
civilians scattered outside of the boundaries of the Near East.
Described as a “problem of colossal dimensions,” the postwar pro-
cess of what Curzon had called the “unmixing populations” officially 
commenced in January 1923.98 The uncertain status of Armenians and 
Assyrians made theirs a particularly difficult case long before that date.99 
The virtual elimination of the entire Christian population in Anatolia 
after Smyrna put pressure on the surrounding regions at a time when 
the Armenian national question remained unresolved.100 In addition to 
Greece, Armenians and Assyrians found their way to British-mandated 
territories in Mesopotamia, settlements in Erivan, the core of the even-
tual Soviet territory of Armenia, and French-mandated territories in 
Syria. Strict immigration controls meant that few ended up in Britain 
itself. The founding of an Orthodox Armenian church in Iverna Gardens 
in Kensington in 1922 offered a token symbol of London’s small Armenian 
community.101 The tightening of immigration restrictions before the war 
accelerated in the postwar period further confined the settlement of refu-
gees to the regions bordering the former Ottoman Empire.102
This closed-door policy left officials desperate to find a solution that 
diffused blame for the refugee crisis and cost taxpayers as little as pos-
sible.103 When Aneurin Williams accused Curzon of not providing a safe 
haven for Armenians massacred at Cilicia after the French withdrawal 
in 1921, Curzon shot back: “What would you have us do? It is a practi-
cal impossibility to accommodate them in Cyprus, Egypt, Mesopotamia 
or Palestine  . . . Further there is no money to defray accommodation 
were it available.”104 Another answer was to transfer responsibility to 
Commonwealth countries. New Zealand, Australia, and Canada previ-
ously had expressed a desire to take refugees willing to work the land. 
After Smyrna, the Foreign Office put pressure on these countries to 
take new refugees. As one official phrased the appeal to Commonwealth 
countries, “many of these Christian refugees are industrious people 
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accustomed to pastoral and agricultural pursuits and constitute desir-
able immigrants.”105 The Australian government objected: “[T]he migra-
tion policy of the Commonwealth is confined to British people under the 
Empire Settlement Act . . . . The High Commissioner regrets that the 
suggestion for the absorption in Australia of a number of Armenians 
cannot be considered at present.” Other Foreign Office appeals yielded 
a similar response. New Zealand was “prepared to consider individual 
applications” but refused to take a large number of Greek, Armenian, or 
Assyrian refugees.106 Canada eventually relented and took a group of 
orphan children.107
In the end, many seemed satisfied to turn to charity appeals rather 
than face the potential flood of immigrants at British ports. The LMF 
declared that Britain would join her allies “in taking the first steps toward 
the liquidation of Allied obligations to the Armenian People” by help-
ing in resettlement efforts abroad.108 In a June 1920 advertisement in 
the English Review, Save the Children appealed for funds to serve the 
“5 million children starving in Central Europe and Near East.” Another 
paper dubbed Save the Children part of “The New Army of Helpers” in 
the fight to help refugee children. The BAC launched numerous cam-
paigns between January and March 1920 in the Times on behalf of “Near 
East” aid organizations. Appeals continued throughout the 1920s. The 
Bishop of London joined with the LMF in taking up the cause of rescuing 
kidnapped “slave girls.”109 A Friends of Armenia appeal in the Saturday 
Review read, “The Refugee — and an opportunity,” calling for support of 
an agricultural relief work scheme for Armenian refugees “who were the 
first nation to embrace the Christian faith” in French-mandated Syria.110 
Another appeal asked, “What are you doing for Armenia?”111
A difficult question indeed. The geographic scope of the refugee crisis 
spread private and government relief efforts thin. Charities like the LMF 
began to oversee several relief efforts initially funded by the British gov-
ernment.112 In 1922, refugee relief efforts were grouped together under 
the heading of the British Relief Mission.113 One of the earliest and largest 
government-initiated programs was the refugee camp established thirty 
miles northeast of Baghdad at Bakuba in December 1918.114 Lt. Dudley 
Stafford Northcote, a Cambridge graduate and grandson of the Earl of 
Iddesleigh, recorded in a series of letters home his three-year experience 
running the camp. Northcote, untrained in relief work, left his regiment 
after the signing of the Armistice with Turkey to find himself in charge 
of 1,300 Armenian and Assyrian refugees from eastern Anatolia (mainly 
Urmiah and Van) with the help of five British soldiers.
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Northcote’s new job assisting the repatriation of refugees, he admitted 
in a letter to his mother, was “quite a change from soldiering.”115 By spring 
1919, the camp’s population had swelled to house 30,000 Assyrians and 
15,000 Armenian refugees. Northcote settled into his role, learning 
Armenian, participating in the daily life and rituals of the refugees, and 
even playing tennis on the newly built courts at Bakuba.116 His early 
assessment of the situation, drawn from Reuters news reports, made him 
cautiously optimistic. He believed that his temporary position would 
continue until peace negotiations decided “which great Power is going to 
take the regions to which the refugees have got to be repatriated.”117 The 
repatriation process began in August 1920, as refugees were moved to 
Nahr-Umar, intended as a transitional camp outside of Basrah.
Contrary to Northcote’s belief, the awarding of the Mesopotamian 
mandate to Britain had done little to help refugees at Nahr-Umar. For 
the Assyrians, the unraveling of Sevres coupled with resistance from 
local inhabitants to resettlement activities slowed the process of repa-
triating them around Mosul.118 Private, public, and League of Nations 
interests all got involved in the resettlement process. The British contin-
ued to participate in the scheme on the grounds that the Assyrians had 
helped the Allies and consequently suffered brutal massacres during the 
war.119 As one aid worker put it, Britain would “never abandon a friend.”120 
With funds administered by the LMF, private appeals met the need of 
£6,000 to supply three months of relief measures. Regular reports to the 
Treasury chronicled how money was being spent.
The LMF soon ran out of money, forcing the fund to appeal to the gov-
ernment for help in anticipation of growing need. A population of around 
15,000 Assyrians scattered throughout the Mediterranean had requested 
help settling in the British mandated territory in Mesopotamia.121 
According to one Foreign Office official, the government, while in sym-
pathy with the plight of the Assyrians, denied the possibility of the use 
of public funds but claimed that “the Archbishop of Canterbury is being 
asked whether money can be raised privately.”122 As one official con-
cluded, “there is no prospect of funds being provided by His Majesty’s 
Government for the repatriation or maintenance of these unfortunate 
people.”123 The government, however, continued its arms-length involve-
ment with Assyrian humanitarian efforts. In the end, the British and 
Iraqi government and philanthropic organizations together would con-
tribute £300,000 to resettlement efforts.
Resettling Armenians from the camp proved equally difficult. The 
League of Nations under High Commissioner Nansen and U.S. President 
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Wilson recognized the unstable region of Erivan, precariously situated 
between Turkey and Russia, as a national homeland for Armenians. 
Proposals for an Allied mandate for the region were initially put forth at 
the San Remo conference in April 1920. Eventually negotiators rejected 
the mandate and supported establishing an Armenian state outside of the 
region of historic Armenia where few Armenians currently lived. The 
founding of Armenia on a small, 11,500 mi2 piece of land on the border of 
the Ottoman Empire further distanced Britain from Anatolian concerns. 
After a brief period of independence as a republic, in 1922 this region 
became the Soviet Republic of Armenia and is today the independent 
Republic of Armenia.124
Logistical problems around the transporting of refugees from Basra 
to Erivan meant that by July 1921 Northcote found himself in charge 
of 13,000 Armenian refugees with nowhere to go.125 The government 
announced plans in summer 1921 that it would close the camp on the 
grounds that it had already cost British taxpayers too much. A small food 
ration was offered to refugees willing to leave voluntarily. Northcote, 
having lived with the refugees for almost three years, refused along with 
his staff, as he put it, to send “women and children out of their tents” 
into the desert. Upon hearing of the plan, the BAC contacted the Colonial 
Office on behalf of the refugees, arguing successfully for more time. The 
group also worked to get Northcote’s message out to the public that the 
£1.5 million spent on the Armenian refugees would be thrown away with 
little to show for humanitarian efforts.126
The public campaign that ensued led to a compromise that put the 
LMF in charge of administrative functions that later brought the refu-
gees to Erivan. Northcote, now an employee of the LMF, agreed to stay 
on and take the refugees to Erivan with the fund’s secretary, Rev. Harold 
Buxton. The government reluctantly continued its involvement. Steadily 
deteriorating conditions in Erivan due to famine and the overwhelm-
ing flow of refugees (more than 1,000 persons per day from all over the 
region) meant more appeals from the LMF.127 Eventually, the govern-
ment High Commission granted £35,000 that Buxton and Northcote 
administered through the fund to close the final chapter on Nahr-Umar. 
Meanwhile, Save the Children donated another £10,000 for this work as 
Northcote raised additional funds by selling refugee lace work in Britain 
until the mid-1920s.128
By this time, the settlement of refugees from the former Ottoman 
Empire had become a global rather than regional problem. As Nansen put 
the case in January 1923, “the presence in Greece of such a vast number 
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of refugees for whom no livelihood can be found constitutes a problem 
with which the Greek government cannot hope to deal unless its efforts 
are supported by the outside world. Capital is needed for the settlement 
of these refugees and is needed at once.”129 Although the British offered 
relatively little in terms of cash, a network of consular officials, civil ser-
vants, and private citizens were hard at work.130 Britain’s chargé d’affaires 
in Athens, C. H. Bentinck, helped coordinate the aid efforts of the British 
Red Cross in Athens and oversaw camps on the outskirts of Athens for 
the more than one million refugees “scattered in large and small groups” 
and speaking over half a dozen languages who had come from “Smyrna, 
Syria, Armenia, Eastern Thrace and areas bordering the Black Sea.”131
Eager to end temporary camps and see the permanent settlement of 
refugees, aid workers understood that “extraneous relief must sooner 
or later come to an end.” To this end, organizations began to appeal “to 
the philanthropy of the people of our Empire to help.” The need, how-
ever, continued to overwhelm aid efforts. In late 1922 13,000 refugees 
had landed in Corfu alone, with the total number in Greece growing to 
868,186, with another 52,000 expected to arrive shortly thereafter.132 
Fear of epidemics setting in with the arrival of hot weather led to a num-
ber of stopgap measures that did little to stem the overall crisis. Outside 
of Athens the Stringos Camp, New Phalerum, held 4,000 refugees under 
the care of the British Relief Committee; its unhealthy conditions worried 
Bentinck.133 In February 1923 he tried to get his counterpart in Cyprus, 
Malcolm Stevenson, to admit around forty Armenian Orphans to the 
Adventist Mission School by assuring him that the mission and not the 
government or the community would support the children.134
When Save the Children pulled out of Greece during the mid-1920s 
one of the things that worried Bentinck most was the thought that the 
British would not get credit for all of the work it had done on behalf of 
refugees.135 An assessment of this role came in the form of the refugee 
survey done by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in the late 
1930s. Britain had earned a “prominent role” in “international work for 
refugees” based largely on the work of private relief societies, according 
to the report. The LMF, the Society of Friends, and Save the Children all 
received praise, as did the efforts of individuals including Lord Robert 
Cecil and Lord Cranborne in connection with the League of Nations. 
British loans to Greece and Bulgaria through the League and money 
given to help in the settlement of Assyrian refugees also received men-
tion. In the final assessment, however, Britain no longer held claim to 
the leadership role it once had regarding minority protection in a newly 
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reconfigured East. As the report concluded: “It is doubtful, however, if this 
international work, largely personal and periodic is a sufficient contribu-
tion when measured by the stand of those made by other countries.”136
kiTh and kin in The ForMer near eaST
The postwar crisis opened up a new category of refugee that further 
tested bonds with the people of the Near East. Refugees who claimed 
British citizenship and lived in the Ottoman Empire, included in the 
broad category of “Levantines,” faced a particular set of challenges after 
Smyrna. Levantine inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire strongly identi-
fied with Britain. Though many had never stepped foot in England they 
held British passports and expected the government to help them during 
the crisis. After all, the government sent ships to Smyrna in the first place 
to assist in the evacuation of this Levantine population. Soon the plight 
of displaced Levantines began to mirror that of the Greek, Armenian, and 
Assyrian refugees. When it came to British subjects claiming asylum, 
officials found themselves stuck between a largely haphazard refugee 
policy and the demands of distressed individuals claiming citizenship 
rights.
A notice posted at the four points of embarkation around Smyrna in 
early September 1922 defined the limits of the government’s responsibil-
ity for Levantines. Since the decision to leave was voluntary the govern-
ment would not provide maintenance for any refugee after they disem-
barked: “nor will you be entitled to claim any compensation against the 
British Government for any damage to your property or losses sustained 
in consequence of your departure” (see figure 24).137 British refugees 
found themselves scattered in settlements throughout the Mediterranean 
after the evacuation of Smyrna. Cyprus and Malta proved the most obvi-
ous stopping points due to their connection with the Empire, though 
some Levantines also ended up in Athens. 
Support did eventually come from the government, but as a series of 
letters to the British legation at Athens from Smyrna refugees revealed, 
the allowance was “hardly enough to keep body and soul together.”138 
A letter signed by “ONE OF THE MANY UNFORTUNATE SMYRNA 
REFUGEES” angrily countered suggestions that the evacuees find jobs 
instead of asking for help from the government, attesting that “we are 
not beggars. . . . All we ask for is fair play and we are not getting it and 
you are aware of the fact. Hoping you will do your best for us and I trust 
that you will if you are British.”139 Word that their allowance would be 
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totally stopped reached the colony in early December. “A BRITISH LADY 
SMYRNA REFUGEE” pleaded their case to Athens and London, call-
ing the action “most unfair. We cannot find work here and we have lost 
everything through no fault of our own.”140 These appeals left the lega-
tion scrambling for an answer. London had the final say and Bentinck 
could do little to hurry their decision even though his staff believed that 
cutting the allowance “would involve hardship.”141
Those with more ambiguous claims on British citizenship joined 
the hundreds and thousands of stateless refugees throughout the 
Mediterranean desperate to find a new home country. When Nicholas 
Sanson and Henry Martin applied for passports from the British Consul 
at Smyrna in late September 1922 they had little to attest to their citizen-
ship status apart from their Anglo-sounding names. The fire had made 
them into undocumented refugees, emergency passholders number 84 
and 90, respectively, dependent on foreign aid supplied by the British 
Figure 24. The voluntary evacuation order from 
Smyrna for British subjects. S. L. Vereker Papers, 
IWM, 75/87/1.
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government and relief organizations. One a clerk claiming Maltese citi-
zenship and the other a shoemaker with a British father, Joseph James 
Martin, they eventually solicited the help of the consul, who protested 
the denial of their application to Foreign Office officials. Both had Greek 
mothers and had been granted emergency passes and a small allowance 
in local currency to help them in get to Malta. There they met up with 
Sanson’s English-speaking cousin, who traveled with them to London. 
Authorities turned away these men at Dover because they did not have 
passports or speak English. They were refused passage back to Malta on 
grounds that they could not produce proof of British citizenship. The two 
men “languished” at Calais during the winter of 1922 as officials tried to 
sort things out.142
Bentinck intervened on the behalf of these two men since he initially 
had granted the passes while working with the Smyrna consulate after 
the fire. “They could not produce to me absolute proof of nationality and 
that is why I gave Passes and not passports,” Bentinck claimed, “but I feel 
pretty certain that with names like theirs they must really be British sub-
jects.” He made the case for their citizenship by arguing that “the character 
and composition of the late British colony at Smyrna consisting largely 
of what are known locally as ‘Levantines’ must be fully understood at 
the Foreign Office. These unfortunate people have no particular connec-
tion with any other part of the world. Smyrna was their home in every 
sense of the word as refugees they are unwelcome wherever they go, but 
it seems particularly pathetic that they should actually be prevented from 
setting foot on English soil.”143 Levantines had enjoyed British nationality 
as a result of the capitulations with Turkey and their connections with 
the Levant Company, he argued, even though many had intermarried. 
After checking with local sources he claimed that the names of Sanson 
and Martin were still well known in the Levantine community alongside 
Whittall, Patterson, and other prominent families. Later, the then acting 
consul at Smyrna questioned this assertion, claiming that he could find 
no evidence of employment or citizenship.144
The case of Sanson and Martin appealed to Bentinck. Eager to defend 
his granting of the passes in the first place, he also held a larger concern 
for the Levantine community, which he believed held legitimate citizen-
ship claims. “The case in point appears to me is to be a particularly hard 
one,” he wrote to his superiors at the Foreign Office in January 1923. 
“These people bear English names and the presumption is that their claim 
to British nationality is a true one. In the circumstances in which the 
flight from Smyrna took place, it seems more than probable that their 
Smyrna’s Ashes   /    173
papers, like their clothing and all their worldly goods were lost. There 
would surely appear to be no justification for allowing them in the face 
of the evidence produced to be stranded in France or in Greece, countries 
to whose hospitality they could produce no possible claim.” In this line of 
thinking Sanson and Martin were British by association if not blood. As 
Bentinck concluded, “I trust your lordship may be able to obtain permis-
sion for these people to set foot upon the soil of the only country in the 
world to whose protection they can lay claim.”145 The fire had exposed the 
unusual status of the Levantine community, a not-quite British mixed-
race element that now showed up on England’s shores claiming citizen-
ship rights. The controversy continued through April, with Bentinck 
defending the claims of Levantines above other refugees like those from 
Bolshevist Russia who “bore far less respectably British” credentials.146 
For Bentinck the historic status of Levantines trumped the problem of 
their mixed origins and questionable citizenship status.
For Lord Curzon, this case tested his own ambivalence regarding 
Britain’s moral responsibility for this population. He intervened in 
November, asking that immigration authorities demonstrate “leniency” 
regarding Sanson and Martin. Curzon insisted “that refugees from the 
Near Eastern theatre of war, whose claim to British nationality appears 
doubtful to the immigration officers, might be given the benefit of the 
doubt unless there are very special reasons to the contrary.”147 He ulti-
mately failed in his appeal. One Foreign Office official expressed fear 
that such a policy “would expose this country to the flood of refugees 
from Smyrna.” This led to a policy that demanded “prima facie evidence of 
British nationality.”148 Britain’s “excessively cautious post-War immigra-
tion policy” led some in the international community to question why a 
country that had traditionally served as a place of asylum had not in this 
moment “shown a braver record as a country of sanctuary.”149 As individu-
als of mixed race, half Greek and half British, Sanson and Martin existed 
in a space between two worlds, stranding them in Calais, where their 
story disappears from the historical record. On one side they belonged 
to a once-prosperous European community that had for centuries domi-
nated commercial life in the Levant. On the other, they bore the mark of a 
persecuted, displaced group of Christian minorities, a stigma that would 
ultimately deny them a home in Britain.
The disaster at Smyrna and the seemingly unsolvable postwar refugee 
crisis further blurred the lines between humanitarianism and foreign 
policy in a much changed world. Historians have tried to understand why 
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postwar policy and sentiment that continued to favor the special treat-
ment of persecuted minorities resulted in half measures that contributed 
to the growing refugee crisis after the war.150 What has been read as a 
gradual disengagement from Turkish affairs after the 1923 Kemalist 
revolution explainable by postwar political expediencies, the thirst for 
oil, and declining British power should also be understood as part of a 
longer story of failed humanitarian diplomacy that attempted to solve 
the problem of sectarian violence through the redrawing of the Near East 
as a patchwork of religiously and ethnically homogenous nation-states. 
In this context, Curzon’s support of the League of Nations’ proposal of 
a Muslim-Christian population exchange at Lausanne that ultimately 
legitimated the nationalist vision of “Turkey for the Turks” made sense.
After Smyrna, the moral certainty that guided humanitarian consid-
erations of the Eastern Question before the war offered little comfort 
to those displaced by this vision of the East starkly divided between 
Muslims and Christians. Seemingly reconfigured to fit postwar geopolit-
ical realities, the new map would nevertheless hold the indelible mark of 
the Victorian mapmaker who first imagined and charted these divisions. 
Ultimately, the ethnographic and religious world view that informed 
nineteenth-century understandings of the Near East found expression 
in a toxic nationalism that further sharpened divisions based on religion, 
ethnicity, and creed in a new Middle East.
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Looking back on his time as an interpreter in the Levant Consular Service 
after World War I, Laurence Grafftey-Smith reflected on how much the 
Victorian map of the world that he had grown up with had changed: “The 
perpetual kaleidoscope of Time, gently making nonsense of dynasties 
and institutions and established circumstance, confuses even the gazet-
teers. Where do the younger generation look to find Fashoda, Christiania 
or Mesopotamia, and who of my generation can recite the states and capi-
tals of independent Africa? There was once a Near Eastern Question, but 
where today is the Near East? The Middle East, remote sixty years ago, 
now encroaches on the Mediterranean.”1 This book has traced the birth of 
the Middle East in Western imaginings through a rather long and circu-
itous route. From its origins in the invention of the idea of the Near East 
after the Crimean War to its entry into common usage after World War 
I, the Middle East, as Grafftey-Smith’s nostalgic narrative map suggests, 
historically has been read through the lens of contemporary concerns. 
The Eastern Question offered a way of ordering and understanding the 
Near and, later, Middle East as a geographic idea in relation to the West. 
Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries map-
makers, diplomats, politicians, travelers, and missionaries participated in 
the invention of the Middle East as a cultural marker that helped define 
its relationship to both the British Empire and Europe.
Ultimately, the historical imprecision of the term “Near East” allowed 
for the expansion and contraction of its geographic and political reach. 
Its elasticity as a geographical descriptor had its final test during World 
War I, which forced the British to rethink their relationship to a wan-
ing Ottoman Empire. The military disaster at Gallipoli, coupled with 
the wartime genocide against Ottoman Armenians that the Allies were 
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unwilling and unable to stop, made the Near East seem distant. Indeed, 
the Western Front overshadowed the Eastern Front both during the war 
itself and in the peace negotiations with the Ottoman Empire, which did 
not see final resolution until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The postwar 
refugee crisis and new international alignments further strained his-
torical connections with the land and people of the Near East as Britain 
struggled to deal with displaced peoples from the region after the war.
The Near East, however, had always refused easy incorporation into 
a religious ideal that had its roots in Victorian debates over the Eastern 
Question. Being made up of a string of “Debatable Lands,” in the words 
of D. G. Hogarth, meant that the Near East and the people that inhabited 
it kept a temporal and geographic distance from Britain itself. The fail-
ure of projects like those spearheaded by the Church Missionary Society 
demonstrated the difficulty in making the kinship metaphor between 
Orthodox and Anglican Christians securely manifest. Part of the problem 
was the marginal status of mission work in the Ottoman Empire. Unlike 
Africa and India, two regions that received the majority of missionary 
attention, Near East missions continued to struggle for recognition and 
status. A lack of conversion among Muslims and Orthodox Christians 
in the region further hampered efforts to put this region at the center of 
evangelical thinking.
Rather than abandon this project, missionaries offered more expansive 
ways of seeing the Near East. On the eve of the war the Church Missionary 
Society offered supporters a “graphic sketch” of the “Near East” “written 
by one of our missionaries at work among Moslems in an Oriental land 
within the Turkish Empire.”2 Here the Near East is reintroduced to readers 
geographically as Asia Minor, Syria, and “Turkish Arabia” and culturally 
as one inhabited by Muslims. The subtext of the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire suggested that the Near East again proved ripe for missionary 
intervention. At the end of the war, missionaries reasserted the idea of 
the Near East as the Holy Land that stretched from the Mediterranean to 
the borders of India. “The Near East, although in a sense the oldest mis-
sion field of the Church, has not hitherto attracted much attention from 
the rank and file of the supporters of Christian missions,” one missionary 
journalist proclaimed. “The lands which lie between the Mediterranean 
and the frontier states of India were the cradle of our race and of our 
faith . . . the war has now drawn the world’s attention to these regions, 
and Christian people are opening their eyes to the strategic importance, 
from the missionary point of view of the lands of the Bible.3 The war had 
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brought the project of defining the Near East within the sphere of British 
geographical, cultural, and religious interests full circle as the granting 
of Britain the mandate over Mesopotamia and Palestine formalized its 
control over the “Holy Land.”
For Mark Sykes, the integrity of the idea of the Near East also revolved 
around its location as the birthplace of Christianity. His pamphlet “The 
Future of the Near East” (1918), published just after the war, defined the 
Near East as encompassing those regions within an “800 mile radius 
centered on Jerusalem” (figure 25). Sykes argued that peace in Europe 
depended on two things: preventing Turkey from “dividing Europe 
against itself” and “redeeming from bondage the Asiatic peoples whom 
the Turks have oppressed.” A month after the signing of the secret Sykes-
Picot agreement, which divided up the Ottoman Empire between Britain 
and France, a memorandum entitled “The Problem of the Near East” 
argued that success on the Eastern Front held the key to Allied success in 
the war. Sykes’s twin narratives of the Near East serve as a reminder that 
a religious conception of the Near East had its counterpoint in an impe-
rial and commercial narrative first conceived of after the Crimean War. 
This capacious vision of the Near East would not last long after the 
Figure 25. Mark Sykes’s map sketch 
on the cover of his pamphlet “The 
Future of the Near East” (London: 
Pelican Press, 1918), depicting his 
religious and geopolitical vision of 
the Near East.
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war. While Sykes was formulating his vision of a Near East centered at 
Jerusalem, other commentators began to revive the idea of the Middle 
East to describe these territories. The “middle east” had been used as a 
general descriptor of parts of the Ottoman Empire as early as 1876, but 
it was only given its geographical integrity and important capital let-
ters in the early twentieth century. Valentine Chirol used the term spe-
cifically to refer to “those regions of Asia which extend to the borders 
of India or command the approaches to India.”4 The idea of a “Middle 
East,” however, had lain dormant until after the war. Between April 1919 
and May 1921 Robert Machray published a series of three articles in the 
Fortnightly Review that reintroduced the Middle East: “The New Middle 
East” (April 1919), “The New Middle East in the Making” (October 1919), 
and “The Situation in the Middle East” (May 1921). By 1921, Machray 
offered his own definition after admitting “that the expression itself is 
one of convenience rather than of geographical correctness.” For Machray 
the Middle East in 1921 consisted of “Caucasia, Armenia, Cilicia, Syria, 
Palestine, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan Persia, Transcaspia, and part 
of Turkistan.” He had argued in an earlier piece that the new nations of 
the Balkans, once considered the beginning of Britain’s Near East were 
now “European nations.” This expansive definition left little room for a 
Near East that seemingly disappeared at the borders of a Turkish rump 
state. An invention of the twentieth century, the overlapping territories 
of Britain’s Middle East would replace outmoded Victorian traces of a 
region once so closely associated with the Eastern Question in the minds 
of the British.
New visual postwar representations of the region further indicated 
that the Near East had begun to lose its usefulness as a political cat-
egory. Harmsworth’s “New Atlas” of 1919 adopted the motto, “The World 
Remapped.” Its use of new lithograph techniques and inclusion of a 
“pictorial gazetteer” that used photos to tell stories made this an atlas 
targeted at the general reader. These were specifically English maps that 
did not follow in the tradition of German mapmakers who tended to 
include every name of every place. Though German maps might be more 
accurate, they were, according to the editor, “unreadable.” Large maps 
of Arabia and Persia were included alongside a thematic map entitled 
“Oriental Industries” that might have looked familiar to those who pur-
chased Harmsworth’s earlier edition (figure 26). This map had originally 
appeared titled as the “Near East” in the 1909 atlas, with some important 
exceptions. Consul stations, railway lines, cables, canals, steamship lines, 
and now wireless stations were designated much as they were ten years 
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earlier as were products, industries, and natural resources. Missing in 
Harmsworth’s new rendering was any reference to this region as the 
“Near East.” 
Two other major atlas projects of the interwar period showed only 
shadowy outlines of the Near East. The massive three-volume Times 
Atlas published in 1922 designated the region as “Persia” (figure 27). 
The “Near East” appeared in shaded type at the front of the Persia plate 
as in the index. Similarly, A. K. Johnston’s 1931 Atlas of World History, 
published for use in British classrooms, contained forty-nine thematic 
historical maps with only one reference to former Ottoman lands: “The 
Expulsion of Turkey from Europe,” a small inset map attached to a larger 
map of Europe.5
Still, the Near East lingered in the British imagination. Cecil Beaton 
was sent by the Ministry of Information at the beginning of World War 
II to take pictures and inform on the situation in Cairo, Alexandria, Iran, 
Iraq, and Syria. In his memoir entitled the Near East he drew a muddled 
and romantic portrait of the overlapping worlds of Middle and Near East: 
“I have discovered how ‘out of touch’ with their homes the men in the 
Middle East seem, it may be that, in spite of the ceaseless newspaper 
reports and countless books on the subject, the Near East is still, to many 
at home, a world apart, remote and mysterious. If so, it may not come 
amiss to give the immediate impression of an ordinary individual arriv-
ing in this utterly different atmosphere.”6
The idea of the Near East survived until World War II in part because 
it was a useful tool for explaining why Britons would care about the 
distant suffering of a small, persecuted minority living on the edge of 
Europe. By offering a face to the Eastern Question Christian minorities 
gave humanitarianism its subject. As that vision of a persecuted minor-
ity under the protection of the British Empire came under strain, the 
result of war and genocide, the Near East faded into the “utterly different 
atmosphere” of a new Middle East. Born out of debates over the Eastern 
Question, the idea of the Near East enabled Victorians to organize their 
world in terms of religious identities, which in turn shaped a generation 
of leaders who helped remake the region after the war. These men, many 
of whom had come of age in an era of Gladstonian moral certainty, par-
ticipated in the most extensive redrawing of the map to date, a process 
of erasure and invention that had the power to determine which things 
Figure 26 (overleaf). A Near East map now retitled “Oriental Industries,” from 
J. A. Hammerton, ed., Harmsworth’s Atlas of the World (London: Amalgamated 
Press, 1919).
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would be remembered and which forgotten. Choosing to remember the 
Eastern Question as primarily a set of geopolitical concerns while forget-
ting the humanitarian ethos that it inspired has rendered events like the 
Armenian Genocide and the burning of Smyrna as forgotten footnotes in 
the story of the Great War.
One of the latest maps with the designation “Near East” that I have 
located was published in 1939 (figure 28). Tucked away in the back of John 
Hope Simpson’s book The Refugee Problem, the map illustrates a freshly 
minted Near East with its boundaries drawn by the Treaty of Versailles 
and the Mandate Commission. Here the Near East is depicted at the cen-
ter not of the British Empire but of a world humanitarian crisis brought 
on by war, genocide, and a peace settlement that ossified the divisions 
between a Muslim East and Christian West. The authors of the report 
Figure 27. “Map of Persia,” shaded plate with reference to the Near East. Times’ 
Survey Atlas of the World (London, 1922).
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wondered why Britain, though generous with private aid relief, refused 
to follow other European capitals and accept destitute refugees from the 
Near East. With a new crisis on the horizon the peoples of the Near East 
were no longer distant kin but potential harbingers of a larger problem 
of decline. The problems of the Middle East, as this region would now be 
known, would be left for a new generation of politicians to solve. 
Figure 28. New postwar map of the Near East depicted as part of the worldwide 
refugee crisis. Reproduced from John Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem: 
Report of a Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), by permission of 
the publisher.
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